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Through Michel Foucault's theoretical tools in the realm of gender and sexuality, the present thesis 
provides a genealogical account of the transformation of same-sex relations into gay identity in 
Iran before and after starting modernization in the nineteenth century until the present. In this 
regard, this thesis focuses on the dialogue and relationships among gayness production, Iranian 
modernity, Western imperialism, and the Western discourse of sexuality. By doing so, this thesis 
shows that in contrast to the official discourse of the Islamic Republic and some academic assertion 
such as Joseph Massad’s ideas—that identities of gays and lesbians as well as homosexuals’rights 
are modern and Western hegemonic project, underpinned by exporting identities of gays and 
lesbians to the Middle East—firstly, modernity is not simply a Western hand-made product, and 
Iranian modernity is not merely a process of Westernization. Instead, it is a hybrid, innovative 
cultural grafting derived from both modern and traditional resources. Secondly, the notion of 
gayness as a function of modernity is not simply a Western product exported to Iran. On the 
contrary, Iranian gayness is a historical evolution produced within the Iranian biopolitical dispositif 
of sexuality that entails discursive practices and nationalist impulses of the nineteenth century and 
the Islamic regime's use of modern technologies of power such as psychology and psychiatry. 
Moreover, this thesis criticizes Massad’s denial of the Middle Eastern non-heterosexual’s agency 
and transformative capacity in regards to their sexual identities and argues that Iranian gay men 
themselves, by drawing on the Western-oriented notion of gay identity, have contributed to the 
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INTRODUCTION 
In September of 2007, controversial Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited the United 
States. He was in New York to attend a meeting at the United Nations. But his remarks during a 
conference at the Roone Arledge Auditorium at Columbia University received much more media 
attention than his meeting at the United Nations. Because when he was asked about the situation 
of homosexuals in Iran, he replied “in Iran, we don’t have homosexuals, like in your country”.1 
This denial of homosexual existence in Iran drew widespread criticism in the world. His 
spokesperson tried to explain that Ahmadinejad’s comment was misunderstood, that he just meant 
to say that Iran does not have many homosexuals compared to American society.2 However, the 
significance of Ahmadinejad’s claim has to be understood in the local context. Because, a couple 
of months after Ahmadinejad’s declaration at Columbia University, in November 2007, the Iranian 
Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, during a speech, stated that “homosexuality has become a 
huge issue in the West” and it “now poses a painful and unsolvable problem for Western 
intellectuals”.3 Even before Ahmadinejad’s controversial statement, in July 2002, a grand Iranian 
Ayatollah, Ebrahim Amini, expressed his hostility toward the West and stated that “gay and lesbian 
marriages reflect a weakness of the Western culture”.4  
Such anti-Western sentiments among Iranian officials trace back to the discourse of the 
toxic West or what eminent Iranian writer and critic Jalal Al-Ahmad conceptualized by the early 
1960s as gharbzadegi (Occidentosis). Through this concept, he depicted Western influences in 
Iran (such as industrialization, urbanization, and sexual policies of the Pahlavi era, including 
women’s emancipation) as a contagious disease, like the plague that aims to corrupt the 
authenticity of the Islamic and Iranian culture. This antagonistic approach toward the West has 
been part of official discourse since the establishment of the Islamic Republic (1979), depicting 
foreign elements as a disease that needs to be cured. Al-Ahmad proposes a solution to the harms 
                                                          
1 Brian Whitaker, “No Homosexuality Here”, The Guardian. (2007, September 25). Retrieved from 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2007/sep/ 25/nohomosexualityhere. 
2 Ali Delforoush, The Iranian Chronicles: Unveiling the Dark Truths of the Islamic Republic (USA, Bloomington: 
2012), 93.    
3 Qauted in Korycki and Nasirzadeh, “Homophobia as a tool of Statecraft Iran and Its Queers” in Global Homophobia, 
edts., Meredith L. Weiss and Michael J. Bosia (USA, the University of Illinois Press: 2013), 189.  
4 Fatemeh Aman and Bill Samii, “Iran: Is Tere an Anti-Homosexual Campaign?”, (accessed June 19, 2011).   
Available at http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/09/febbe245–8b6f-4d30-a77f-d0b40c23da05. 
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of this disease that entails a return to the roots of ‘authentic’ Islamic values.5 From its establishment 
in 1979, the Islamic state, in the expression of its national interest, often draws on Al-Ahmad’s 
discourse of cultural authenticity, meant as pure Iranian-Islamic culture vis-a-vis the 
contamination of the Western values. The official discourse on homosexuality also draws heavily 
on this discourse of authenticity, considering homosexuality as a disease that belongs to the toxic 
West that aims to impure the pure Islamic-Iranian culture.6 Therefore, Ahmadinejad’s Columbia 
talk should not be assumed as a naïve, hasty, and uncalculated reaction. Indeed, rejecting the 
existence of homosexual individuals in Iran, calling the phenomenon that belongs and only exists 
in the West is a rhetorical strategy and a part of the Islamic Republic’s official discourse in 
addressing homosexuality. 
In addition to the discourse of toxic West, the rejection of homosexuality by Iranian 
officials orbits around the notion of “the will not to know”7—a tactic that worked and still works 
against the enforcement of anti-homosexual laws in Muslim societies. This tactic denotes that 
despite strong Shari’a disapproval, same-sex desire and love has been implicitly recognized and 
tolerated as cultural practices as long as those men who desire such relations remain discreet while 
also respecting certain social conventions. In other words, in Muslim societies such as Iran, same-
sex relations have been an ‘open secret’, something neither talked about nor expressed in public.8 
Thus, when Ahmadinejad denied the existence of homosexuals, he was also referring to this 
cultural division between private and public spheres. Taking into account the qualification of this 
cultural point, Ahmadinejad’s meaning of his statement can be changed from “in Iran, we don’t 
have people who desire same-sex relations” into “in Iran, we don’t have people who identify 
themselves as homosexuals in the same way people do in the United States”. In other words, his 
remarks can be understood in different ways: that American gay culture does not exist in Iran, 
sexual identity categories are not cross-cultural, and there exists a traditional and nameless same-
sex relationship in Iran that is not compatible with the Western discourse of sexuality.  
                                                          
5 Jalal Al-Ahamd, Occidentosis: A Plague from the Western (USA: Mizan Press, 1984).  
6 Jón Ingvar Kjaran, Gay Life Stories:Same-Sex Desires in Post-Revolutionary Iran (Switzerland, Palgrave Macmillan: 
2019), 56. 
7 Stephen O. Murray, “The Will not to Know, Islamic Accommodations of Male Homosexuality” in Islamic 
Homosexualities: Culture, History, and Literature, eds. Stephen O. Murray, Will Roscoe (New York: New York 
University Press, 1997). 14-54. 
8 Kjaran, Gay Life Stories:Same-Sex Desires in Post-Revolutionary Iran, 2.  
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  However, while the audience in the Roone Arledge Auditorium at Columbia University 
laughed and booed at Ahmadinejad’s claims, in the same year and in the same place, Joseph A. 
Massad, an Associate Professor of Modern Arab Politics and Intellectual History, through his book 
Desiring Arabs9 legitimized Ahmadinejad’s remarks. Massad, in his theoretical foundations, 
draws on the works of Edward Said and Michel Foucault. In his critique of Orientalism, Said is 
blind to the issue of gender and sexuality in the East. However, Massad, who was his disciple at 
Columbia University, explores specifically the question of gender and sexuality in the Middle East. 
He investigates the role that sex and sexuality have played in the transformation of constructions 
of culture and politics in the Middle East in terms of their differences with the West. By adopting 
Said’s trend in postcolonialism, Massad argues that in present times the West views the Middle 
East as culturally, politically, and ‘sexually’ backward, but in the past, this was different: “While 
the pre-modern West attacked Islam’s alleged sexual licentiousness, the modern West attacks its 
alleged repression of sexual freedom in the present”.10  
Massad also reworks Foucault’s concept of the dispositif of sexuality, which refers to a 
mechanism of control concerning the individual’s body and management of the population as a 
whole. Through this concept, Foucault shows that the obsession with sexuality emerged in 
nineteenth-century middle-class European societies, and modern sciences of psychology, 
sociology, biology, and anthropology were used to understand and control ‘deviant’ sexual 
behaviors. This gave rise to the notions of sexual identity, particularly the idea that ‘homosexual 
and heterosexual’ are distinct types of persons. By drawing on Foucault, Massad goes one step 
forward and argues that in contemporary time, the Western dispositif of sexuality, particularly in 
the form of LGBTQ identities (he mostly refers to gay identity), has been deployed by the West 
as an ideological and political tool to construct a binary model by which America and Europe are 
depicted as civilized vis-a-vis the uncivilized societies of the Middle East with regards to the 
sexual/civil rights of gays and lesbians.11 Thus, while Foucault’s concept of homosexuality is a 
‘historical evolution’ that emerged in nineteenth-century Europe, the way Massad uses the concept 
of gayness is in the colonial settings within which international LGBTQI+ and human rights 
organizations or what he calls ‘Gay International’, in the name of saving Middle Eastern sexual 
                                                          
       9 Josph A. Massad, Desiring Arabs (University of Chicago Press, Chicago: 2007). 
10 Ibid., 175. 
11 Ibid., 6-9. 
 
  4  
 
minorities from their societies, export and impose a Western discourse of sexual understanding to 
produce and universalize Western sexual identity categories in the Middle East where only “the 
practitioners of the same-sex contact” exist.12 Massad, unlike Ahmadinejad, acknowledges that 
gay-identifying men exist in Iran and other Middle Eastern societies. But, in a shared agreement 
with Iranian officials, he views their gayness as a foreign element that has been exported and 
imposed on the Middle East by Gay International. He also produces a victimization discourse 
within which Middle Eastern sexual minorities are depicted as victims who blindly adopted these 
Western sexual identity categories.    
These arguments—imposition of Western sexual identity categories and victimization of 
Middle East’s sexual minorities—provoked me to investigate them in Iran, my home country, 
where a deep-rooted tradition of homoerotism exists in history and classical literature, but in 
contemporary time, homosexuality, as a Western trope of invasion, is criminalized and subjected 
to punishments ranging from flogging to the death penalty. In the Arab context, Massad’s 
argument is criticized by scholars, such as Samar Habib and Sahar Amer, who argue that Massad 
reduces homosexuality to the “practitioners of same-sex contact”,13while instances of passionate 
love between men in the Arab world exist and are “documented throughout the Arabic literary 
canon”, from the “Abbasid period to the Andalusian and Ottoman periods”, and it is not something 
simply imposed through Western contact.14 
In the case of Iran, however, Massad’s assertion has not been the subject of investigation. 
For example, Janet Afary in Sexual Politics in Modern Iran15 and Afsaneh Najmabadi in Women 
with Mustaches and Men without Beards: Gender and Sexual Anxieties of Iranian Modernity,16 
generally discuss the construction and transformation of gender and sexuality in pre-modern and 
modern Iran, but without having a particular sensibility and critical approach toward the issue of 
gayness production and its relation to the issues of imperialism, essentialism, and universalism of 
sexual identity categories. In Desiring Arabs, Massad focuses on the Arab world in particular and 
                                                          
12 Ibid., 177. 
13 Sahar Amer, “Joseph Massad and the Alleged Violence of Human Rights.” GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay 
Studies, (2010), 16(4), 649-653. 
14 Samar Habib, “Introduction” in Islam and Homosexuality, Volume One (USA, Praeger: 2010), xxx.     
15 Janet Afary, Sexual Politics in Modern Iran (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
16 Afsaneh Najmabadi, Women with Mustaches and Men without Beards: Gender and Sexual Anxieties of Iranian 
Modernity (California: California Press, 2005).  
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in the Middle East in general. He mentions ‘Iran’ several times to expand his argument—regarding 
the Gay International’s imposition of the Western dispositif of sexuality—into a non-Arab society 
in the Middle East. For example, he describes the efforts of human rights organizations to “stop 
the mass execution of homosexuals in Iran”; as an “unsubstantiated propagandistic claim” that is 
a part of Gay International’s “aggressive universalization campaign”. In this thesis, the main aim 
is to provide a genealogical account of the transformation of same-sex relations into gay 
identification in Iran from the nineteenth century until the present. However, since Massad’s 
academic assertions produce a discourse strikingly similar to that of the Islamic Republic, we need 
to bring his claims into an Iranian context, discuss them, and criticize them. Therefore, I investigate 
the production of Iranian gayness with a focus on the Massad’s account of imperialism and his 
critique of the Western hegemonic trajectory of the subject formation in the Middle East.  
Massad reworks Foucault’s category of the dispositif of sexuality in order to develop his 
argument regarding “Gay International’s incitement to discourse”.17 He argues that incitement to 
talk about sexuality as the "truth" of oneself represents an instrument of Western colonialism of 
the Middle East. In order to answer Massad, in this thesis, I also use Foucault’s concept of dispositif 
to investigate the production of Iranian gayness. My claim is that although homosexuality itself 
might be considered as a form of dispositif—produced in nineteenth-century Europe through the 
intersection of power, knowledge, and discourse—, homosexuals have historically resisted within 
this dispositif to transform themselves into ethical subjects who fight for their freedom and 
recognition. This happened in the West and is also happening in Iran. Through this thesis, I try to 
show how gayness is produced and developed in Iran and how gays, through their agency and 
transformative capacity, have constructed their own local gayness. 
This thesis includes two parts. In the first part, Rereading Foucault, Rethinking Sexuality, 
I lay out the theoretical foundation of my reflections mostly by drawing on Foucault’s theories. 
Foucault’s works are based on the historical development and social and cultural attributes of 
European societies. However, his writings on sexuality and their relations with discourse, power, 
subjectivity, and resistance have provided invaluable contributions to the subsequent studies of 
gender and sexualities, which cannot be limited merely to Western societies. His works on the 
history of Western desire and sexuality can be expanded to investigate the implications of gender 
                                                          
17 . Massad, Desiring Arabs,  
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and sexuality in the everyday life of non-Western societies. Moreover, Foucault is one of the few 
Western philosophers who traveled to Iran, and in his writings, he gave his exclusive support to 
the Islamist wing, and certain modalities of his works (such as power, subjectivity, and care of the 
self) resonated with revolutionary Islamist intelligentsia. In the first part, thus, I elaborate on 
Foucault’s account of sexuality and his conceptualizations on the repressive hypothesis, 
confession, power, subjectivity, dispositif, and his insights into the constitution of the practice of 
self within different ethical regimes. This part mostly focuses on the concept of the dispositif. As 
argued by Foucault, prior to the end of the eighteenth century, the regulation of social life in 
Western societies was mediated through the dispositif of alliance, which was “a system of 
marriage, of fixation and development of kinship ties”. From the eighteenth century onward, 
instead, a new dispositif, the dispositif of sexuality—which is a mechanism of control concerning 
the individual’s body and management of a population as a whole—was deployed by Western 
societies and superimposed on the dispositif of alliance.18 Foucault associates the dispositif of 
sexuality with the rise of scientific discourses of the nineteenth century, such as medicine, 
psychiatry, psychology, biology, etc. Through these discourses of science, according to Foucault, 
individuals are incited to talk about themselves and their sexual secrets in order to uncover the 
truth about themselves in relation to sex. Foucault argues that this incitement to talk about sex and 
the production of discourses regarding sexuality is associated with the constitution of subjectivity 
and the production of new categories of identity through the productivity of power-knowledge 
operations. However, in dispositif, the agency is always possible and the subject is not only 
affected by power relations but to a certain extent through them, the subject has the opportunity to 
resist such technologies of power. To formulate a form of emancipatory politics for resisting 
dispositif, Foucault goes back to Greco-Roman antiquity to propose ethical and aesthetic 
techniques of the self for stylizing and transforming oneself and one’s life.  
        In part two, Modernity and Transformation of Same-Sex Relations into Gay Identity, I 
contextualize Massad’s ideas and Foucault’s theoretical tools in Iran; but before, by drawing on 
postcolonialism, the critique of, and new approaches to modernity, I rethink the notion of 
modernity, its Western narrative, and its representation of non-Western cultures and societies. By 
doing this, I am able to investigate gayness production and its dialogue with modernity, the 
                                                          
18 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality vol. 1: The Will to Knowledge, (NewYork: Pantheon, 1978). 
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Western discourse of sexuality, and imperialism. To develop my argument that begins in pre-
modern Iran, I analyze the primary and secondary historical sources, especially literature and 
poetry of the eleventh until the nineteenth century, that give accounts of Iranian dispositif of 
alliance in general, and Iranian traditional same-sex relations in particular. In the next step, with 
the beginning of Iranian modernization in the nineteenth century, I investigate the superimposition 
of Iranian dispositif of sexuality on the dispositif of alliance, particularly with a focus on the 
transformation of same-sex desire into homosexuality with regards to imperialism, the Western 
discourse of sexuality, and gender and sexual polices in Pahlavi era (1925-1979).  
 Moreover, I need to discuss how nineteenth-century Iranian intellectuals created a hybrid 
form of modernity—derived from both Western and traditional resources—and how Iranian 
homosexuality itself has also been developed within a hybridized and cultural grafting construction 
of Iranian modernity. When I arrive at the 1979 Iranian revolution in my account of historical 
events, I direct my discussion from dispositif of sexuality to the Islamic dispositif of post-
revolutionary Iran, and I provide an account of gayness production within such dispositif. Gay 
International, according to Massad, launched its activities in the 80s and the 90s, exactly when the 
discourse of human rights entered Iran. Therefore, I should discuss the influence of Western sexual 
dispositif and imperialism in post-revolutionary Iran. But before, I give my reflection on Massad’s 
account of Western imperialism and criticize some of his points regarding his assumption of 
modernity, gay space of activism, and ignorance of the Middle Eastern gay men’s agency. Finally, 
I explore how Iranian gay men resist within the Islamic dispositif and respond to the Western 
sexual understating and universality of sexual identity categories. Moreover, I show that how 
Iranian gay men have transformed themselves into active agents to contribute to the construction 
of their local sexual identity. Furthermore, since the use of identity markers is fundamental in this 
thesis, in my historical account on the post-revolutionary Iran, I use the English term 'gay' and the 
new terminology in the Persian language 'hamjensgara' (same-sex identification and orientation). 
Because firstly, both are used as the self-identification by the majority of local men in present 
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Iran19 (I use hamjensgara only in the 2000s when this term appeared for the first time) and 
secondly, I consider the construction of the term hamjensgara as a form of creative and ethical 
activity for localization of the Western notion of gayness. To develop the argument regarding 
hamjensgarayan’s (in plueal)/gays’ exitance and their resistance in Iran, I draw on and analyze the 
secondary resources regarding the real lives of Iranian hamjensgarayan/gays, of their livability, 
resistance, activism, and their embodiment and actions in the post-revolutionary era.  
This thesis was born out of my personal experiences as well as curiosity about male 
homoerotism and gayness production in Iran. Therefore, I concentrate only on male homoerotism 
because there is little evidence of female same-sex relations in pre-modern Iran, particularly in 
Persian literature. Moreover, we have a lack of lesbians’ existence both in the Islamic Republic’s 
and Massad’s discourses. On the contrary, there is the hegemony of gay men in the political 
discourse of the West and the East. However, I have realized that one could not simply talk about 
male homoeroticism and particularly homosexuality in modern Iran without also addressing 
Iranian women’s presence in society. Thus, while the main argument of this thesis is centralized 
around the transformation of male same-sex relations into gay identity, simultaneously, I also 
consider the women’s issues, including their roles in the institution of family, marriage, and 





                                                          
19 Abouzar Nasirzadeh, “The Role of Social Media in the Lives of Gay Iranians” in Social Media in Iran: Politics and 
Society after 2009, eds., David M. Faris and Babak Rahimi (New York: State University of New York, 2015), 57; 
Kjaran, Gay Life Stories Same-Sex Desires in Post-Revolutionary Iran, (Switzerland, Palgrave Macmillan: 2019); 
Ahmad Karimi, “Hamjensgara Belongs to Family; Exclusion and Inclusion of Male homosexuality in Relation to 
Family Structure in Iran”, Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power,( 2017). 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1070289X.2017.128692. 
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1. Foucault’s Deconstruction of the Repressive Hypothesis 
            Foucault’s writings on sexuality and its relations with the discourse, power, subjectivity 
and oppression have provided invaluable contributions to the subsequent studies of gender and 
sexualities; his works on the history of Western desire and sexuality can be expanded to investigate 
the implications of gender and sexuality in everyday life of non-Western societies. This thesis's 
main purpose is to investigate the transformation of Iranian gender and sexuality before and after 
the modernization process through Foucault’s contributions to the discourse of sexuality. Thus, 
the first chapter elaborates Foucault’s account of sexuality through his conceptualizations on the 
repressive hypothesis, confession, power, subjectivity, dispositif and his insights into the 
constitution of the practice of self within different ethical regimes.  
1.1. The Repressive Hypothesis  
        Michel Foucault (1926–1984) was a French 20th-century philosopher and historian. He also 
was one of the most important figures in critical theory. His theories have been concerned with the 
concepts of power, knowledge, discourse, and subjectivity. His earlier writings on madness and 
reason, the condition of possibilities for developments in medical knowledge and the emergence 
of the human sciences as well as his later writings on subjectivity and power-knowledge relations 
show a great deal of his influence in poststructuralism, postmodernism, postcolonialism, and 
politico-philosophical thought. During his philosophical studies at the École Normale, he was 
under the influence of the important works of his tutors, such as Jean Hyppolite’s works on Hegel, 
the structuralist reading of Louis Althusser on Marx, and George Dumézil’s analysis of discourse. 
In addition to the level of personal influences, Foucault’s works have been developed by the 
influence of other intellectual figures such as the works of Marx, Freud, and Nietzsche.20 In 
Foucault’s view, what connects each of these thinkers is the existence of a power-knowledge 
relation. For Marx, this relation took the form of a relation between ideas and economic power. 
For Freud, it took a form of a relation between desire and knowledge, and for Nietzsche, all forms 
of thought and knowledge were a form of expression of a “will to power”.21  
                                                          
20 Barry Smart, Michel Foucault (London: Routledge, 1988), 2-3. 
21 Ibid., 3. 
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       Foucault generally has been seen as a philosopher of power, knowledge and subject; however, 
in addition to the problem of power-knowledge relations and subjectivity, the problem of truth is 
another significant and central theme of discussion in Foucault’s writings. In an interview in 1981, 
he explicitly confirms that he has “consistently pursued the problem of knowing how truth comes 
to things and how it comes about that a certain number of areas are slowly integrated into the 
problematic and search for truth.”22 Foucault is interested in how the relations of truth are 
integrated in the diverse fields of human activities. In an interview of 1983, Foucault points to 
three themes, three historical ontologies of the self he has desired to investigate: 
First, a historical ontology of ourselves in relation to truth through which we 
constitute ourselves as subjects of knowledge; second, a historical ontology of 
ourselves in relation to a field of power through which we constitute ourselves as 
subjects acting on others; third, a historical ontology in relation to ethics through 
which we constitute ourselves as a moral agent.23   
      Through the expression of these three axes–power, knowledge and subject–Foucault poses the 
question about truth’s historicity in relation to the themes of power-knowledge-subject relations. 
These are “three concepts that form the three main axes of Foucault’s thinking, all of them hinging 
on the issue of truth”24 because he was interested in “how different pieces of knowledge had attained 
truth status over the course of history, how power had legitimated itself through truth, how people 
had shaped themselves via producing truth.”25 Accordingly, Foucault’s analysis of sex and sexuality 
is not at all pertinent to the history of sexual acts and behaviors, but rather, in most of his writings 
on sexuality, particularly in the four-volume study of sexuality in The History of Sexuality, he 
analyzes the history of the discourses that the West has produced and conducted about sex. On this 
account, Foucault says:  
                                                          
22 Michel Foucault, “Interview with Jean Francois and John de Wit. May 22, 1981”, in Foucault, Wrong-Doing, Truth-
Telling: The Function of Avowal in Justice, ed., Fabienne Brion and Bernard E. Harcourt (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2014), 253–69.  
23 Michel Foucault, “On the Genealogy of ethics: An overview of work in progress” in Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth: 
Essentail Works, vol. 1, ed. Paul. Rabinow (London: Penguin, 2000), 262.   
24 Marek Tamm, “Sex and Truth: Foucault’s History of Sexuality as History of Truth,” Edinburg University Press 
Journal 5, no. 2 (2016): 153–168. 
25 Ibid. 
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Between each of us and our sex, the West has placed a never-ending demand for 
truth: it is up to us to extract the truth of sex, since this truth is beyond its grasp; 
it is up to sex to tell us our truth, since sex is what hold it in darkness. 26  
       The relation of sexuality and truth can take place in diverse cultural and historical regimes of 
truth, but Foucault particularly investigates the relation of sexuality and the regime of truth in the 
West through genealogy. Influenced by Nietzsche’s development of morals through the function 
of power in On the Genealogy of Morals27, Foucault accounts the conception of genealogical 
analysis “for the constitution of knowledge, discourses, domains of subjects etc., without having 
to make reference to a subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field of events or 
runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of history.”28 In the essay Nietzsche, Genealogy, 
History29, Foucault differentiates the conception of historical analysis, namely genealogy, from 
traditional history. The essay explicates that genealogy is characterized by an opposition to a 
pursuit of the origin of things because origin, as an intrinsic feature of traditional historical 
analysis, seeks to capture “the exact essence of things, their purest possibilities, and their carefully 
protected identities.” In contrast, genealogy, on the other side, refutes the idea of origin as a truth 
and attempts to show that “there is something altogether different behind things: not a timeless and 
essential secret, but the secret that they have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a 
piecemeal fashion from alien forms.”30 To further clarify the difference between traditional history 
and genealogy, Foucault follows Nietzsche in contrasting the concept of Ursprung/origin with 
Herkunft/descent and Entstehung/emergence. The descent analysis dissolves the exclusive generic 
characteristics of an object or an idea and permits us to rediscover the myriad events that contribute 
to its emergence. The analysis of descent distrusts unity and identity in order to reveal “the subtle, 
singular and subindividual marks that might possibly intersect in them to form a network that is 
difficult to unravel.”31 Another dimension of genealogy is concerned with the analysis of historical 
emergence, which is conceptualized not as a process of development or as the culmination of 
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events, but rather it designates the moment of arising, a moment of manifestation of “the hazardous 
play of dominations”32. Emergence “takes place within the context of power relations and is always 
produced through a particular stage of forces”.33 In short, genealogy as the analysis of historical 
descent and emergence rejects a form of linear development, stable forms, and historical dominant 
assumptions and hypotheses in favor of revealing discontinuities, contingencies, and complexities 
surrounding historical events.    
          One of the dominant hypotheses in the Western history of sexuality that Foucault, through 
genealogy, has tried to challenge is “the repressive hypothesis”. An understanding of sexuality that 
claims once the expression of sexual acts, both verbal and physical, were free, “sexual practices had 
little need of secrecy; words were said without undue reticence, and things were done without too 
much concealment”. But in the course of Victorianism, “twilight soon fell upon this bright day”34 
and sexuality has been subject to the repressive power by the Victorian regime. This typical historical 
account of Western sexuality that Victorian era is marked by prohibitions on the public discussion 
of sexuality enables “a narrative extrapolation through the struggles of psychoanalysis with 
repression to the sexual liberation movement of the 1960s and 1970s”35 for bringing back “the bright 
day”36 of sexual freedom. For this purpose, according to the repressive hypothesis, people need to 
challenge their silence and shame in order to liberate their sexualities. This is why Chloë Taylor sees 
the repressive hypothesis as a teleological attitude because it expresses “the idea of the sexually 
liberated society toward which we are striving”, “a society of free love in which we can express our 
sexuality both in acts and words, without the baggage of Christian morality and Victorian 
prudishness.”37 Foucault challenges this teleological view of sexual liberation in The History of 
Sexuality, because for him sexuality is socially and culturally constituted within shifting forms of 
power-knowledge relations: sexual liberation movements, according to him, are a form of 
exchanging one kind of control for another. In an interview in 1977, titled Body/Power, he says that 
individuals in sexual liberation are controlled by  
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An economic (and also perhaps ideological) exploitation of eroticization, from 
un-tan products to pornographic films. Responding precisely to the revolt of the 
body, we find a new mode of investment which presents itself no longer in the 
form of control by repression but that of control by stimulation.38   
         The repressive hypothesis assumes that in the Western societies of the seventeenth century, 
there existed a series of prohibitions that has regulated individuals and their sexualities. According 
to the hypothesis, the only kind of sex that was permitted was between heterosexual married couples 
and any forms of sexual acts outside of marital relations have been subject to prohibition, sin and 
illegality. The central aim of this regulation was to confine and move sexuality into the home and 
absorb it into the function of procreation. According to the repressive hypothesis, the restriction of 
sex has created a compulsory relationship between the privacy of the home and procreative couples. 
In one sense, one is allowed to have marital sex leading to the expectation of procreation, whose 
lack would taint sexual behavior as being abnormal. 
          Foucault associates the repressive hypothesis with the writings of Freudo-Marxist authors such 
as German psychiatrist Wilhelm Reich and social philosopher Herbert Marcuse who were very 
influential faces in the sexual liberation movements of the 1960s and 1970s. From Freud’s point of 
view, “the essence of repression lies in turning something away and keeping it at a distance, from the 
conscious”.39 For Freud, unpleasant ideas through censors are hidden from our conscious in order to 
ensure that they are dismissed to the corner of our unconscious. In other words, some mental contents 
are denied and hidden from access to conscious thought.40 This is what Freud calls repression; psychic 
repression is cured only through talk about one’s repressed feelings between patient and 
psychoanalyst. Psychoanalysis tries to deal with psychological repression in order to control patients’ 
sexual repression rather than simply repress their libido. Freud in Civilization and its Discontents 
argues that sexual repression is necessary for civilization. For him, a non-repressive civilization is 
impossible because human nature requires coercive law in order to control aggressive and destructive 
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impulses.41 Freud says that sexuality must be controlled and sublimated into a form of energy needed 
for work.42 
         However, Freudo-Marxists, like Marcuse and Reich, who have tried to synthesize Freud’s 
theory of sexual repression with Marxist principles, disagrees with Freud’s psychic 
conceptualization of repression. They see repression as social repression requiring not just 
speaking but a revolution to break the laws in order to have “a whole new economy in the 
mechanism of power.”43 To counter Freud, Marcuse in Eros and Civilization claims that instinctual 
liberation would not only avoid chaos and disorder but would actually form a libidinal order that 
brings the enhancement of human life and non-repressed civilization.44 In Sexual Revolution, 
Reich, by drawing on Marxism and Freudian principles, argues that a social revolution is needed 
to eliminate social and sexual repression. Reich writes that: 
It is correct that, objectively and from the viewpoint of class, the sexual crisis is a 
manifestation of the conflict between capitalist decline and revolutionary 
ascendancy. But it is also correct that it expresses the contradiction between 
sexual needs and mechanistic society […]. Objectively, the sexual crisis is a 
phenomenon of class distinctions; but how is it represented subjectively? What 
does it mean: a new proletarian morality? Capitalist class morality is opposed to 
sexuality, i.e., it creates the contradiction and the resulting misery. The 
revolutionary movement eliminates this contradiction by its ideological 
endorsement of sexual gratification, which is then strengthened by laws and a new 
ordering of sexual life. Thus, capitalism and sexual suppression go together as do 
revolutionary “morality” and sexual gratification.45 
         Both Reich and Marcuse reject Freud’s argument that sexual repression is needed for society, 
but Marcuse also rejects the way Reich rejects Freud’s argument in terms of the broaden scope 
Reich devotes for getting rid of repression through revolution. Marcuse argues that Reich’s notion 
of sexual repression remains as an undifferentiated constant that requires liberation. Marcuse 
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argues that “Reich neglects the historical dynamic nature of sex instincts and of their fusion with 
the destructive impulses”.46 Reich, according to Marcuse,  
Rejects Freud’s hypothesis of the death instinct and the whole dimension reveal 
depth dimension revealed in Freud’s late metapsychology. Consequently, sexual 
liberation per se becomes for Reich a panacea for individual and social ills. The 
problem of sublimation is minimized; no essential distinction is made between 
repressive and non-repressive sublimation, and progress in freedom appears as a 
mere release of sexuality.47 
          Marcuse seems to be more careful in handling the notion of sexual repression. He 
understands repression not only in Freud’s sense but also as “oppression”. He writes that 
“repression and repressive are used in the non-technical sense to designate both conscious and 
unconscious, external and internal processes of restraint, and suppression.”48 In contrast to Reich 
and instead of bolstering repression/oppression through revolution, Marcuse psychoanalytically 
critiques repression/oppression both in an individual and a societal level.49  
         Foucault does not deny that Freud’s psychoanalysis and his conceptualization of repression 
is normalizing and politically conservative,50 but he directs his critique toward those who 
criticize Freud for his conservative position and see themselves engaged in the project of anti-
normalization and political liberalism by adapting the repressive hypothesis. For Foucault, 
Marcuse and Reich are the main representatives of repressive hypothesis. Foucault is concerned 
with refuting their Freudo-Marxist ideas about power and their psychoanalytic understanding of 
sex, because he thinks their theories are involved in a misunderstanding of how power works. In 
the already quoted interview titled, “Body/Power” Foucault gives a remark on the problem of 
power as a negative and a repressive force.51 He does not deny that power often operates 
negatively—in the forms of censorship, exclusion, and repression—but what he argues is the 
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tendentious and one-sided nature of interpretation of power in Freudo-Marxism and specifically 
in Marcuse’s writings. Foucault also criticizes Marxism because of its” tendency to occlude” the 
operation of power acting upon body in favor of “consciousness” and “ideology”.52  He says: 
I would also distinguish myself from para-Marxists like Marcuse who give the 
notion of repression an exaggerated role—because power would be a fragile thing 
if its only function were to repress, if it worked only through the mode of 
censorships, exclusion, blockage and repression, in the manner of a superego, 
exercising itself only in an negative way. If, on the contrary, power is strong this 
is because, as we are beginning to realize, it produces effects at the level of 
desire—and also at the level of knowledge. Far from preventing knowledge, 
power produces it. If it has been possible to constitute a knowledge of the body, 
this has been by way of an ensemble of military and educational disciplines. It 
was on the basis of power over the body that a physiological, organic knowledge 
of it become possible.53  
         To counter Freudo-Marxism and its anti-repression and sexual liberation approach, in the 
Will to Knowledge, Foucault argues that Reich’s critiques of sexual repression has “always 
unfolded within the deployment [dispositif]54 of sexuality, and not outside or against it”.55 Thus:  
The fact that so many things were able to change in the sexual behavior of Western 
societies without any of the promises or political conditions predicted by Reich 
being realized is sufficient proof that this whole sexual “revolution” this whole 
“antirepressive” struggle, represented nothing more, but nothing less—and its 
importance is undeniable—than a tactical shift and reversal in the great 
deployment [dispositif] of sexuality.56 
         Against the repressive hypothesis, Foucault criticizes the “idea that power created sexuality 
as a device to say no to sex.” Instead, he postulates “the idea of sex as internal to the apparatus 
[dispositif] of sexuality, and the consequent idea that what must be found at the root of that 
apparatus [dispositif] is not the rejection of sex, but a positive economy of the body and of 
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pleasure.” 57 Foucault argues that “sexuality must not be thought as a kind of natural given which 
power tries to hold in check”, but rather sexuality should be considered as: 
a great surface network in which the stimulation of bodies, the intensification of 
pleasure, the incitement to discourse, the formation of special knowledge, the 
strengthening of controls and resistances, are linked to one another, in accordance 
with a few major strategies of knowledge and power.58   
         Reflecting on this conceptualization of sexuality, Foucault situates both psychoanalysts and 
revolutionary theorists, who attempt to release “the truth of sex” through “quasi-scientific methods” 
as well as overthrowing the repressive capitalist system, within a general deployment [dispositif] 
of sexuality. Foucault sees psychoanalysis in its Freudo-Marxism form as a form of disciplinary 
power59. In the Freudo-Marxist psychoanalysis, patients are convinced that they are sexually 
repressed and that sexuality is identity. Moreover, patients are convinced that their sexual desire 
should be liberated through psychotherapy rather than bolstering its repression. What the Freudo-
Marxist psychoanalysts actually do is that under the alluring guise of sexual freedom, they not 
only—through positing repression—place subjects in a relation of disciplinary power but also never 
question the notion that sex is identity and destiny.60 Far from concealing, silencing or repressing 
sex, for Foucault, in the modern Western societies to which psychoanalysis belongs, sex “had to be 
put into words.”61 But more importantly, for him is: 
The multiplication of discourses concerning sex in the fields of exercise of power 
itself: an institutional incitement to speak about it, and to do so more and more; a 
determination on the part of the agencies of power to hear it spoken about, and to 
cause it to speak through explicit articulation and endlessly accumulated detail.62 
Foucault argues that power essentially and functionally is productive, and its repression 
and prohibition are only one part of it. He claims that since the beginning of the eighteenth century 
in Western societies, there has been a tendency toward the proliferation of sexual discourses that 
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emerged from “political, economic, and technical incitements to talk about sex”.63 According to 
him, this proliferation of discourse on sex has produced and created sexuality “in the form of 
analysis, stocktaking, classification, and specification of quantitative or causal studies”64 so that 
talk about “sex increasingly became an object of administration, management and government”.65 
From this point, in the eighteenth century, a form in which sex was considered as an “object of 
administration and management” was that of the government of the population.66 This new form 
of government became possible through the employment of statistical methods and techniques of 
analysis for understating and regulating various dimensions of the population, such as “the 
problems of birthrate, longevity, public health, housing, and migration.”67  
          On this account, Foucault says that in Western societies, people’s lives, from the eighteenth 
century to the present time, are saturated by sex because they talk and think about sex constantly, 
and they categorize their sexualities and see sex as a health and scientific issue. Today sex is an 
omnipresent theme. The trace of sex can be seen in television and advertising; pornography 
occupies the majority of the internet; there is sex education for adolescents, and sexologists are 
continually invited in radio and talk show programs.68 In short, instead of depicting sex as an object 
of silence, there has been the insistence by scientific faces on the importance of opening a discourse 
about sex. With so much evidence about the omnipresence of sex, Foucault also argues that the 
repressive hypothesis has such staying power because “a solemn historical and political guarantee 
protects it.”69 One of the reasons to uphold the repressive hypothesis, according to Foucault, is the 
correspondence of the dawn of sexual repression at the beginning of the seventeenth century with 
the rise of capitalism.70 According to the repressive hypothesis, in repressive modern societies, the 
only form of sex that was permitted was between heterosexual married couples for the sake of 
reproduction, especially for the proletariat, that corresponded to the constituting of labor forces.71 
This understanding of the repressive hypothesis reverberates Marxism in terms of class and 
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economic issues. For Foucault, this Marxist interpretation of sexual repression is problematic72 
because he believes that power is not simply directed from the above to those below; but rather it 
circulates; in other words, the relation between sex and power is not restricted merely to the 
instances of prohibitions. Moreover; Foucault observes, in contrast to Marcuse, “the working 
classes managed for a long time to escape the deployment [dispositif] of sexuality”73 and it was 
the bourgeoisies that submitted themselves, their children and wives to psychiatric and pedagogical 
forms of disciplinary power74 because they thought that their own sex was “something important, 
a fragile treasure, a secret that had to be discovered at all costs.”75 Therefore, Foucault asserts that” 
sexuality is originally, historically bourgeois, and that it induces specific class effects in its 
successive shifts and transpositions.”76 
Another reason that upholds the repressive hypothesis is what Foucault calls “the speaker’s 
benefit.”77 Once we are speaking about sex under the influence of this hypothesis, we assume that 
sex is something condemned to prohibition, nonexistence, and silence. Thus, we feel that we are 
engaged in a serious and emancipatory political task for the transgression of established laws.78 
According to Foucault, a person who is speaking about sex with this anti-repressive rhetoric     
Somehow anticipates the coming freedom. This explains the solemnity with 
which one speaks of sex nowadays. When they had to allude to it, the first 
demographers and psychiatrists of the nineteenth century thought it advisable to 
excuse themselves for asking their readers to dwell on matters so trivial and base. 
But for decades now, we have found it difficult to speak on the subject without 
striking a different pose: we are conscious of defying established power, our tone 
of voice shows that we know we are being subversive, and we ardently conjure 
away the present and appeal to the future, whose day will be hastened by the 
contribution we believe we are making.79 
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What Foucault argues is that instead of thinking about the relation between sex and power 
as fundamentally negative, repressive, and silent, we need to know that the power and sexual 
relationship is much more complicated. According to Foucault, what is more remarkable is that 
there has been a proliferation of discourses about sex that led to productive effects. Instead of 
denying or affirming the issue of prohibition, Foucault says that an overemphasis has been placed 
on it in Western history of sexuality. For him, sexuality is not simply a “great central mechanism,” 
including negative elements—“defenses”, “censorships,” and “denials”—to repress sexuality. 
Instead, it is a question of the transformation of sex into the discourse.80 Consequently; Foucault 
is not interested in giving an answer to the question, “why are we repressed?”, but rather his aim 
is to explore: “why sexuality has been so widely discussed, and what has been said about it?”, 
“what were the effects of power generated by what was said?”, “what are the links between these 
discourses, these effects of power, and the pleasure that were invested by them?”, “what 
knowledge was formed as a result of this linkage?” In other words, for Foucault, what is at issue 
is to examine who, and through what positions and viewpoints, talks about sex and which 
institutions incite this discussion of sex. He is also concerned with the forms of power and the 
channels they take, the discourses they privilege, the paths they should pass in order to control and 
dominate everyday forms of pleasure of individuals; in short, he is interested in the “polymorphous 
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1.2.      Confession  
By criticizing the repressive hypothesis and Freudo-Marxist conceptualization of power, 
which is productive, Foucault argues that despite many instances of sexual censorship and 
prohibition over the past centuries, modern Western societies are characterized not by negation 
and silence or prohibition of discourses about sex but by the proliferation of new practices and 
discourses about sex and their association with the system of producing truth. In describing the 
physicians’ attitudes of the nineteenth century toward sex in the Will to Knowledge, Foucault 
writes that: 
The important thing, in this affair, is not that these men shut their eyes 
or stopped their ears, or that they were mistaken; it is rather that they 
constructed around and apropos of sex an immense apparatus for 
producing truth, even if this truth was to be masked at the last moment. 
The essential point is that sex was not only a matter of sensation and 
pleasure, of law and taboo, but also of truth and falsehood, that the truth 
of sex became something fundamental, useful, or dangerous, precious 
or formidable: in short, that sex was constituted as a problem of truth.82 
          To trace back the origin of these institutional discourses of sex, Foucault considers a 
historical account of the relationship between sex and truth. According to Foucault, there have 
been two historical “procedures” to produce the truth of sex. On the one hand, mostly in ancient 
Oriental societies such as China, Japan, India, and Arab-Muslim societies or even in Rome, 
producing the truth of sex was made possible through what Foucault calls ars erotica. In the ars 
erotica the truth of sex is drawn from pleasure itself; “understood as a practice and accumulated 
as experience; pleasure is not considered in relation to an absolute law of the permitted and the 
forbidden” but rather in relation to itself and it is evaluated in terms of “its intensity, its specific 
quality, its duration, its reverberation in the body and the soul.” Moreover, the knowledge of the 
ars erotica must be “deflected back into the sexual practice itself, in order to shape it as though 
from within and amplify its effects.”83 The knowledge which is formed in ars erotica should 
remain a secret because its secrecy holds its effectiveness and only the master who holds this 
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knowledge can transmit it “in an esoteric manner and as the culmination of an initiation in which 
he guides the discipline’s progress with unfailing skill and severity.” 
On the other hand and in contrast to ars erotica and Oriental societies, for centuries in 
modern Western societies, there has been a procedure for telling the truth of sex that Foucault calls 
scientia sexualis or sex knowledge. This procedure is not driven from the pleasure itself and the 
secrecy that revolves around its knowledge, but rather it is interwoven with a form of power-
knowledge relations derived from the examination, consultation, and research for knowledge about 
sex.84 Later, however, in an interview in 1983, Foucault prefers to draw back the characteristics of 
ancient Western sexual practices as ars erotica,  
One of the numerous points where I was wrong in that book was what I said about 
ars erotica. I should have opposed our science of sex to a contrasting practice in 
our own culture. The Greeks and Romans did not have any ars erotica to be 
compared with the Chinese ars erotica (or at least it was not something very 
important in their culture). They had a tekhne tou biou in which the economy of 
pleasure played a very large role. In this “art of life” the notion of exercising a 
perfect mastery over oneself soon became the main issue. And the Christian 
hermeneutics of the self-constituted a new elaboration of this tekhne.
85
  
         Despite abandoning his division between the Oriental ars erotica and the Western scientia 
sexualis, Foucault continues to uphold his idea about Western civilization and its development of 
procedures over centuries for telling the truth of sex.86 Debating over scientia sexualis, Foucault 
does not propose that Western societies have uniquely developed the knowledge of sex, and other 
cultures do not have knowledge about sex. All cultures have their knowledge about sex, but what 
Foucault argues is indeed the overproduction of knowledge of sex in the West which is constituted 
in scientific terms and emerged in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and in the 
field of medicine, pedagogy, economy, and politics.87 At the center of this scientia sexualita, there 
was the practice of ‘confession’ that traced back to the first centuries of Christianity.88 Foucault 
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was eager to follow a “thread through which so many centuries have linked sex” and the search for 
“the truth in Western societies”.89 In an interview in 1983 titled Critical Theory/Intellectual History, 
he says: 
How is it that in a society like ours, sexuality is not simply a means of reproducing 
the species, the family and the individual? Not simply a means to obtain pleasure 
and enjoyment? How has sexuality come to be considered the privileged place 
where our deepest "truth" is read and expressed? For that is the essential fact: 
since Christianity, the Western world has never ceased saying: "to know who you 
are, know what your sexuality is". Sex has always been the forum where both the 
future of our species and our "truth" as human subjects is decided. Confession, 
the examination of the conscience, all the insistence on the important secrets of 
the flesh, has not been simply a means of prohibiting sex or of repressing it as far 
as possible from consciousness, but was a means of placing sexuality at the heart 
of existence and of connecting salvation with the mastery of these obscure 
movements. In Christian societies, sex has been the central object of examination, 
surveillance, avowal and transformation into discourse.90 
       In The History of Sexuality: Volume 1, Foucault analyzes confession in the sense of genealogy. 
As I explained in paragraph 1.1, “The Repressive Hypothesis”, genealogy or what Nietzsche calls 
“effective history”, asserts that “what is found at the historical beginning of things is not the 
inviolable identity of their origin; it is the dissension of other things. It is disparity.”91 In other 
words, genealogy “disturbs what was previously considered immobile; it fragments what was 
thought unified; it shows the heterogeneity of what was imagined consistent with itself.”92 In the 
case of confession, genealogy draws on “a field entangled and confused parchments, on documents 
that have been scratched over and recopied many times”93 in order to disturb the totalizing of 
histories and opens up spaces for transformations. To be more precise, as Chloë Taylor explains in 
The Culture of Confession from Augustine to Foucault, a genealogy of confession is “episodic and 
incomplete, but the episodes chosen will be selected not for their similitude with the present, but 
                                                          
89 Michel Foucault, “Critical Theory/Intellectual History” in Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interview and Other 
Writing, 1977-1984, (first edit), ed. Lawrence D. Kritzman (London: Routledge press, 1988), 110-111. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History”, 142-151. 
92 Ibid., 145. 
93 Ibid., 139. 
 
  24  
 
for the manners in which they put pressure on the assumption made about confession in the 
present.”94 Thus, a genealogy of confession is “invested with the author’s concerns for the present, 
however, these are not a concern to preserve the present or to see it reflected in the past, but to show 
its contingency and its difference or absence in the other eras.”95 Therefore; by drawing on 
genealogical historiography, Foucault asserts that confession has become a technique for producing 
truth only in Western culture.96 He defines confession as a technique “to declare aloud and 
intelligibly the truth of oneself”97 in the presence of another. In The History of Sexuality: Volume 1 
Foucault describes the confession as:       
A ritual of discourse where the subject who speaks corresponds with the subject 
of the statement it is also a ritual which unfold in a relation of power, since one 
doesn’t confess without the presence, at least the virtual presence, of a partner 
who is not simply an interlocutor but the agency that requires the confession, 
imposes it, weights it, and intervenes to judge, punish, pardon, console, 
reconcile.98  
        Foucault continues by describing confession in two significant ways: as is a “ritual where truth 
is corroborated by the obstacles and resistance it has had to surmount in order to be formulated” 
and as “a ritual in which the expression alone, independently of its external consequences, produces 
intrinsic modifications in the person who articulates it: it exonerates, redeems, and purifies him; it 
unburdens him of his wrong, liberates him; and promises him salvation.” 99 Foucault traces back 
the origin of the religious confession in the Lateran Council in 1215, before Reformation in the 
early sixteenth century and Protestants’ division from the Catholic Church. After division, 
according to Foucault, there has been a split between methods of examination of conscience and 
pastoral direction between Catholics and Protestants. However, according to Foucault, we should 
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not rule out a “certain parallelism” existing in both “Catholic and Protestant” procedures for 
analyzing conscience. In the seventeenth century, the Council of Trent made confession into a rule 
for every catholic.100 Thus, confession turned into an ideal for every good Christian. The Christians 
were asked: “not only will you confess to acts contravening the law, but you will seek to transform 
your desire, your every desire, into discourse.”101 By enforcing the practice of confession on the 
Christians and repeating it over time, confession became a habit that gained prominence in the 
Western and Christian societies in the Middle Ages. Confession, since then, due to “the codification 
of the sacrament of penance by the Lateran council in 1215, with the resulting development of 
confessional techniques, the declining importance of accusatory in criminal justice, […] the setting 
up of tribunals of Inquisition”102 became one of the highly prominence Western techniques for 
producing truth with a widespread effect. It was not merely restricted to the Church rituals, but 
rather extended to a “central role in the civil and religious powers” so that it took the shape of 
procedure in jurisprudence for “criminal justice”, “the abandonment of the test of guilt” and “the 
development of methods of interrogation and inquest.”103 
           Foucault argues that for a long time, “confession was, and still remains, the general standard 
governing the production of the true discourse on sex.”104 However, in addition to Protestantism 
and Reformation, he asserts that ‘eighteenth-century pedagogy’ and ‘nineteenth-century medicine’ 
caused the act of confessing to gradually be transformed in its ritualistic and exclusive localization 
and distributed to a numerous social relationships such as “children and parents, students and 
educators, patients and psychiatrists, delinquents and experts”.105 Besides the extensive effects of 
confession on the juridical inquiries, scientists and doctors, by drawing on sexual confession, started 
to gather information about sex.106 At the end of the eighteenth century, sex became a concern of 
the state—“a matter that required” “a social body as a whole” and “its individuals” who “place 
themselves under surveillance” of authorities because they felt that sex should be monitored for the 
sake of having wholesome individuals with a compatible society due to the fact that sexual diseases 
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can engender sick individuals resulting in the degeneration of the population and the threat of the 
entire fabric of society.107 For this purpose, “the nineteenth-century psychiatrists”108 found 
confession to be a source of data, depending largely on the confession of others.  
          Foucault indicates how, in the nineteenth century in modern Western societies, sexual 
confession has been scientifically developed into five methods to justify the medical interrogations 
into the sexual lives of patients. 109 First, confession through the incitement of discourse (the 
examination, the interrogation of the personal history, the recollection of memory, and the 
questionnaire) became clinically codified as a set of scientific procedures in the nineteenth century. 
Second, the medical interrogation into the sexual lives of people was justified through “ the 
postulate of a general and diffuse causality”110 in the nineteenth century and in modern Western 
society. As Foucault writes, “having to tell everything, being able to pose questions about 
everything, found their [doctors] justification in the principle that endowed sex with an 
inexhaustible and polymorphous causal power.”111 The diffuse causal power in one’s sexual 
behavior can be a result of an “accident or a deviation, a deficit or an excess.”112 Foucault argues 
that, “from bad habits of children to the apoplexies of old people, nervous maladies, and the 
degenerations of the race, the medicine of that era wove an entire network of sexual causality to 
explain them.”113 For instance, in the nineteenth century, some Western sexual scientists and 
doctors warned parents that children’s masturbation leads to homosexuality and the population's 
degeneration. As Foucault writes: 
Educators and doctors combatted children’s onanism like an epidemic that needed 
to be eradicated. What this actually entailed, throughout this whole secular 
campaign that mobilized the adult world around the sex of children, was using 
these tenuous pleasure as prop, constituting them as secret (that is, forcing them 
into hiding so as to make possible their discovery), tracing them back to their 
source, tracking them from their origins to their effects, searching out everything 
that might cause them or simply enable them to exist. Wherever there was a 
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chance they might appear, devices of surveillance were installed; traps were laid 
for compelling admissions; inexhaustible and corrective discourses were 
imposed; parents and teachers were alerted […] they were kept in readiness in the 
face of this recurrent danger; their conduct was prescribed and their pedagogy 
recodified; an entire medico-sexual regime took hold of the family milieu.114    
In short, maintaining and protecting the health of the population was a justification for 
inquisitiveness on behalf of doctors and sexual scientists. Third, extracting the truth of sex through 
confession techniques was a requirement, not solely because it was difficult to tell, but also because 
sexuality itself was conceived intrinsically as latent. In one sense, “the ways of sex were obscure; 
it was elusive by nature; its energy and its mechanism escaped observation, and its causal power 
was partly clandestine.”115 Fourth, regarding the latent and complex nature of sex, producing the 
truth had to pass through a scientifically validated procedure. Thus, the interpretation of confession 
required a qualified person and expertise.116 Finally, after scientific extraction of the truth of sex 
by doctors, confession and “its effects were recodified as therapeutic operations”, and sexuality 
was recodified and classified as the issue of either normal or pathological and it was no longer 
simply “the notion of error or sin, excess or transgression.”117  
For the first time in nineteenth-century Europe, “a characteristic sexual morbidity was 
defined” through which “sex appeared as an extremely unstable pathological field: a surface of 
repercussion for other ailments, but also the focus of a specific nosography, that of instincts, 
tendencies, images, pleasure, and conduct.”118 Thus, for almost one hundred and fifty years, a 
complex machinery has been in process for producing true discourse about sex.119 Foucault says 
that there has been an overproduction on the discourses of sex throughout modern Western 
societies. The effects of this overproduction of discourses turned sexuality into a problematic issue 
in need of interpretation and medicalization. Regarding the nineteenth-century assumption of 
Western scientists that considered children’s masturbation as a serious threat to the population, 
there have been attempts to convince societies about the importance of dangers of sex. Thus, 
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Foucault argues that discourses about sex not only produce normalizations but also produce 
perversions. In short, the progress in Human Sciences and the incitement to discourse construct a 
site for the exercise of power that in modernity resulted in the increasing social control and 
surveillance over individuals’ bodies and their sexuality, both of which are sites for producing 
subjectivity. The technology of the confession is a set of procedures by which individuals are 
incited to produce the truth about inner selves and their. In the course of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, the essential features of this sexuality are not totally “distorted by ideology 
or by a misunderstanding caused by taboos”, but rather they functionally corresponded to a 
discourse that must produce its truth.120 Consequently, for Foucault, sexuality in modern Western 
societies is situated at an intersection of a “technique of confession” and “scientific discursivity” 
where “certain major mechanisms had to be found for adapting them to one another (the listening 
technique, the postulate of causality, the principle of latency, the rule of interpretation, the 
imperative of medicalization).”121 Therefore, sexuality at the point of this intersection was defined 
as: 
Being “by nature”: a domain susceptible to pathological processes, and hence one 
calling for therapeutic or normalizing intervention; a field of meanings to 
decipher; the site of processes concealed by specific mechanisms; a focus of 
indefinite casual relations; and an obscure speech (parole) that had to be ferreted 
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2. A New Analytic of Power and Resistance 
2.1     Power 
          As explained in paragraph 1.1, “The Repressive Hypothesis”, Foucault criticizes traditional 
historiography, preferring instead a genealogical approach. According to him, in contrast to the 
traditional historians, genealogists “find that there is something altogether different behind things: 
not a tieless and essential secret, but the secret that they have no essence.”123 Foucault is skeptical 
about the notion of historical truth because, for him, “truth, and its original reign, has had a history 
within history from which we are barely emerging.”124 Through genealogy, Foucault makes the 
point that there is no continuity from the past to the present or from the present to the future. 
Genealogy is not the deduction of the past from the present. Genealogy does not “pretend to go 
back in time to restore an unbroken continuity … its duty is not to demonstrate that the past actively 
exists in the present.”125 Instead, genealogy “disturbs what was previously considered immobile; 
it fragments what was thought unified; it shows the heterogeneity of what was imagined consistent 
within itself.”126    
          Regarding the concept of power in Foucault’s works, one might say that if Foucault’s 
genealogy, in general, can be read as a critique of the transcendentalist tendencies of the traditional 
history of ideas, Foucault’s genealogy of power, in particular, can be read as a critique of 
traditional conceptualization of power as an exclusively political power possessed by some who 
exercise it to the detriment of others. In direct “contrast to the Enlightenment’s idea that truth and 
knowledge stand outside power and political and social relations, Foucault insists that truth and 
knowledge” are functions of power, produced by individuals occupying specific social 
positions.127 In a 1977 interview, in contrast to traditional historiography, Foucault says that “truth 
is not outside power … Truth is a thing of this world … Each society has its regime of truth, …truth 
is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, 
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circulation, and operation of statements.”128 Thus, Foucault’s genealogy indicates that the relation 
between power and “truth is circular; truth is produced and sustained by power, and in turn, truth 
produces and extends the effects of power”.129 He also argues that “power produces knowledge … 
power and knowledge directly imply one another … there is no power relation without the 
correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and 
constitute at the same time power relations.”130  
          Foucault’s genealogy of power criticizes traditional models of power wherein power is 
conceived of as limitation, repression and prohibition131. He claims that the repressive hypothesis 
in Freudo-Marxism is exactly drawn from this negative conception of power. He notes that in 
contrast to the Freudo-Marxist repressive hypothesis that assumes a pre-existing desire held down 
by repression, a different hypothesis (formulated by Lacan even though Foucault does not mention 
his name) takes law and regulations to be constitutive of “both desire and the lack on which it is 
predicated.”132 However, Foucault argues that repression and law are equivalent notions, relying 
on a common negative representation of power as prohibition and censorship. He calls these 
traditional models of power the ‘juridico-philosophical’ or ‘sovereign’ models of power, which 
can take different forms. For instance, the traditional liberal or juridical point of view considers 
power as a natural right that individuals possess and should give up to the sovereign state in a 
contractual exchange for peace. Instead Marxists, by focusing on class conflict and production, 
treat power as a political-economic apparatus of oppression, and in Hegel and Freud’s theory, 
power is represented as the repression of the individual nature or instinct for the sake of some 
higher reality.133  
           Foucault outlines five main characteristics that these models have in common: (1) The 
negative relation: power is conceived as various kinds of negative relations. “Where sex and 
pleasure are concerned”, this power refuses, denies, and excludes them and “can do nothing but 
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say no to them”. (2) The insistence on the rule: firstly, power is always thought of as a law, 
dictating its rule. For instance, power places sex in the binary of licit and illicit, permitted and 
forbidden. Secondly, “power’s hold on sex is maintained through language, or rather through the 
act of discourse that creates, from the very fact that it is articulated, a rule of law.”134 (3) the cycle 
of prohibition: by considering power as a form of negative relation, a combination of law and 
negativity, one might say that power deploys “nothing more than a law of prohibition with its 
objective that sex renounce itself” and its instrument which is “the threat of a punishment that is 
nothing other than suppression of sex.” (4) The logic of censorship: censorship, according to 
Foucault, is thought to take three distinct forms: affirming that something is banned, preventing 
speech about a thing, and denying that it exists. The “illicit”, the “inexpressible” and the 
“inexistence” are seen as connected in “such a way that each is at the same time the principle and 
the effect of the others.” The logic of censorship, indeed, dictates that “what is inexistent has no 
right to show itself, even in the order of speech where its inexistence is declared; and that which 
one must keep silent about banished from reality as the thing that is tabooed above all else.”(5) 
The uniformity of the apparatus (dispositif): power is conceived as operating in the same way at 
all levels and at all times. Power acts in “uniform and comprehensive manner” throughout its 
structure and “according to the simple and endlessly reproduced mechanisms of law, taboo, and 
censorship: from state to family, from prince to father, from the tribunal to the small change of 
everyday punishments … one finds a general form of power, varying in scale alone.”135  
           In other words, these traditional interpretation models, according to Foucault, understand 
power in terms of limitations––prohibiting certain behaviors by enforcement of laws imposed to 
limit one’s access to the forbidden things and ideas. Foucault says that this negative conception of 
power is inadequate for understanding the sophisticated forms of power in modernity. And he 
proposes a more complex understanding of power. Understanding Foucault’s account of power is 
probably the first step to understand his broader philosophico-political project. Reflections on 
power are made in Discipline and Punish (1975), The Will to Knowledge (1976), and in his lectures 
at the Collège de France in the same period such as Society Must be Defended (1977-78), Security, 
Territory, Population (1977-78), The Birth of Biopolitics (1977-78) and also in many articles, 
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studies, and interviews of the 1970s-1980s. Many of his works on power, indeed, have to do with 
the shifting from the traditional understanding of power to a new understanding of power in terms 
of ‘disciplinary power’ and ‘biopolitics’.  
 For example, Foucault represents two distinct penal systems at the beginning pages of 
Discipline and Punish, separated by eighty years interval. At first, Foucault points out the Gazette 
d’Amsterdam’s136 reports on torture and public execution of Robert-François Damiens137 in 1757, 
and then he immediately refers to the timetable of days of the residents in “the House of Young 
Prisoners in Paris” in 1838. By drawing on these two documents, Foucault highlights the 
importance of the birth of prison for the emergence of the power mechanism of discipline. He 
indicates the transformation of punishment from killing or maiming––as the juridico-legal form of 
punishment in medieval and early modern societies in “which the force of sovereign is imposed 
upon a body”––to the technology of power as a disciplinary and political tactic to domesticate 
behaviors.138 Through argument on the birth of the prison, Foucault attempts to show the 
importance of a new understating of power, which is productive and omnipresent. He refers to the 
concept of panopticism, or panoptic view, which is an architectural concept regarding the 
construction of prisons. It is a circular arrangement of prison cells and at the center of this circle 
is a tower by which a guard, who is stationed there, is able to observe and control the inmates while 
they are not able to see whether the tower’s guard is watching them. The panopticon, therefore, 
serves as a part of disciplinary power, as it provides a feeling of being constantly watched by an 
omnipresent watchful eye.139  
In the last lecture of Society Must be Defended, as well as the last chapter of The Will to 
Knowledge, Foucault states that the traditional “theory of sovereignty” considers the “right of life 
and death” as the basic attributes of society.140 The right of life and death, according to Foucault, 
means that a sovereign has absolute power over the life and the death of his subjects. In other 
words, in a sovereignty system, the subject’s right of life and death is a result of the will of the 
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sovereign. As Foucault writes, “the right of sovereignty was the right to take life or let live.”141 
Foucault illustrates that this juridical form of power was connected to a historical type of society 
(middle age society) wherein power was exercised as a subtraction mechanism, “a right to 
appropriate a portion of the wealth, a tax of products, goods and services, labor and blood, levied 
on the subjects.” 142 Foucault points to public execution, torture and slavery 143 as examples of 
sovereign power’s right over life, because they are operated through the right of seizure and the 
threat of violence to grab time, bodies and ultimately life itself.144 Foucault writes that: 
The sovereign exercised his right of life only by exercising his right to kill, or by 
refraining from killing; he evidenced his power over life only through the death 
he was capable of requiring. The right which was formulated as the ‘power of life 
and death’ was in reality the right to take or let live. Its symbol, after all, was the 
sword.145 
          The model of sovereign power in its more characteristic modern form is theorized in the 
writings of the seventeenth-century English political philosopher Thomas Hobbes. In Hobbes’s 
account of power, “laws are of no power to protect them [people] without a sword in the hands of 
a man, or men, to cause those laws to be put in execution.”146 He argues that: 
For seeing there is no Commonwealth in the world wherein there be rules enough 
set down for the regulating of all the actions and words of men (as being a thing 
impossible): it followeth necessarily that in all kinds of actions, by the laws 
pretermitted, men have the liberty of doing what their own reasons shall suggest 
for the most profitable to themselves.147 
           Thus, Hobbes claims that even in sovereign systems, there are not enough rules to regulate 
all aspects of people’s lives; as a consequence, freedom exists to some extent because “if we take 
liberty in the proper sense, for corporal liberty; that is to say, freedom from chains and prison, it 
were very absurd for men to clamour as they do for the liberty they so manifestly enjoy.”148 In other 
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words, Hobbes argues that it is absurd to imagine that there is a mechanism of power in sovereign 
systems to dictate in detail how subjects must behave in every single aspect of life like desire, 
housing, children education, and diet; thus, subjects in sovereign power are also free and have 
corporal liberty. He elaborates more that:    
The liberty of a subject, lieth therefore only in those things, which in regulating 
their actions, the sovereign hath pretermitted: such as is the liberty to buy, and 
sell, and otherwise contract with one another, to choose their own abode, their 
own diet, their own trade of life, and institute their children as they themselves 
think fit, the like.149  
          While Hobbes claims that subjects are free in any commonwealth as far as the corporal liberty 
is considered, and those corporal aspects of life are outside of interests of the sovereign, Foucault 
argues that those aspects of life are exactly the loci of focus in modern forms of power. Since the 
classical age (XVII century) in the West, according to Foucault, sovereignty has ceased to operate 
in the form theorized by Hobbes. Political power has undergone “a very profound transformation of 
mechanism” and this change has led it to operate differently. “Deduction has tended to be no longer 
the main form of power”: it has not gone away completely, but it has become one element among 
others, and has been for the most part replaced by a power “working to incite, reinforce, control, 
monitor, optimize, and organize the forces under it”. In one sense, instead of destroying, deducting 
and submitting, power has shifted into a productive form––a form of power “bent on generating 
forces, making them grow, and ordering them.”150  
In Society Must be Defended, Foucault says that although power has undergone these 
transformations––from the right of the sovereign to the right of social body––more people have been 
killed in bloody wars since the nineteenth century when many cities were bombed, and millions of 
people died from starvation. Foucault explains that in contemporary times war should be conceived 
“no longer in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the 
existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the 
name of life necessity: massacres have become vital.” According to Foucault, the production of new 
technologies was crucial to this change in the function of power. As Foucault writes:    
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The principle underlying the tactics of battle–that one has to be capable of killing 
in order to go on living–has become the principle that defines the strategy of 
states. But the existence in the question is no longer the juridical existence of 
sovereignty; at stake is the biological existence of a population. If genocide is 
indeed the dream of modern power, this is not because of a recent return of the 
ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of 
life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population.151   
Foucault also asks: how is it possible that power exercises its “highest prerogatives by putting 
people to death when”152 the main role of it, in contemporary times, is to produce forces and put 
them in order? For such a power, Foucault says, ‘capital punishment’ was at the same time a ‘scandal 
and a contradiction’. Thus, capital punishment “could not be maintained except by invoking less the 
enormity of the crime and the safeguard of society. One had the right to kill those who represented 
a kind of biological danger to others.”153 In one sense, in order to maintain people’s social and 
biological survival conditions, the state kills those who can be dangerous to those conditions and not 
only through wholesale slaughters but rather by ‘disallowing’ life to the point of death. Foucault 
says: 
Power would no longer be dealing simply with legal subjects over whom the 
ultimate dominion was death, but with living beings, and the mastery it would be 
able to exercise over them would have to be applied at the level of life itself: it 
was the taking charge of life, more than the threat of death, that gave power its 
access even to the body.154 
          At the beginning of the seventeenth century, Foucault says, ‘this power over life’ was 
constituted around two main poles. Foucault calls the first pole ‘anatomo-politics’ or simply as 
‘discipline’. Disciplinary power operates at the level of single institutions––educational (schools 
and colleges), medical (psychiatric hospitals), and punitive (prisons) institutions––and work 
through tactics such as surveillance, training, and detention. This power concerns each individual 
in society and produces obeying and docile bodies through normalization operations. In other 
words, disciplinary power works at the micro-level, and its main function is to regulate and produce 
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single subjectivities through their subjugations. Instead, on the second pole, Foucault places a 
power that concerns humans not as individuals but as a species. This power over life or what 
Foucault calls biopower is a macro-level technology and works through the state's tactics and what 
Foucault calls governmentality. The biopolitics of population administrates the population as a 
whole by regulating “the propagation, births and morality, the level of health, life expectancy and 
longevity, with all of the conditions that can cause these to vary.”155 In fact, Foucault argues that 
this power over life emphasizes the preservation of health and prevention of diseases as can be seen 
in the following quotation:  
It is the body of society, which became the new principle [of biopolitics] in the nineteenth 
century. It is this social body, which needs to be protected, in a quasi-medical sense. In 
place of the rituals that served to restore the corporeal integrity of the monarch, remedies 
and therapeutic devices are employed such as the segregation of the sick, the monitoring 
of contagions, the exclusion of delinquents. The elimination of hostile elements by the 
supplice (public torture and execution) is thus replaced by the method of asepsis-
criminology, eugenics and the quarantining of “degenerates”.156   
          For Foucault, therefore, the concern of a biopolitical state is to produce “healthy and 
productive citizens”.157 Its aim is to safeguard and enhance the health of the individual’s body in 
order to foster the health of the population. This means that, as argued by Foucault, in modernity 
“biological existence” has come to be “reflected in political existence”. In other words, since the 
nineteenth century, individuals as living beings have become politicalized beings through the state’s 
political tactics; the state’s politics have turned into a biopolitical state. Moreover, as Foucault 
shows in the quote above, the biopolitical state segregates and preserves productive bodies from 
those that can be a threat to the population's health. In one sense, biopolitics in modern states 
“move[s] to manage the population through strategies of fostering respectable and productive 
bodies while divesting in degenerate abject bodies a process of making live and letting die”158. This 
process serves two purposes: firstly, to improve the general life of the whole population, and 
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secondly, to maximize the potential productivity of a population in order to secure “the highest 
profit for the biopolitical nation-state”.159   
         In The Will to Knowledge, Foucault associates biopolitics with the development of scientific 
discourses on sexuality in the nineteenth century, such as medicine, psychiatry, psychology, 
biology, etc. He says, “it was a time when the most singular pleasures were called upon to 
pronounce a discourse of truth concerning themselves, a discourse which had to model itself after 
that which spoke, not of sin and salvation, but of bodies and life processes—the discourse of 
science”160. The topic of sex began to take hold as the center of these discourses, and through them, 
according to Foucault, individuals were incited to talk about themselves and their sexual secrets in 
order to uncover the truth about themselves in relation to sex. Foucault argues that this incitement 
to talk about sex and the production of discourses about sexuality are associated with the 
constitution of subjectivities and identities and the production of new categories of persons through 
the productivity of power-knowledge operations. Foucault identified four strategies of biopolitical 
productivity in order to show how in the nineteenth century in the West, individuals were modeled 
as sexual beings. Firstly, power operations produced a medical-sexual regime with the aim of 
exploring family and children’s sexuality. Secondly, the increased scrutiny and control of sex is a 
part of what Foucault calls “perpetual spirals of power and pleasure” in the sense that power 
achieved direct contact with the body and began to influence its pleasure experience in many ways. 
Foucault here argues that the exercise of power through the medicalization of sexuality brought 
pleasure to doctors and patients during scrutiny, or in other words, “power anchors the pleasure 
that it came to dig out of hiding”. On the one hand, a doctor exercises power through exploring 
and extracting the patient’s sexual pleasures, and this exam gives the doctor a kind of pleasure. On 
the other hand, the doctor highlights the patient’s pleasures, and the patient enjoys being examined. 
Thirdly, the increased exercise of power over sexuality is accompanied by the normalization of 
one particular type of sexuality: the heterosexual conjugal couple. Fourthly, the productivity of 
power operations creates and categorizes “new specifications of individuals” (new categories of 
persons) according to sexual perversion.161 In sum, scientists developed a “will to knowledge” 
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about sex in order to categorize and cure perversions. As Foucault writes, in the nineteenth century, 
“a clinical analysis was made of all the forms of anomalies by which it [sexual instinct] could be 
afflicted; it was assigned a role of normalization or pathologization with respect to all behavior; 
and finally, a corrective technology was sought for these anomalies.”162 Therefore, it was the 
beginning for the “setting apart of ‘unnatural’ as a specific dimension in the field of sexuality”––
“to marry a close relative or practice sodomy, to seduce a nun or engage in sadism, to deceive 
one’s wife or violate cadavers, became things that were essentially different.”163  Of course, as 
Foucault argues, these acts were not new, but rather what was new in the nineteenth century was 
defining “new rules for the game of power and pleasure”164 and interpreting these acts as identities. 
Regarding homosexuality, Foucault claims that the psychological, psychiatric and medical notion 
of the homosexual emerged in 1870,–– Foucault refers to Carl Friedrich Otto Westphal’s famous 
article “Contrary Sexual Sensation” in 1870 that can be considered as the notion of 
homosexuality’s date of birth––from the moment 
it was characterized…less by a type of sexual relations than by a certain quality of sexual 
sensibility, a certain way of inverting the masculine and the feminine in oneself. 
Homosexuality appeared as one of the forms of sexuality when it was transposed from the 
practice of sodomy onto a kind of interior androgyny…the sodomite had been a temporary 
aberration; the homosexual was now a species.165 
        Foucault argues that in the ancient civil codes, “sodomy was a category of forbidden acts; 
their perpetrator was nothing more than the juridical subject of them”. In contrast, the nineteenth-
century homosexual became 
A personage, a past, a case history, and a childhood, in addition to being a type of life, a 
life form, and a morphology, with an indiscreet anatomy and possibly a mysterious 
physiology. Nothing that went into his total composition was unaffected by his sexuality. 
It was everywhere present in him: at the root of all his actions because it was their 
insidious and indefinitely active principle; written immodestly on his face and body 
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because it was a secret that always gave itself away. It was consubstantial with him, less 
as habitual sin than as a singular nature.”166    
         In pre-modern Europe, sex with people of the same-sex (which was defined as sodomy) was 
considered as a moral failure and often a crime––because it violated the laws of nature and civil 
society. On the contrary,  the modern homosexuality was understood as a matter of someone’s very 
nature and not anymore as a punishable act. At the same time, according to Foucault, in the scientific 
works of the nineteenth century, such as Heinrich Kaan’s Psychopathia Sexualis and Krafft-Ebing’s 
Psychopathia Sexualis: A Medico-Legal Study, the perverse sexual acts, such as homosexuality, 
came to be seen as “constitutive anomalies, acquired derivations, infirmities or pathological 
processes”.167 In other words, homosexuality was scientifically taxonomized as an abnormal form 
or illness of sexuality, needing treatments to be cured or normalized. For instance, Krafft-Ebing 
sees homosexuals as sex deviants and situates them in the domain of medicine because for him, not 
only are homosexuality and other non-productive forms of sexuality considered medical afflictions, 
but they are also dangerous for society because they are congenital conditions, heritable traits that 
can degenerate future generations.      
        Therefore, by focusing on Foucault’s critical analysis, we understand that sexuality in general 
and homosexuality, in particular, should not be thought of as a “kind of natural given, which power 
tries to hold in check”.168 Instead, they should be conceived in a power-oriented network, a network 
in which “the stimulation of bodies, the intensification of pleasure, the incitement to discourse, the 
formation of special knowledge, and the strengthening of controls and resistance, are linked to one 
another, in accordance with a few major strategies of knowledge and power”.169 According to 
Foucault, it was the operation of this power-knowledge network or what Foucault calls dispositif that 
made possible the establishment of the modern notion of sex and sexuality. In his analysis, the 
disciplinary power of individual bodies and the biopolitics of population are “two forms of dispositif 
linking technologies of power that operate” through norms to subjugate population and individual 
bodies to “create conditions whereby individual and population are brought or bring themselves into 
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conformity with particular standards”170. However, in the dispositif, agency is always possible. It 
means that the subject is not only affected by power relations but to a certain extent through them, 
subject has the opportunity to resist such technologies of power. To formulate a form of emancipatory 
politics for resisting disciplines and biopower, Foucault goes back to Greco-Roman antiquity to 
propose ethical and aesthetic techniques of the self that are a kind of self-stylization for transforming 
oneself and changing one’s environment.  
      By reworking Foucault’s concept of the dispositif of sexuality, Joseph Massad argues that 
identification of homosexuality and gayness are modern products produced in the Western dispositif 
of sexuality and have been exported to the Middle East. He also denies the Middle Eastern non-
heterosexual’s agency and transformative capacity in relation to homosexual identity. In contrast to 
Massad’s ideas, in the second part of this work my aim is to argue that the Iranian gayness are 
constituted in the Iranian dispositif of sexuality and specifically in the biopolitical system of the post-
revolutionary era. Moreover, my aim is to argue that Iranian homosexuals are able to open a space of 
agency and self-transformation through ethical and aesthetic techniques of the self to resist the 
totalizing manner of dispositif.  For this sake, in the next paragraph, I will explain at length the 
Foucauldian concept of dispositif, and in the subsequent one, I will elaborate on Foucault’s account 
of technologies of the self, and I will give the example of gay movements as a form of aesthetic 
resistance for the creation of new forms of life. Then, the first part of this work, on Foucault, will 
end, and the second part will start, where I will use the methodological tools molded by Foucault in 
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2.2         Dispositif 
      Dispositif is a key term in Foucault’s thought, representing the network of power-knowledge 
relations within which a “human being is transformed into both a subject and an object of power 
relations”.171 Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben, in the essay ‘What Is an Apparatus?172 
develops a “brief genealogy” to trace the Foucauldian concept of the dispositif. Agamben relates 
it to the notion of positivity—etymologically very similar to dispositif—as used by Foucault in The 
Archeology of Knowledge.173 Agamben finds the first uses of positivity in the works of Jean 
Hyppolite, Foucault’s teacher at École Normale Supérieure, especially his work on Hegel titled 
Introduction to Hegel’s Philosophy of History.174 Thus, according to Agamben, the likely source 
of dispositif goes back to Hegel. In Hegel’s thought, “positive religion” is in opposition to “natural 
religion”.175 While the primary concern of natural religion is related to the general relations of 
human reason regarding divinity, positive religion is concerned with a set of rules and beliefs that 
are imposed on the individuals of a certain society by an external power176.  
       Regarding the concept of positivity, Agamben argues that Foucault’s main concern is “the 
investigation of concrete modes in which the positivities (or the apparatuses [dispositifs]) act 
within the relations, mechanisms and plays of power”.177 Agamben then traces back the 
etymological root of the French use of dispositif and finds that it derives from the Greek term 
oikonomia that signifies the administration of oikos (home) and management. The term oikonomia 
at first was introduced to Christian theology and then translated into dispositio by Church Fathers. 
The term dispositio in Christian theology can be understood as the administration and management 
that God imposes on Christ, the second person of the Holy Trinity.178 Agamben also points out 
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etymologically the relation of dispositif to the Latin noun dispositio and the Latin verb dis-ponere, 
which correspond to the meanings: ordering, arranging, and setting out.179  
        Unfortunately, there is not a satisfactory English translation of dispositif. The concept of 
dispositif in Foucault’s works is often translated into “apparatus”, “deployment” or “device”: 
Despite Agamben’s genealogy, even in the English edition of his essay, it is translated into 
“apparatus”. However, in connection with Foucault’s texts, these translations can be misleading. 
Mark G.E. Kelly, in a guidebook on The History of Sexuality Volume I, points out that the 
translation ‘apparatus’ is more popular among translators of Foucault, but the word can be used 
also for other French terms like appareillage and appareil. In particular, the use of appareil by 
Louis Althusser in the essay Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses180 was translated into 
apparatus and “use [ing] apparatus for Foucault’s dispositif makes it seem like he is referencing 
Althusser where he is not”.181 
      The other common translation for dispositif is “deployment”, which suggests a military context 
and implies that there is a process of deployment or that someone is deploying something, but this 
is not the case when Foucault refers to dispositif. The other translation is “device” that implies 
something much more immaterial, while Foucault’s choice of dispositif encompasses both material 
and immaterial components, something linguistic and non-linguistic, discursive and non-
discursive.182 Concerning discussions on the translations of dispositif and Agamben’s genealogy, I 
prefer to use the French term dispositif in my English-language text because these translations 
contain meanings that are different from what dispositif itself implies in the philosophy of Foucault.  
         In an interview from 1977, Foucault is asked about the “meaning” or “the methodological 
function” of the dispositif and he gives a detailed definition as follows: 
What I’m trying to pick out with this term is, firstly, a thoroughly heterogeneous 
ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory 
decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, 
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moral and philanthropic propositions—in short, the said as much as the unsaid. 
Such are the elements of the apparatus [dispositif]. The apparatus [dispositif] itself 
is the system of relations that can be established between these elements. Secondly, 
what I am trying to identify in this apparatus [dispositif] is precisely the nature of 
the connection that can exist between these heterogeneous elements. Thus, a 
particular discourse can figure at one time as the programme of an institution, and 
at another it can function as a means of justifying or masking a practice which itself 
remains silent, or as a secondary re-interpretation of this practice, opening out for 
it a new field of rationality. In short, between these elements, whether discursive 
or non-discursive, there is a sort of interplay of shifts of positions and modifications 
of function, which can also vary very widely. Thirdly, I understand by the term 
‘apparatus’ [dispositif] a sort of—shall we say—formation which has as its major 
function at a given historical moment that of responding to an urgent need. The 
apparatus [dispositif] thus has a domain strategic function.183    
       According to this definition, the methodological function of the concept of dispositif allows 
Foucault to bring together and arrange a set of heterogeneous elements of culture to analyze and 
show how their interlocking connections result in historical formations that are not constant or 
preordained and how the subject is constituted within these historical formations. Foucault 
emphasizes that the analysis of changing historical relationships remains a central element in his 
methodology184. Furthermore, by considering both discursive elements (writing and language) and 
non-discursive elements (institutions, laws, and administrative measures), Foucault’s strategy goes 
beyond epistemic statements—which are entirely language-based185. In this context, Foucault 
“gradually replaced the notion of episteme by that of dispositif, moving from discursive object to 
non-discursive practices, strategies and institutions”186. Moreover, whereas “episteme outlines the 
constitution of a body of knowledge, dispositif is entirely centered around power effects and a body 
of knowledge is developed in relation to power”187. As noted by Stuart Elden in Foucault’s Last 
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Decade, dispositif is “more than just an apparatus or mechanism, but it replaces the earlier notion 
of episteme as a collection of rules for the formation of knowledge, now including relations of 
power, practice, and action. As Foucault’s work on knowledge shifts to power-knowledge, so too 
does the episteme to the dispositif.”188 As Foucault insists, “discursive practices are not purely and 
simply ways of producing discourse. They are embodied in technical processes, in institutions, in 
patterns of behaviors, in forms for transmission and diffusion”189.  
       In the first volume of his trilogy on the history of sexuality, Foucault refers to a fundamental 
distinction that marks the rise of biopower in modern European history as the distinction between 
two intertwined dispositifs. According to Foucault, prior to the end of the eighteenth century, the 
regulation of social life was mediated through what Foucault calls the dispositif of alliance:  
Relations of sex gave rise, in every society, to a deployment [dispositif] of alliance: 
a system of marriage, of fixation and development of kinship ties, of transmission of 
names and possessions.190  
Instead, from the eighteenth century, a new dispositif, the dispositif of sexuality, was deployed by 
Western societies and superimposed on the dispositif of alliance. This modern dispositif has 
increasingly come to reduce the importance of the former dispositif without completely changing 
its efficacy over time. Foucault states that these two systems can be contrasted terms by terms.  
The deployment [dispositif] of alliance is built around a system of rules defining the 
permitted and the forbidden, the licit and the illicit, whereas the deployment of 
sexuality operates according to mobile, polymorphous, and contingent techniques 
of power. The deployment [dispositif] of alliance has as one of its chief objectives 
to reproduce the interplay of relations and maintain the law that governs them; the 
deployment [dispositif] of sexuality, on the other hand, engenders a continual 
extension of areas and forms of control. For the first, what is pertinent is the link 
between partners and define status; the second is concerned with the sensation of 
the body, the quality of pleasures, and the nature of impressions, however tenuous 
or imperceptible these may be. Lastly, if the deployment [dispositif] of alliance is 
firmly tied to the economy due to the role it can play in the transmission or 
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circulation of wealth, the deployment [dispositif] of sexuality is linked to the 
economy through numerous and subtle relays, the main one of which, however, is 
body—the body that produces and consumes191.      
       One dispositif, Foucault claims, does not completely supplant another one, and both of them 
do not possess exclusive fields of forces and historical periods. Rather the dispositif of sexuality 
was based on the dispositif of alliance. Foucault argues that sexuality originally came into 
existence from the dispositif of alliance. As I have explained, confession, which is a central issue 
in the formation of sexuality, and the sexual subject, was initially a practice focused on the question 
of marital relations—the core point of the dispositif of alliance—and later expanded beyond this 
function. As explained in the previous paragraph, the dispositif of sexuality is a biopolitical 
dispositif that, on the one hand, focuses on the politics of body and how power is exercised through 
it in order to regulate and discipline the human body. On the other hand, this dispositif is concerned 
with the body of society and management of its life processes such as health, disease, regulation 
of birth and sexual relations. 192 
       The transition from alliance to sexuality was made possible through a common theme to both 
dispositifs. What remained as a shared locus throughout this transition was the family cell. 
Foucault insists that family is central to both dispositifs of alliance and sexuality. It is in the family 
that the dispositifs of alliance and sexuality have the most contact193. Foucault regards the family 
as a traditional institution that held rights over its members. However, he argues that its power has 
been weakened over centuries, and it has been subjected to the infiltration by disciplinary power 
and biopower194. In his lecture at the Collège de France 1974-1975 titled Abnormal, he states that 
the new form of family in European societies took shape during the nineteenth century and then 
was substituted with the traditional family. In this lecture, he compares the modern and traditional 
forms of family: 
Until the middle of the eighteenth century, the aristocratic or bourgeois family … was 
above all a sort of relational system. It was a bundle of relation of ancestry, descent, 
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collateral relations, cousinhood, primogeniture, and alliance corresponding to 
schemas for the transmission of kinship and the division of goods and social status. 
Sexual prohibitions effectively focused on these kinds of relations.195    
      In contrast to the traditional family, we now encounter a biopolitical form of family that is “a 
sort of restricted, close-knit, substantial, compact, corporeal, and affective family core: the cell 
family in place of the relational family; the cell family with its corporeal, affective, and sexual 
space entirely saturated by direct parent-child relationships”196. He argues that the newborn family 
is medicalized, normalized, and panoptic, and parents function as doctors within the family cell 
or, in other words, as instruments of interests of the biopolitical state. Foucault writes that  
In the family, parents and relatives became the chief agents of a deployment 
[dispositif] of sexuality which drew its outside support from doctors, educators, and 
later psychiatrists, and which began by competing with the relations of alliance but 
soon ‘psychologized’ or ‘psychiatrized’ the latter. Then, these new personages made 
their appearance: the nervous woman, the frigid wife, the indifferent mother—or 
worse, the mother beset by murderous obsessions—the impotent, sadistic, perverse 
husband, the hysterical or neurasthenic girl, the precious and already exhausted 
child, and the young homosexual who rejects marriage or neglects his wife. These 
were the combined figures of an alliance gone bad and an abnormal sexuality; they 
were the means by which the disturbing factors of the latter were brought into 
former; and yet they also provided an opportunity for the alliance system to assert 
its prerogatives in the order of sexuality… the family was the crystal in the 
deployment [dispositif] of sexuality: it seemed to be the source of a sexuality which 
it actually only reflected and diffracted. By virtue of its permeability, and through 
that process of reflections to the outside, it became one of the most valuable tactical 
components of the deployment197.     
       Pursuing this disciplining and biopoliticalization of the family in the modern era, Foucault 
investigates the manners through which the nineteenth-century family was steeped in sexuality.  In 
the first volume of The History of Sexuality, Foucault points to the three axes of biopower—
pedagogy, medicine and demography—that have specific targets: pedagogy “the sexuality of 
children”; medicine “the sexual physiology peculiar to women”; and demography, “the 
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spontaneous or concerted regulation of births” along with the medicine of perversions and the 
programs of eugenics. As a result of the sexualization of the family institution through the process 
of biopoliticization, according to Foucault, these four strategic unities (the sexuality of women, 
the sexuality of children, the regulation of birth, and the taxonomization of perversions) were 
developed as main domains of the dispositif of sexuality: 
  - A hysterization of women’s bodies: biopolitics targeted women’s bodies through “a 
threefold process whereby the feminine body was analyzed—qualified and disqualified—as being 
thoroughly saturated with sexuality; whereby it was integrated into the sphere of medical practices, 
by reason of a pathology intrinsic to it”. Therefore, the feminine body was placed in an “organic 
communication” with the social body “(whose regulated fecundity it [feminine body] was 
supposed to ensure)”; the family space “(of which it had to be a substantial and functional 
element)”; and the life of children “(which it produced and had to guarantee, by virtue of a 
biologico-moral responsibility lasting through the entire period of the children’s education): the 
Mother, with her negative image of ‘nervous women,’ constituted the most visible form of this 
hysterization”. 198 
- A pedagogization of children’s sex: a paradoxical argumentative strategy stating that all 
children were prone to indulge in sexual activity; and that, “being unwarranted, at the same time 
‘natural’ and ‘contrary to nature’ this sexual activity posed physical and moral, individual and 
collective dangers”. In one sense, children were defined as “preliminary sexual beings” who 
engage in sexual behavior, but at the same time, this was considered completely inappropriate. 
This double assertion led to a major attempt to educate the sexuality of children in an appropriate 
direction. For this reason, “parents, families, educators, doctors, and eventually psychologists 
would have to take charge, in a continuous way, of this precious and perilous, dangerous and 
endangered sexual potential”199.     
- A socialization of procreative behavior: Foucault describes how sexuality was deployed 
through what he calls the “socialization of procreative behavior” in the course of the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries.200 Sexual reproduction was located in the process of socialization, a way 
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to socialize couples’ procreative behavior as much as possible in terms of social and economic 
concerns. This process was composed by “an economic socialization via all the incitements and 
restrictions, the social and fiscal measures brought to bear on the fertility of couples”; “a political 
socialization "achieved through the responsibilization of couples with regard to the social body as 
a whole (which had to be limited or on the contrary reinvigorated)”; and a “medical socialization 
carried out by attributing a pathogenic value—for the individual and the species—to birth-control 
practices”.201   
- Psychiatrization of perverse pleasure: Foucault writes that during the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, sexuality was categorized as a “separate biological” and psychological 
instinct; therefore, “a clinical analysis was made of all the forms of anomalies by which it [sexual 
instinct] could be afflicted; it was assigned a role of normalization or pathologization with respect 
to all behavior; and family, a corrective technology was sought for these anomalies.”202 This fourth 
strategy is tightly related to the medicalization of sexual perversion that led to the emergence of 
homosexuality that I explained in paragraph 2.1 “Power”.  
      Such strategies, as Foucault contests, are the way through which biopower works to govern 
life by regulating in the domain of dispositif of sexuality. However, Foucault claims that  
“resistance comes first, and resistance remains superior to the forces of the process; power relations 
are obliged to change with the resistance… resistance is the main word, the key word, in this 
dynamic”203. In Foucault’s thought, power produces its resistance; thus there is always a possibility 
of resistance in the domain of a dispositif. Foucault argues that “where there is power, there is 
resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in 
relation to power.”204 In this sense, “power and resistance are coeval: power always engenders 
resistance, resistance always elicits counter-resistance”.205 The dispositif defines the subject and, 
at the same time, opens a space within which the subject has the opportunity to break free of power 
relations. Therefore, the subject in the dispositif can be seen as both affected by and affecting 
power relations. And freedom is not a mere resistance, in the sense of a simple negation, to power. 
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Rather, it is a form of careful and creative deployment of power.206 The key task, for Foucault, is 
to “refuse what we are” to “promote new forms of subjectivity through the refusal of this kind of 
individuality which has been imposed on us for several centuries”207. The possibility of resistance, 
according to Foucault, lays in the ability of subjects to construct an ethical form of life through the 
practices of the self 208 in order to work out the game of power.  
       French philosopher Gilles Deleuze is the first who devoted an essay on the Focault’s 
conceptualization of dispositif and conceptualized his own treatment concerning this notion. In the 
essay ‘What is a Dispositif?’209 Deleuze describes Foucault’s concept of dispositif as a “multilinear 
ensemble” of different lines that produce a heterogeneous network of discourses, practices, 
subjects and objects. He considers the concept of dispositif as a relationship between words and 
things. He says that “the first two dimensions of an apparatus [dispositif] or the ones that Foucault 
first extracted are the curves of visibility and the curves of utterance”. According to him, dispositifs 
can be thought of as “machines that make one see and speak” (knowledge), “lines of force [that] 
come about in any relationship between one point and another, and passes through every area in 
the apparatus [dispositif]” (power), and “lines of subjectification” (subject) that allow subjectivity 
to “come into being or make it possible” 210. In Deleuze’s view, in Foucault’s works, “there will 
be always a relation to oneself that resists” against dispositifs”211. He almost shares a similar kind 
of perspective with Foucault and argues that subjects have a potential to break free of the totalizing 
logic of dispositif. According to him, "practices of freedom are not outside power relations; instead, 
they are a negotiation of it and the “act of freedom constitutes itself through acting at the limit” of 
the dispositif212. This is why Deleuze says that power relation has a “folding” character. He writes 
that:     
The outside is not a fixed limit but a moving matter animated by peristaltic 
movements, folds, and foldings that together make up an inside: they are not 
something other than outside, but precisely the inside of the outside… the inside as 
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operation of the outside: in all his work Foucault seems haunted by this theme of an 
inside which is merely the fold of the outside, as if the ship were a folding of the sea.213  
      Individuals cannot move outside of or escape from the totalizing manner of dispositif to 
achieve freedom; instead, they are able to think from the outside, from the limit of the dispositif. 
Therefore, what the dispositif produces is an “inside as an interiorisation of the outside”. According 
to Deleuze, this “folding” character of power relations in dispositif opens a space for individuals 
to transgress. In the Deleuzean reading of Foucault, the subjectification process is figured as a 
process of folding.214 Subjectivity is enabled and produced by power-knowledge relations within 
the constraints of dispositif, but it is the subject who exercises power within the constraints of the 
power relation network for producing the transgressive freedom, which gives rise to the self-
creation of the new. Thus, dispositif, according to Deleuze, is a heterogeneous, dynamic, and 
moving configuration. 
        Agamben also conceptualizes his own treatment of the concept dispositif. If Deleuze’s 
conceptualization of dispositif privileges the transformative capacity and dynamicity of dispositif, 
Agamben stresses the totalizing manner of power by which dispositifs produce subjects or serve 
to desubjectivize them. He interprets dispositif as a conglomeration of practices, tasks, processes, 
inclusions, and exclusions that together make up a great “machine of governance” that produces 
subjectification.215 His definition of dispositif as a machine bears a close affinity to Heidegger’s 
notion of machination, whose main function is to produce subjects216. However, according to 
Agamben, dispositif as a machine tends to desubjectivize rather than produce subjects. According 
to him, desubjectification is at the heart of today’s crisis of the subject. Agamben gives the example 
of TV watcher and mobile phone user as forms of desubjectification and writes that 
what we are now witnessing is that processes of subjectifications and practices of 
desubjectification seem to become reciprocally indifferent, and so they do not give rise 
to the recomposition of a new subject, except in larval or, as it were, spectral form. In 
the nontruth of the subject, its own truth is no longer at stake. He who let himself be 
captured by the ‘cellular telephone’ apparatus [dispositifs]—whatever the intensity of 
                                                          
213 Deleuze, Foucault (New York: Continuum, 1999), 96-97. 
214 Forest, “The Dispositif between Foucault and Agamben”, 165.  
215 Agamben, What is an Apparatus?, 20. 
216 Luigi Pellizzoni, Ontological Politics in a Disposable World: The New Mastery of Nature (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2016), 181. 
 
  51  
 
the desire that has driven him—cannot acquire a new subjectivity, but only a number 
through which he can, eventually, be controlled. The spectator who spends his evenings 
in front of the television set only gets, in exchange for his desubjectification, the 
frustrated mask of the couch potato, or his inclusion in the calculation of viewership 
ratings.217        
       Compared to Foucault and Deleuze, Agamben sees dispositif in a much more totalizing 
manner and argues that the subject—that is produced and dominated by dispositif—is not able to 
escape the control of the dispositif or to utilize the dispositif (due to the operation of the 
governmental machine). But Foucault’s thought is different: for him, as already explained, 
resistance is not exterior to power. For him, resistance is connected to an ethical and aesthetic self-
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2.3       The Practice of the Self 
  In this paragraph, I will discuss Foucault’s understanding of ethics and the practices of the 
self, and I will show how, according to the author, within the totalizing manner of the biopolitical 
dispositif, subjects can transform themselves into ethical subjects through ethical works. Then I 
will propose that queer rights movements might have represented a form of ethical resistance for 
the creation of a new form of life. Then, in the second part of this work, I will use the theoretical 
tools developed by Foucault in order to understand the complexity regarding gay subjectivity, 
subjectification and gay community in Iran today. But first, some discussion is needed on the 
Foucauldian concept of subjectivity and subjectification.  
       In Disciple and Punish 218 and The History of Sexuality: Volume 1,219 Foucault analyzes the 
relation of subjectivity with power and argues that power is not just repressive, nor does it just act 
upon the subject from above. Rather, the subject is produced through and within power-knowledge 
relations. As Tina Besley states, it was Nietzsche that “inspired Foucault to analyze the different 
modes by which human beings become subjects without privileging either power (as in Marxism) 
or desire (as in Freud).”220 As Nietzsche, through genealogical narrative, Foucault argues that there 
is “no essence of human beings, and therefore no possibility for universalist theories concerning 
the nature of human beings” as a fixed human nature once and for all. Instead, he argues that 
subjectivity should be conceived in an intersecting relation of discourse, power, and knowledge.221 
And he also argues that power should be understood as “a productive network which runs through 
the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression”.222 
Knowledge, on the other hand, is connected to power in a productive way: “power and knowledge 
are joined together”. Discourse does not limit the subject at the level of language. Rather, “a 
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multiplicity of discursive elements […] can come into play in various strategies” 223 to shape 
specific knowledge, generate truth effects, construct reality and the subject itself.   
       In an essay titled The Subject and Power224 , Foucault argues that the process through which 
human beings become subjects deals with three modes that he calls “modes of objectification”. 
The first are the “modes of inquiry which try to give themselves the status of sciences”, for 
example, “the objectivizing” of speaking and living subject through discourses of linguistics and 
philology. Another example of these first modes is “the objectivizing of the productive subject, 
the subject who labors in the analysis of wealth and of economics”.225 The second mode of 
objectification concerns what Foucault calls “dividing practices”—practices that divide the subject 
either inside her or himself or from others.226 Dividing practices are “modes of manipulation that 
combine the mediation of a science (or pseudo-science) and the practice of exclusion, usually in a 
spatial sense, but always in a social one.”227 These practices are processes of “social objectification 
and categorization within which human beings are given social and personal identity”. For 
example, in these processes, the dividing practices separate the criminal from the non-criminal or 
sexually abnormal from sexually normal. The third mode of objectification is what Foucault calls 
“subjectifications”. This mode concerns the way human beings turn themselves into a subject. The 
third mode differs in significant ways from two other modes. While in both modes of 
objectification—objectivizing the subject through dividing practices and various social scientific 
forms of classification, both as techniques of domination—individuals are compiled in a passive 
position. On the contrary, the third mode is a process of self-formation in which individuals are 
active.228  
       Foucault focuses on this third mode in his later works, especially in his books The Use of 
Pleasure229 and The Care of the Self,230 and Confessions of the Flesh231 where he describes how in 
the Hellenistic era, individuals began to take up “a certain number of operations on [their] own 
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bodies, on their own soul, on their own thoughts, on their own conduct, and way of being” in order 
to elaborate and transform themselves into ethical subjects.232 Foucault also dedicates his lectures 
at the Collège de France The Hermeneutics of The Subject233 and The Courage of Truth234 to the 
question of the discontinuities and changes in the construction and understanding of the self from 
antiquity until modernity, with a particular focus on Greco-Roman and Christian practices of the 
self. In connection with this topic, in an interview in 1984 titled The Ethic of Care of the Self as a 
Practice of Freedom, he discusses the distinction between the Greco-Roman notion of the care of 
the self—which deals with practices of ethical self-transformation and one’s relation to oneself—
and the Christian understanding of the self that is achieved through knowledge and a preoccupation 
with truth through the confessional mechanism.235 Early Christian practices of the self were carried 
out within an interconnection of power and truth through which individuals come to know the truth 
about themselves and gain access to truth through a process of self-sacrifice.236 In one sense, in 
Christianity, subjectivity is achieved only by way of sacrificing the self. By doing so, individuals 
“are guided toward salvation by others to whom they subordinate themselves”.237 Within this 
salvation-oriented relationship, the subordinate individuals should submit to certain forms of 
“generated truths such as doctrines and codes”238 and participate in various kinds of practices, 
“general rules, particular knowledge, precepts, methods of examination, confessions, and 
interviews”, in order to reveal the truth and inner self239.     
       Foucault calls this kind of subjectivity a “hermeneutic” and “confessional” mode of 
subjectivity240, which is formed through “activities of self-interpretation (hermeneutics is the art 
of interpretation) and self-expression (confession is the art or practice of expressing and 
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communicating that which is difficult but necessary to say)”.241 Foucault’s point is that the 
practices of hermeneutics and confession are at the service of a regulatory power that produces 
subjects who are compelled to decipher and discern the inner truth about their desires. He argues 
that the hermeneutic and confessional mechanisms have been diffused “across Western culture 
through numerous channels and integrated with various types of attitudes and experiences”.242 For 
example, the interpretive dialogues between a psychiatrist and patient or priest and confessor do 
not merely disclose inner truth, but they also produce a “self that lives a certain way, that sees itself 
and the world in terms of normalization, self-interpretation and self-expression.”243 
       In response to this hermeneutic and confessional subjectivity, Foucault proposes an alternative 
way of thinking about and forming our lives and selves. For him, subjectivity is not something we 
are, rather he sees it as an activity that we do. Therefore, if subjectivity is an “active becoming” 
rather than a “fixed being”, the desire to discover one’s inner truth is vain. In order to analyze this 
way of understanding subjectivity, he turns to the ancient Greeks’ philosophical notions of the care 
of the self and Parrhesia.244 In 1981-82 Collège de France course, The Hermeneutics of the 
Subject, he notes that in the history of Western thought, the Socratic imperative “know yourself” 
is considered the “funding formula of history of philosophy” in terms of the relation between 
subject and truth. However, he states that “you have to know yourself”, in the ancient Greek 
philosophy, was not simply grounded in search of one’s inner truth as in Christian confession. 
Rather it was interwoven with the “care of the self”.245 He argues that in ancient Greek philosophy, 
subjectivity was based on the care of the self and knowing oneself functioned as one, among many, 
practices for taking care of the self. However, due to the philosophical influences of Descartes, as 
well as scientific achievements and influences of religion, in modernity, the imperative “know 
yourself” completely replaced “care of the self”.246  
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         Through his genealogical research on the subject, Foucault then provides a different mode 
of “ethical subjectivity” in “antiquity” that revolved around “the care of the self” 247. For him, 
“ancient philosophy can be comprehended… as a vast project of inventing, defining, elaborating 
and practicing a complex care of the self”. 248 In his book The Care of the Self, Foucault argues 
that in the philosophical and medical texts of the first centuries after Christ, there is an insistence 
on “the attention that should be brought to bear on oneself”.249 This attention, in the Hellenistic 
era, is linked to “the practices of self-fashioning that one takes up in order to give one’s existence 
a particular form”. 250 Care of the self is an intensification and elaboration of the self and 
“designates a number of actions exercised on the self by the self, actions by which one takes 
responsibility for oneself and by which one changes, purifies, transforms and transfigures 
oneself”.251 It is a set of practices and techniques that one performs actively on oneself in order to 
transform oneself and to achieve a “certain mode of being”.252 When Foucault talks about the care 
of the self, indeed, he also refers to some techniques that he calls “technologies of the self”. These 
techniques include writing exercises, mediations, dialogues with oneself, and Parrhesia (I will 
give the example of Parrhesia in the next pages). Through these techniques, the subject is able to 
elaborate a personal ethos.253 Foucault characterizes these techniques of the self as “the procedures, 
which no doubt exist in every civilization, suggested or prescribed to individuals in order to 
determine their identity, maintain it and transform it in terms of a certain number of ends, through 
relations of self-mastery or self-knowledge.”254 Foucault notes that in Hellenistic and Roman eras, 
these techniques of the self embodied a “conversion or transformation” process. He argues that in 
these practices “the truth is never given to subject[s] by right… subject[s] does not have the right 
of access to the truth and is not capable of having access to the truth”, but rather, “truth is only 
given to the subject[s] at a price that brings the subject’s being into play”. Therefore, in order to 
embody their truth, the subjects have to “be changed, transformed, shifted, and become, to some 
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extent and up to a certain point, other than himself”.255 Thus, care of the self is a practice of 
“conversion” that “may take place in the form of a movement that removes the subject from his 
current status and condition”.256 It is at this level that power is concerned. In fact, according to 
Foucault, “the struggle against the forms of subjection—against the submission of subjectivity” is 
a fundamental ethical technique of the self that leads to the process of forming oneself as an 
“ethical subject”.257  
       In The Use of Pleasure, Foucault uses a fourfold ethical framework to designate how the 
subject transforms himself ethically through (1) ethical substance, (2) mode of subjection, (3) 
ethical work, and (4) telos.258 The ethical substance deals with determining an aspect of the self 
(an aspect of one’s identity, behavior and emotion) that needs to be problematized and worked on. 
For the Greeks, ethical substance equated to pleasure because a lack of restraint to exercise 
moderation in sexual activities represented a disrepute. In contrast, for Christians ethical substance 
equated to desire because, for instance, any erotic yearning was a sign of the first sin.259 After 
identifying the ethical substance, through the mode of subjection, subjects position themselves in 
relation to certain roles, moral codes, and norms, then they are able to recognize their obligation 
and different ways of obeying and conforming to rules and regulations. For the Greeks, while 
modes of subjection were an aesthetic-political decision to transform one’s life into a work of art, 
Christians viewed it as a juridico-religious injunction or divine law. 260 In the next step, through a 
critical reflection on the mode of subjection, subjects can determine the specific practices that one 
needs to engage in to achieve one’s ethical aims. For the Greeks, ethical work included aesthetic-
political techniques (of contemplation and body exercises) or self-forming activities through which 
one can transform oneself into an autonomous, ethical agent. On the other hand, for Christians, 
ethical work included uncovering of hidden desires through examination and self-deciphering that 
could be practiced through the use of self-renouncing and confessional techniques.261 
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       The last component of this framework is telos or teleology that deals with goals or the mode 
of being toward which this ethical activity is directed. In order to achieve telos, one can take 
different paths to change oneself into an ethical subject. For Christians, telos was self-renunciation, 
while for Greeks, it was self-mastery. 262 By drawing on ancient Greek philosophy, Foucault points 
to the practice of truth telling or Parrhesia as an ethical work to transform oneself into an ethical 
subject. But in order to know what Parrhesia is and how it functions as an ethical work, we need 
to know why Foucault shifts from the care of the self to it in his last lectures at the Collège de 
France.  
       Foucault’s account of care of the self adheres to the idea that care of the self is ethical in itself 
and “ontologically” and “ethically” prior to care for others: “care for others should not be put 
before the care of oneself”.263 As Fred Evans claims, this assertion “makes care of others appear 
as only a derivative concern and care of the self as narcissistic”.264 However, by drawing on the 
Hellenic school of thought such as Cynics, Foucault elaborates a specific treatment of care of the 
self. The Cynics hold the idea that care of the self means looking after others, and caring for others 
is at the same time care for oneself. According to the Cynics, through the care of the self and the 
others “an individual bond with individuals”265, and this “bond” is “true political activity, the true 
politeuesthai”.266 Foucault notes that Cynics’s care of the self is a sort of solidarity with humanity: 
“thus it is [Cynic] solidarity with humankind which is […] the object of [Cynic] care, concern, and 
supervision when [the Cynic] looks at how men act and spend their lives, and when he inquiries 
into what they take care of”. He then concludes that “the Cynic is someone, consequently, who, 
caring for others in order to know what these others care about, at the same time and thereby cares 
for himself”.267 This way, Foucault upholds the Cynics version of Parrhesia—through which 
subjects practice care of the self as the way in which each relates to themselves and to others—as 
a worthy way of life also for our own time.       
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       Parrhesia is a Greek concept in ancient philosophy that deals with the “act of telling the truth 
out of one’s moral duty, even in dangerous situations”.268 Foucault dedicates especially his Collège 
de France lectures The Courage of Truth to this concept, but we can also reconstruct it from 
Fearless Speech, a seminar that he gave in 1983 at the University of California, Berkeley. Here, 
Foucault highlights five important characteristics of Parrhesia: frankness, truth, danger, criticism 
and duty: “in Parrhesia, the speaker uses his freedom and chooses frankness instead of persuasion, 
truth instead of falsehood or silence, the risk of death instead of life and security, criticism instead 
of flattery, and moral duty instead of self-interest and moral apathy”. 269  For Foucault, even more 
than the care of the self, it is Parrhesia that as an ethos of self-transformation, represents an 
alternative to Christian and modern way of understanding the subject.  As he says in the seminar:    
I believe that with that notion of parrhesia – with [its] political roots and 
moral derivation... there is a possibility to pose the question of the subject 
and of the truth from the point of view of a practice that we could call the 
rule of oneself and of others. .... It seems to me that by 
examining a bit the notion of parrhesia we can see connecting together  
the analysis of modes of truth-telling, the study of the 
techniques of governmentality, and the localization, of the forms 
of practices of the self.270  
      In Foucault’s definition, Parrhesia is the courage to speak the truth: it is “linked to courage in 
the face of danger: it demands the courage to speak the truth in spite of some danger.” Parrhesia 
is a “form of criticism, either towards another or towards oneself, but always in a situation where 
the speaker or confessor is in a position of inferiority with respect to the interlocutor”.271 In the 
Berkeley seminar, Foucault illustrates the public use of Parrhesia. For doing so, he returns to the 
Cynics’ tradition in which truth telling is a means of instruction.272 He highlights three practices 
of the Cynics’ version of Parrhesia: critical preaching, scandalous behavior and procreative 
dialogue.273 Foucault states that critical preaching “is still one of the main forms of truth telling 
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practiced in our society”,274 “directed against social institutions, the arbitrariness of the rules, of 
law, and any sort of lifestyle that was dependent upon such institutions or laws”.275 The Cynics 
also used “scandalous behavior or attitudes” that “call into question collective habits, opinions, 
standards of decency, institutional rules and so on”. Additionally, they used procreative dialogues, 
which is a unique variation of Socratic dialogue by which “individuals examine and challenge each 
other’s most cherished beliefs”. 276  
       By drawing on Foucault’s concepts, I would argue that although homosexuality itself is a form 
of dispositif—produced in nineteenth-century Europe through the intersection of power, 
knowledge and discourse—, and that homosexuals have historically resisted within their own 
dispositifs to transform themselves into ethical subjects through forms of care of the self and 
Parrhesia. This is exactly what Massad ignores in his argument about homosexual identification 
in the Middle East. Massad argues that incitement to speak about sexual identity, to speak about 
sexuality as the "truth" of oneself, represents an instrument of Western colonialism of the Arab 
world and the Middle East. But he ignores that Middle Eastern non-heterosexuals, through their 
agency and transformative capacity, are able to resist their dispositifs and construct their own local 
gayness. In this paragraph, I suggest that gay/queer rights movements might represent a form of 
collective ethical resistance as well as truth telling that have given rise to the critique of social-
sexual norms and laws. Through considering the gay/queer rights movements as a form of 
collective ethical resistance, I will show how within the legal-social and historical context of 
Western societies of the nineteenth century until the present, homosexuals have transformed 
themselves into ethical subjects, subjects who are “capable of political acts of resistance, 
contestation and even revolt”.277   
       For example, in Il Sessuale Politico: Freud con Marx, Fanon, Foucault, Lorenzo Bernini 
argues that besides sexologists and psychiatrists, homosexuals themselves contributed to the 
historical process of construction of homosexual identity and at the same time gave rise to the first 
homosexual rights movements around the seventies of the nineteenth century.278 In this period, 
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German homosexual activists, such as Ulrichs, Kertbeny and Hirschfeld began to problematize 
their ethical substance (that could be their sexuality or sexual existence) and were able to recognize 
and resist the moral, religious, and juridical heterosexual norms that regulated them.279 
Additionally, through the public use of Parrhesia (critique of social institutions, rules, norms and 
collective habits), they tried to gain a sexual or a gendered state of being and construct their own 
homosexual subjectivity. In the 1870s, in Berlin, a movement of opinion was formed which called 
for the abolition of paragraph 143 of the Prussian penal code, which punished sexual acts against 
nature (and which would later be extended first to the Confederation of Northern Germany with 
the number 152, and then to the German Empire with the number 175). In this context, to advocate 
this movement, in 1869, the Hungarian scholar Karl Maria Kertbeny argued against the Prussian 
antisodomy penal code in an essay in which, for the first time, the terms “homosexuality” and 
“heterosexuality” appeared.280 In the essay, he called for a modernization of social and political 
conditions to establish a state that no longer plays “the role of guardian, which is, anyhow, a 
thankless and irritating role”. He advocated the respect of one’s rights and one’s own life “with 
which one may do as one pleases, fully free from the start to finish as long as the rights of other 
individuals of society or of the state are not injured by these actions”281.        
       Another German activist who contributed to the construction of homosexual identity was 
Ulrichs. Bernini notes that before Kertbeny’s introduction of the term ‘homosexuality’, jurist Karl 
Heinrich Ulrichs in 1864 introduced the term ‘uranism’ (he borrowed the word—in Plato’s 
Symposium—from the god Uranos who bore Aphrodite and is the protector of love between men) 
to describe a man who is sexually attracted to other men. In the pamphlets that he “published 
between 1864 and 1879, Ulrichs not only disclosed his own homosexuality,” but also advocated 
an emancipationist science of same-sex love. 282 Doctor Magnus Hirschfeld later used the term 
‘uranism’ in his own theory of ‘third sex’ or ‘intermediate sexual condition’ that also included 
transsexualism and transvestitism. Indeed, it was not just the terminology that made a distinction 
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between Kertbeny’s conception and Hirschfeld’s. Through the term homosexuality, Kertbeny 
anticipated the current concept of homosexual orientation while, in line with the sexology of time, 
Hirschfeld interpreted homosexuality as a form of inversion, which is of a discrepancy between 
anatomical sex and psychological sex (that today is called gender)283. Hirschfeld also established 
the Scientific Humanitarian Committee and the Institute for Sexual Science in Germany in 1897 
to campaign through scientific research for acceptance of homosexuality or what he called the 
‘intermediate sexual condition’ (up until the 1930s when Hitler came to power and stopped such 
advocacy and started his policy of extermination).284 Besides Germany, in France, prominent 
French writer André Gide’s 1911 defense of homosexual love, Corydon; in England, the poet 
Edward Carpenter’s 1894 pamphlet Homogenic Love; in America, the works of American writer 
Walt Whitman, especially his 1980 Leaves of Grass, all criticized and challenged their societies 
that forced individuals to live according to their established norms and laws.285   
        Although after World War II, a remarkable number of published researches suggested 
“ubiquity and normality of homosexual experience”, and Kinsey’s report in 1948 and 1953 
concluded that “homosexual behavior was neither unnatural nor neurotic in itself but an inherent 
physiologic capacity”; throughout this period, homosexuality was strongly condemned by law in 
most European and all American states.286 For example, in 1952—due to the conservative version 
of psychoanalysis that developed in the United States—the American Psychiatric Association 
included homosexuality in the list of mental disorders in the DSM (Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders).287 Against these laws and this regime of truth, in 1969 with the 
modern international gay movement was born: with the New York Stonewall Riots. Influenced by 
various movements–including those by women, workers, African Americans, as well as the 
Student's protest of 1968–288those who created the first gay/queer movements, I would argue, 
asked themselves, ‘What are we making of our life?’. Their answer was that, as sexual minorities, 
they were oppressed and had to agitate for change and transformation. Therefore, they transformed 
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themselves into ethical subjects with the capability of political acts and revolt. On the night 
between 27th and 28th June 1969, the patrons of the Stonewall club located at 53 Christopher 
Street in Greenwich Village, New York, rebelled against a police raid and prompted several days 
of rioting by thousands of New Yorkers.289 On that night, the police lost control of the raid when 
patrons—including working and middle-class white youths, African Americans, Latinos, drag 
queens, transsexuals, transgenders, and sex workers—fought back, and it soon became a gay power 
riot. Many described the riots as the first acts of gay and lesbian resistance ever.290 Since then, it 
has been this outburst of resistance that is remembered every year in the LGBTQIA + Pride 
parades. These first New York uprisings were inspiring throughout the United States and around 
the world. In a short time, a Gay Liberation Front appeared first in the USA and then in Great 
Britain; in the Francoist Spain, the Español de Liberación Homosexual Movement (MELH) was 
founded, which later became Front d'Alliberament Gai de Catalunya (FAGC); in France, the Front 
Homosexuel d'Action Revolutionnaire (FHAR) was born; in Belgium the Movement Homosexuel 
d'Action Révolutionnaire (MHAR); in Germany the Homosexuelle Aktion Westberlin (HAW); in 
Italy the Italian Revolutionary Unified Homosexual Front (FUORI!).291 
          It was within this context that homosexuals began to choose the “self-created term gay” 
instead of “scientifically imposed term homosexual”. Additionally, “medical rhetoric” was 
changed into “political language”. Organizations and communities for homosexuals (men and 
women) became widespread in many cities around the West, and millions of gays and lesbians 
began to “come out” and identified themselves with the positive terms “gay” and “lesbian”.292 
Similarly, “bisexuals” claimed their visibility in the 1980s. In the 1990s, the term “transgender” 
first appeared in trans movements and then in numerous others to indicate those who did not wish 
to undergo surgery to make their genitals in accordance with male and female standards. As a 
consequence of these mobilizations, in 1990, homosexuality was removed from the ICD 
(International Classification of Diseases), the list of diseases of the WHO (World Health 
Organization). And in 2018, transsexuality was removed from the chapter of mental illness of the 
same list. Moreover, in the 2000s, intersex movements refused the pathologizing acronym “DSD” 
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(Disorders of Sexual Development) introduced by doctors. Finally, other subjectivities gradually 
took the floor: asexual, demisexual, pansexual…293 In particular, in many countries of the world, 
homosexuality is becoming acceptable. In December 2019, out of 196 countries, 27 authorize 
same-sex marriage, 31 recognize civil unions, 57 have rules that explicitly sanction discrimination 
against sexual minorities, and 3 prohibit restorative therapies by law (which were condemned by 
the American Psychiatric Association in 2000 and by the Italian National Order of Psychologists 
in 2008). However, despite this progress, homosexual acts, especially in some Muslim societies, 
are punishable, and those who identify as homosexuals are seen as sick who should be cured. It is 
still criminalized in 68 countries, punished by death in 11 (among which Iran), and the promotion 
of LGBTQIA+ rights is forbidden in 41.294 
       This historical evidence shows that although the nineteenth century saw the ascendancy of the 
clinical model of homosexuality, it also saw the growth of writings and campaigning held by 
homosexuals as agents to challenge the orthodox heterosexual assumptions and contribute to the 
construction of their own sexual identity. In Foucaultian terms, I propose to consider them as 
subjects who have applied to themselves different forms of care of themselves to modify 
themselves as the ethical subjects of their actions. And as the subjects who have practiced 
Parrhesia against the pathologizing regime of truth of  dispositif that firstly defined their existence. 
I would argue that the identity categories of gays and lesbians undoubtedly were born in a specific 
place and time in the history of sexuality, but in the Iranian context, by drawing and elaborating 
on these Western identity categories, the Iranian gay-identifying men have constructed their own 
local sexual identity and transformed themselves into ethical subjects in order to resist the regime 
of truth of heteronormativity and gain their own sexual and gendered state of being.295 In my 
opinion, Massad’s thesis—that gays and lesbians do not exist in the Muslim world and Muslim 
cultures enjoy a pervasive form of nameless same-sex relations, which are not compatible with 
Western discourse of sexuality—on one side, are problematic and on the other side are not 
appropriate for the Iranian context. In paragraphs 4.2, “Reading Josef Massad” and 4.3, 
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Hamjensgara/Gay’s Existence”, I will give a further discussion on Massad’s thesis and Iranian 
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3     Iranian Male Homoerotism between Western and Native Modernity 
In the second part, through Foucault's theoretical tools in the realm of gender and sexuality, I 
will release a genealogical account of the transformation of same-sex relations into gay identity in 
Iran before and after starting modernization in the nineteenth century until the present. For doing 
so, I will rethink the notion of modernity, the Western narrative of modernity, and its representation 
of non-Western societies. After doing this, I will be able to investigate Iranian modernity and Iran’s 
construction of gender and sexuality. But before, by drawing on Classical Persian literature, I will 
show the fluidity of sexual relations in what I call, using Foucauldian terms, the Iranian dispositif 
of alliance. Furthermore, I will argue that in the nineteenth century, Iranian modernity gave rise to 
the establishment of a biopolitical dispositif within which, for the articulation of a new national 
identity and the building of a modern nation-state, fluid and multi-faced sexuality, particularly 
same-sex relations, were covered and erased from the collective memory of Iranians in favor of 
the heterosexualization of the eros. Regarding homosexual identification and in contrast to 
Massad's thesis—that argues homosexuality and gayness are modern products of the Western 
dispositif of sexuality exported to the Middle East—I will claim that the Iranian homosexuality 
and gayness are constituted within the Iranian dispositif of sexuality, and particularly, within the 
Iranian biopolitical system of the post-revolutionary era. Finally, by bringing the Foucauldian 
account of practices of the self into the Iranian context, I will discuss how Iranian gay-identifying 
men as ethical and authentic agents have resisted heteropatriarchy to constitute their own local 
gayness.   
 
 
3.1      Rethinking Modernity       
      In this paragraph, by drawing on postcolonialism, the critique of, and new approaches to 
modernity, I will criticize the idea that modernity has only a Western governing center to accompany 
it. On the contrary, modernity and its consequences have always been globally interconnected and 
produced within an active and creative process of cultural hybridization and diversification. Through 
this approach to modernity, in the next paragraphs of this part, I will argue that, firstly, Iranian 
modernity is not just a process of westernization. Rather, it is a hybrid, innovative cultural grafting 
derived from both modern and traditional resources. Secondly, the notion of gayness (sexual and 
emotional relationships among gay men) as a function of modernity is not merely a Western product 
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exported to Iran. On the contrary, it has been produced in the Iranian biopolitical dispositif, and 
Iranian gay men themselves, by drawing on the Western-oriented notion of gay identity, have 
contributed to the construction of their own local gayness. Thirdly, I will argue that Massad’s thesis 
lacks an assumption of divergence in modernity and thus, reduces same-sex identification to the 
modern West and reinstates a Eurocentric view of modernity in the postcolonial analyses through 
which he equates LGBTQIA+ rights campaigns with neo-colonialist politics. Therefore, to develop 
these arguments, first of all, I need to rethink the notion of modernity. 
      It has always been assumed that modernity started and finished in Western societies, and those 
non-Western societies (places of otherness) were modernized as a result of interaction with Western 
societies.296 This assumption of modernity is highlighted in the works of theorists of classical 
sociology and philosophy such as Karl Marx (1818-1883), Émile Durkheim (1858-1917) and Max 
Weber (1864-1920). Although they have different interpretations of modernity, their interpretations 
are always marked by a conceptual distinction between the rational Western and traditional non-
Western societies.297 For example, although in The Future Results of British Rule in India, the 
German philosopher and sociologist Karl Marx criticizes capitalism and colonialism, he regards 
both of them as necessary steps for what he calls backward societies (non-Western societies, 
emphasizing India and China) to change and lay the foundation for a new form of society, which 
they would have never achieved on their own.298 In The Division of Labor in Society, French 
sociologist Émile Durkheim asserts that the paradigms of modernization are highly tied to “the 
increasing differentiation of knowledge and social function, the expansion of state powers; and the 
growing density of communication through urbanization, migration and new technologies”. He also 
supports this idea that the Western path of modernization should be a model for other non-Western 
world.299 In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Weber defines one of his core 
research questions as, “What concatenation of circumstances has led to the fact that in the Occident, 
and here only, cultural phenomena have appeared which—as at least we like to imagine—lie in a 
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direction of development of universal significance and validity?” According to him, the “cultural 
phenomena” of modernity and rationalism have appeared in the West and developed only there, 
and then spread to other cultures to gain a universal significance.300     
      Foucault also respects this spatialisation of modernity; the modernity that he identifies is 
centered, as already explained, on the development of the power-knowledge regime that focuses on 
the welfare of the population and large-scale management of life and death by the Western states. 
Thus, he sees the development of bio-power as the threshold of modernity for European societies. 
Therefore, while Foucault’s theoretical tools have provided significant contributions to the critical 
analysis of the power-knowledge relations of post-Enlightenment Europe, the issue of colonialism 
and colonial construction of European modernity does not figure ostensibly in his writings. In this 
respect, in Questions of Modernity, Timothy Mitchell points out that it is by “relegating the non-
West to the margins and footnotes of his account [that] Foucault reproduces the spatialisation of 
modernity. The homogeneous time of modernity, its characteristic contemporaneity, is preserved 
by the way Foucault respects the territorial boundaries of the modern.”301 Thus, according to 
Mitchell, Foucault situates modern governmental techniques squarely within the culture, history, 
and geography of Europe.302 Edward Said also criticizes Foucault’s Eurocentric vision and his 
failure to pay attention to the West’s other: “His Eurocentrism was almost total, as if history itself 
took place only among a group of German and French thinkers.” 303 
       Although Said criticizes Foucault’s Eurocentrism, he applies Foucault’s notion of discourse 
and discursive formation to the Western representations of the Eastern world. As we have seen, 
Foucault argues that knowledge is constructed according to a set of discursive formations that 
define and construct the objects, concepts, paradigms, and theoretical formations that are available 
in a given culture. Following Foucault, in Orientalism304 Said argues that a complex set of 
representations and fabrications produced the discursive formation of the Orient. He says that 
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Orientalism itself is a set of complex academic forms of knowledge with institutions of power, a 
“system of knowledge about the Orient, an accepted grid for filtering the Orient into Western 
consciousness” (in other words, a dispositif).305 Through Foucault’s concept of discursive formation 
and along with Gramsci’s theorization on hegemony, Said questions the validity of the Western 
representation of the Orient. The notion of culture is a substantial element in Said’s works. Said 
defines culture in two distinctive but interconnected senses. Firstly, he defines culture as those 
“practices, like the art of description, communication and representation, that have relative 
autonomy from the economic, social, and political realms and that often exist in aesthetic forms, 
one of whose principal aims is pleasure”.306 Secondly, he also sees culture as: 
a concept that includes a refining and elevating element, each society’s reservoir 
of the best that has been known and thought… You read Dante or Shakespeare in 
order to keep up with the best that was thought and known, and also to see 
yourself, your people, society, and tradition in their best lights. In time, culture 
comes to be associated, often aggressively, with the nation or the state; this 
differentiates “us” from “them”, almost always with some degree of xenophobia. 
Culture in this sense is a source of identity, and a rather combative one at that.307  
       Therefore, Said’s understating of culture is situated between culture as “artistic production” on 
the one hand and “identity”308 on the other. Moreover, he elaborates his account of the culture 
around Gramsci’s notion of hegemony. According to Gramsci, hegemony relies on “predominance 
obtained by consent”309 rather than the force of one class or group over other groups. In other words, 
according to Gramsci, power can be exercised and reinforced as much through cultural texts as 
through physical forces: hegemonic elites establish a cultural system to promote and legitimize their 
own state of hegemony, and when a culture becomes hegemonic, it becomes common sense for the 
majority of the population.  
      By drawing on Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, Said argues that “the relation between Occident 
and Orient is a relationship of power, of domination, of varying degrees of a complex 
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hegemony”.310 As he explains, “insofar as it was a science of incorporation and inclusion by virtue 
of which the Orient was constituted and then introduced into Europe, Orientalism was a scientific 
movement whose analogue in the world of empirical politics was the Orient’s colonial accumulation 
and acquisition by Europe”.311 In other words, Orientalism is the Western strategy of dealing with 
the Orient through “dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing 
it, by teaching it, setting it, ruling over it: in short […] a Western-style for dominating, restructuring, 
and having authority over the Orient”312. In addition, he posits that the Orient is an integral part of 
“European material civilization and culture”313. It has helped the West to define itself; it has 
functioned as an imaginary figure against which Europe can construct itself by contrast. The 
European Orientalist discourse for Said projected on the Orient all those characteristics that Europe 
wanted to expel from itself, while also constructing the “Other”. In Said’s view, therefore, 
Orientalism is at the service of the West’s hegemony to produce the West as a superior civilization 
while constructing the East as the inferior ‘Other’. This distinction is primarily formed by 
distinguishing and then essentializing East and West's identities through a dichotomizing system of 
representations in the regime of stereotypes, with the aim of making differences between Western 
and Eastern parts of the world. As a consequence of such binary opposition, in the Orientalist 
discourse, the East is characterized negatively as irrational, backward, voiceless and despotic. On 
the contrary, the West is represented positively as rational, democratic, moral, and progressive.314  
      For this thesis, Orientalism has been criticized by many reviewers and commenters. For 
example, in White Mythology: Writing History and the West Robert Young points to a lack of theory 
of agency and resistance in Said’s work and finds a contradiction in this: “as we might anticipate 
from his retrieval of the category of the human, and his endorsement of the validity of individual 
experience as affording a theoretical and political base, Said rejects Foucault’s downgrading of the 
role of individual agency”.315 In Orientalism and Orientalism in Reverse, Sadik Jalal al-Azm argues 
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that Said’s Orientalism confirms an essentializing dichotomy between the East and the West by 
means of a monolithic and static approach to culture.316 In Orientalism and After, Aijaz Ahmad, 
proclaims his fundamental disagreement with Said and like others, he criticizes Said’s 
methodological inconsistencies. According to Ahmad, Said’s methodology is an ahistorical and un-
Foucauldian approach because Foucault, in contrast to Said, rejects long-term continuities. 
Moreover, Ahmad wonders how it is possible that Said reconciles the anti-humanism of 
Foucauldian discourse theory and Marxism with a celebration of humanist values derives from an 
older tradition of Western scholarship. Like al-‘Azm, Ahmad claims that Said accuses justifiably 
the essentializing of the Orient, but his essentializing of the West is equally remarkable. 317 
       Homi Bhabha, an Indian English scholar and one of the most influential figures in 
contemporary postcolonial studies, also criticizes Said’s hierarchical dualism of the West and the 
East. According to Bhabha, the colonial discourse is marked by ambivalence: Said tries to resolve 
this ambivalence in the “most traditional literary critical way by referring to a single originating 
intention”318, while Bhabha recasts the problem of ambivalence in a positive and enabling form. 
Through developing the Freudian understating of ambivalence, which is the coexistence of two 
opposite instincts, Bhabha argues that at the center of Orientalism there is a polarity rather than a 
single homogenizing perspective. This polarity, according to him, is “on the one hand, a topic of 
learning, discovery, practice; on the other, it is the site of dreams, images, fantasies, myths, 
obsessions and requirements”.319 Bhabha proposes a view of colonial discourse as “negotiation 
rather than negation”. He also transfers and challenges the idea of modernity—the idea of scientific 
and material progress that marks the West as modern—, and argues that we need to look again at 
modernity through a postcolonial perspective drawing from the experience of colonized people and 
their relations with colonizers. According to him, it is not only a question of historiography: also 
the spatialities of modernity should not be sought outside of those produced through the project of 
imperialism:  
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our major task now is to probe further the cunning of Western modernity, its historical 
ironies, its disjunctive temporalities, its much-vaunted crisis of representation. It is 
important to say that it would change the values of all critical work if the emergence of 
modernity were given a colonial and post-colonial genealogy. We must never forget that 
the establishment of colonized space profoundly informs and historically contests the 
emergence of those so-called post Enlightenment values associated with the notion of 
modern stability.320          
Bhabha argues that “there is always, in Said, the suggestion that colonial power is possessed entirely 
by the colonizer which is a historical and theoretical simplification”.321 On the contrary, as said, 
Bhabha reads colonial stereotypes as ambivalent. Of course, the purpose of colonialist stereotypes 
is to construct the colonized as a “population of degenerate racial types with a view to justify 
conquest, exploitation, and civilization”.322 But Bhabha argues that this aim is “never fully met”323 
because “the colonial stereotype is a complex ambivalent, contradictory mode of representation, as 
anxious as it is assertive, and demands not only that we extend our critical and political objectives 
but that we change the object of analysis itself”.324 In Bhabha’s reading, the stereotype declares 
“what is known about the native but nonetheless anxiously [restate] this knowledge as if it can never 
be confirmed but only reinforced through constant repetition, making it a sign of a deeper crisis of 
authority in the wielding of colonial power”.325      
       To highlight this crisis, Bhabha uses the notion of mimicry, which is “one of the most elusive 
and effective strategies of colonial power and knowledge”.326 In his words, mimicry is a strategy of 
power and knowledge that “seeks the inclusion of an authorized good native, with a view to 
excluding bad natives”.327 For example, Bhabha focuses on the fact that in colonized locations such 
as India, British authorities needed to produce a class of Indians capable of taking English language, 
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opinions, morals, and intellect. 328 Bhabha describes this group of Indians as “mimic men” who act 
English but do not look English, who are Anglicised rather than English.329 By drawing on 
Foucault’s conceptualization of power, Bhabha further argues that the strategy of mimicry is 
ambivalent, embracing both mockery and a certain menace (that is a form of resistance). He 
contends that the presence of Anglicised people—who are not exclusively native and not quite 
English, but something in between—“menace the discourse of colonialism because they 
[Anglicised people] threaten to expose the ambivalence at its heart. Hearing their language coming 
through the mouths of the colonized, the colonizers are faced with the worrying threat of 
resemblance between colonizers and colonized”.330 Such a resemblance “threatens the racial and 
other hierarchies on which imperialism was premised”.331 According to Bhabha, this menace in 
mimicry is not only acted by the colonized but is rather an effect of the colonizer’s own discourse. 
In this respect, the relationships between colonizers and colonized go beyond dependence, it is of 
interdependence and mutual construction that changes the identities of both cultures. Bhabha 
explains this interdependency through the concept of “hybridization”.  
      In Bhabha’s account of culture, hybridity refers to mixed-ness and impurity of culture. It refers 
to the fact that every single culture is not a discrete phenomenon; instead, each culture has always 
been in contact with other cultures, and this connection has led to a hybrid mixed-ness culture.332 
For Bhabha, hybrid culture is not merely the interconnection of cultures leading to a hybrid form. 
Rather, he insists on the hybridity of culture as an ongoing process. In other words, “cultures are 
the consequence of attempts to still the flux of cultural hybridity".333 Hybridity, Bhabha says, is not 
simply the “integration of two original moments from which the third emerges”. Rather, hybridity 
is the “third space” which provides another position to emerge.334 It “displaces the histories that 
constitute it, and sets up new structures of authority, new political initiatives, which are 
inadequately understood through received wisdom”.335 Therefore, hybridity is a process that leads 
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to the creation of something new, “a new area of negotiation of meaning and representation”.336 
Through mimicry and hybridity concepts, Bhabha makes visible the hidden presence of colonialism 
in the narratives of European modernity and progress. The narrative of modernity is not coherent 
and serene, and it should not be conceptualized through the East and the West's oppositions. He 
sees modernity as a location of shared mimicries and practices: it is brought into being in response 
to a certain historical, political and geographical conditions and dispositions, but we cannot merely 
say that it belongs to one discrete culture or another.  
      Alongside Bhabha, other scholars have worked on the idea of the multiplicity of modernities. 
Scholars such as Shmuel Eisenstadt understand modernity as a global system, which is diverse, 
dynamic, and multidirectional. In Multiple Modernities, he goes beyond the structural notion of a 
single homogeneous modernity and proposes that 
The idea of multiple modernities presumes that the best way to understand the 
contemporary world—indeed to explain the history of modernity—is to see it as a 
story of continual constitution and reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural program 
… Western patterns of modernity are not the only authentic modernities, though they 
enjoy historical precedence and continue to be a basic point for others.337 
Although Eisenstadt problematizes the centrality of Eurocentrism, his interpretation of modernity 
is reliant on an ideal type of modernity, originated in Europe338 then spread to the non-Western 
world to give rise to the development of several and different modern civilizations that existed side-
by-side.339In response, Dilip Gaonkar in On Alternative Modernities reformulates and extends 
Eisenstadt’s concept of multiple modernities and proposes the concept of alternative modernity. 
Gaonkar defines modernity as a process originated “in and of the West some centuries ago” that 
“always unfolds within a specific cultural or civilizational context”. According to him,  “different 
starting points for the transition to modernity lead to different outcomes […] in both outlook and 
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institutional arrangement”.340 According to Gaonkar, modernity is produced through “creative 
adaptations” by subjects who are not receivers but rather active agents.341  
      In a similar way, Sanjay Subrahmanyam in Connected Histories challenges the Eurocentric 
discourse of modernity and proposes the concept of “connected histories”. Through this concept, 
he seeks “to delink the notion of modernity from a particular European trajectory (Greece, the 
classical Rome… the Renaissance)” to argue a “more-or-less global shift, with many different 
sources and roots, and—inevitably—many different forms and meanings depending on which 
society we look at it from”. He looks at the possibilities of global connections rather than the 
disciplinary constructions of differences; he argues that nationalism and historical ethnography 
have “blinded us to the possibilities of connection”; and then he concludes that historians should 
seek out the “fragile threads that connected the globe, even as the globe came to be defined as 
such”.342  
     In The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness, Paul Gilroy argues that another 
problem with the standard definition of modernization is that it has prevented an intercultural 
understanding of the modernity/tradition binary. In this definition, modernity is essentially 
associated with the West and tradition with the rest.343 Similarly, in Tradition through Modernity, 
Anttonen points out that modern societies and institutions are full of traditions in terms of 
“established collective models and cognitive patterns of repetition”.344 And through the definition 
of invented traditions, in The Invention of Tradition, also Hobsbawm proposes that modernity 
includes traditions that are “actually invented, constructed and formally instituted”.345 Inventing 
traditions is a social process that establishes social cohesion, legitimizes institutions, socializes 
individuals and inculcates beliefs, value systems and conventions of behaviour.346 In Tradition and 
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Modernity, Gusfield argues that the modernization process should be understood as being 
constituted by an admixture of tradition and modernity in which “each drives a degree of support 
from the other, rather than [being considered as] a clash of opposites”.347  
      Another strand of thought against the standard interpretation of single homogeneous modernity 
suggests a revision of the genealogy of modernity in Western history and a new perspective on the 
transnational history of the East. For instance, in Lost Modernities, Woodside argues that not only 
do aspects of modernities not necessarily coincide with Western periodization (the Renaissance, 
Enlightenment, and industrialization) but they are also found independently in their own timeframes 
in preindustrial societies such as China, Korea, and Vietnam. For example, Woodside points to the 
two institutions common to these three societies: the civil service examinations and the social 
welfare systems that were considered as pre-modern institutions. But he argues that they should be 
re-examined in the light of a more comprehensive definition of modernity that no longer adheres to 
the Western calendar. Because the same systems were developed much later in the industrial 
West.348 
      In the Iranian context, in Lost Wisdom: Rethinking Modernity in Iran, Abbas Milani criticizes 
the idea of European rationalism through which Max Weber, Milan Kundera and many Western 
scholars have argued that all the paradigms of modernity from representative democracy and 
rational thought to the art of novels and essays are originally Western and are exclusively suited to 
Western culture.349 Locating the concept of modernity in a larger historical and cultural context, 
Milani develops his theory around the central theme that “Iran and the West have more in common 
than in difference”350 and that some quintessences of modernity such as democracy, rationalism, 
secularism, individualism, urbanism, and limited government are not alien ideas to Iran. In fact, 
between the tenth and twelfth centuries, these phenomena “began to evolve in Iran and helped shape 
a native Renaissance.” Milani illustrates that:  
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From the tenth to the twelfth centuries, a large group of Persian writers and 
poets, historians and philosophers, astronomers and mathematicians—from 
Khayyam and Kharazmi to Beyhaghi and Biruni—created what has been 
called “the most glorious era” in the history of Persian culture. The 
intellectual hallmarks of this era included many of the ideas that usually 
herald the advent of modernity in a society. Rationalism, empiricism, 
skepticism, pluralism of ideas, secularism, the idea of a “social contract,” 
development of a national language, [and] the evolution of a simple prose 
tailored to the contours of Ockham’s famous razor.351 
      Through rethinking modernity as an active process of cultural hybridization and diversification, 
and by drawing on Najmabadi and Tavakoli Targhi’s contributions to the conceptualization of 
modernity in Iran, I will give a further discussion about Iranian modernity in paragraph 3.3, 
“Hybridized Homosexuality”. There, I will show that Iranian modernity was a creative process of 
cultural hybridization and grafting between reinventing the Iranian pre-Islamic tradition and modern 
European resources that eventually gave also rise to the establishment of a biopolitical dispositif 
within which—for the sake of building a modern nation-state and national identity— the memory of 
homoeroticism was covered or erased in favor of the heterosexualization of society. But before that, 
in the next paragraph, I will explore the Iranian dispositif of alliance with a focus on the ambiguity 
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3.2         Homoerotic Persia       
      In this paragraph, I will explore the Iranian pre-modern sexual practices, using Foucauldian 
term, what I call the Iranian dispositif of alliance. In particular, I will show that in the Iranian 
dispositif of alliance male sexuality was not limited to the heteronormative binary system of 
contrasting homosexuality and heterosexuality. Instead, the construction of sexuality and gender 
was multi-faced and fluid, and such sexual-gender fluidity was not the subject of a harsh public’s 
judgment. To develop my arguments, by using classical Persian literature and poetry, I will 
investigate male gender fluidity and dynamics of sexual relations, particularly the traditional male 
same-sex relations operating in pre-modern Iran. But before, I will give a short discussion on the 
issues of the marriage institution, the establishment of family, and procreation in the Iranian 
dispositif of alliance. 
      As already mentioned in paragraph 2.2 Dispositif, Foucault argues that in Western societies 
prior to the end of the eighteenth century, the regulation of social life was mediated through the 
dispositif of alliance: “a system of marriage, of fixation and development of kinship ties, of 
transmission of names and possessions”.352 By drawing on Afsaneh Najmabadi,353 Mohammad 
Tavakoli Targhi,354 Minoo Moallem,355 Sivan Balslev,356 and Janet Afary’s357 contributions to the 
history of pre-modern Iranian society, I would argue that prior to the end of the nineteenth century, 
in Iran, regulation of social life was mediated through a particular kind of dispositif of alliance. Of 
course, this does not mean that after the nineteenth century, Iran became modern immediately. 
Rather, modernization was a long-lasting process that took shape over a few centuries and 
hybridized with Iranian traditions.358 Iranian dispositif of alliance was rooted in the religious 
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discourse and the practice of Shari’a, but compared to the contemporary Iranian regime of 
sexuality, pre-modern Iran was less judgmental about male sexual orientations, gender fluidity and 
bodily expressions. For example, same-sex relations between a male adult and a male adolescent 
were not perceived as pedophilia. Instead, sexual relations with boys could belong to a man’s 
repertoire of experiences, and under certain conditions, he could seek the love of a boy in 
homosocial spaces. Nevertheless, sexuality in the Iranian dispositif of alliance was mainly 
regulated by the practice of the arranged nekhah (marriage) within which the procreation, 
establishment of a family and transition of name and possessions took place. 
     Afary’s Sexual Politics in Modern Iran greatly contributes to the historical reconstruction of 
the institution of nekhah in pre-modern Iran. As she writes, parents were in charge of arranging 
their children’s nekhah. Mothers often found a spouse for their son or daughter, while fathers or 
male guardians of family negotiated the financial details. The marriage contract was built around 
payment or a promise of payment of mahriyeh—a marriage dowry usually is in the form of money 
and possession that the groom should pay the bride at any time after the marriage. On the other 
side, the bride’s family purchased their daughter’s jahizieh (trousseau), including quilts, bedding 
and household items. Urban and elite families supplemented their daughters' jahizieh with 
additional gifts such as Persian carpets, jewels, or even slaves for both sexes. According to Islamic 
laws, boys gained legal maturity at fifteen and girls at nine. In both Shiite and Sunni laws, the 
father or guardian had the authority to arrange a contract on the daughter’s behalf even before she 
reached the age of nine, although marriage would be consummated later. When she reached legal 
maturity, her consent in marriage was required. However, rarely did girls or even boys have a real 
opportunity to select their spouses, revoke the marriage contract, or take part in negotiation over 
mahriyeh. Age difference in marriage was considered mandatory. The groom was usually/always 
older than the bride (maybe several years, a decade, or even more), and large age gaps were also 
acceptable. For example, a sixty-year-old man could marry a ten-year-old girl. The opposite 
occasionally happened in the case of marriage between a young boy and an older widow when 
there were family and financial concerns to consider. A popular form of marriage was restricted 
to kinship relations—marriage between first cousins whose fathers were brothers. Cousin marriage 
played a significant role in the transition of properties.359 It “kept land and property within the 
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family and also offered some protection to women through the tight web of family 
relationships”.360  
      Once the marriage contract was signed and the marriage ceremony was consummated, the 
groom's responsibility began with providing nafagheh (maintenance) for his wife and any children 
born from the marriage. The level of a woman’s nafagheh was dependent on her social standing, 
and her husband had to provide for her according to the lifestyle she had been accustomed. A 
husband’s continuation or discontinuation of nafagheh was based on the inability or refusal of 
sexual intimacy on the part of the wife. A husband’s discontinuation of nafagheh or a wife’s refusal 
of sexual intimacy both could provide the grounds for divorce.361 In pre-modern Iran, marriage 
was an institution for the procreation and establishment of a family rather than for emotional 
intimacy and love. Because, on one side, marriage was a contract between families and one had 
no chance to choose one’s own wife or husband 362 , and on the other side, the patriarchal laws of 
Shari’a allow363 men to have access to sex outside marriage in legalized forms.364 Accordingly, 
man as the head in the hierarchy of power in the family had to maintain kinship ties and fulfill the 
public and family obligations but could look for additional forms of sexual gratification in other 
relations, such as sigheh (temporary marriage)365, that is the object of study of Anthropologist 
Shahlah Haeri in Temporary Marriage and the State in Iran. 
      Temporary marriage366 is a “form of contract” permitted in Shiite doctrine in which a “married 
or unmarried man and an unmarried woman (virgin, divorced, widowed)” privately and verbally 
agree upon a temporary sexual relation with a specific duration of time and sum—from one hour 
to ninety-nine years. Aside from this payment, a “temporary husband is not obliged to provide 
financial support for his temporary wife”.367 As Haeri argues Shiite Muslim man could make 
several contracts of temporary marriage, aside from four permanent wives that legally are allowed. 
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However, a Muslim woman could marry either temporarily or permanently with no more than one 
man.368  
      Besides temporary marriage, man could seek “friendship/love/sexuality” in a homosocial 
domain.369 In this regard, Najmabadi notes that “vaginal intercourse with wives was aimed to fulfill 
procreative obligations, while other acts were linked to the pleasures of power, gender [mostly 
men’s pleasure], age, class, and rank. It was (is) also the case that if men performed their 
procreative obligations, the larger community was generally not much concerned with the rest of 
their sex life”.370 This is a tactic that Murray in Islamic Homosexualities calls, by a rephrasing of 
Foucault’s title, “the will not to know”371—a tactic that worked and still works against the 
enforcement of anti-homosexual laws in Muslim societies. Therefore, besides lawful heterosexual 
unions, fulfillment of procreative obligations and hierarchies of power in the family, male same-
sex relationships also played a significant role in the Iranian dispositif of alliance. Homoerotic 
passion was in fact, common and accommodated in pre-modern Iran, and falling in love with an 
adolescent or youth and celebrating that love was acceptable as long as men fulfilled their public 
and family obligations and remained circumspect and discreet. Of course, this does not mean that 
pre-modern Iran should be praised as a golden era for cherishing same-sex relations. Rather, with 
this paragraph, my intention is to argue that pre-modern Iran fostered different forms of erotic 
expression and the construction of gender and sexuality was more fluid and multi-faced than in 
contemporary Iran. In the next paragraphs, I will show how during modernization and particularly 
the post-revolutionary era, such sexual-gender fluidity was reduced to heteronormativity and 
cisnormativity. But here, before exploring the construction of gender and sexuality, I would like 
to explain the theological debate revolving around same-sex relations in Muslim Worlds.  
     As Christian and Jewish sacred texts, the Qur’an and Islamic laws of Shiite and Sunni regard 
male same-sex practices as an abomination.372 In the Qur’anic story about people of Lut, the prophet 
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Lot had been sent to the people of Lut who were engaged in sexual indiscretions. After years of 
preaching, the people of Lut not only ignored the prophet, but they also threatened him with 
punishment. Thereafter, God ordered Lot to leave the city and subsequently destroyed Lut by a rain 
of stones of baked clay. There are some passages in this story that Muslim scholars interpreted as a 
condemnation of the sexual acts of the people of Lut:  
 — “Will ye commit abomination such as no creature ever did before you? Lo, ye come with lust unto men 
instead of women. Nay, but ye are wanton”.373  
 — “Do you approach males of all the world and leave what God your Lord has created for you of your wives? 
Nay, but you are people who transgress”.374  
 — “Verily, ye approach which no one in all the world anticipated you in! What! Do ye approach men? And 
stop folks on the highway? And approach in your assembly sin?”375 
         Interestingly, the relevant passages of the Qur’an do not specify what sexual acts the people 
of Lut had committed. Nevertheless, from early on, a majority of Muslim jurists identified the act 
of people of Lut with anal intercourse to the extent that the Arabic juridical terminology liwat could 
be used to refer to the anal intercourse between two men.376 In Neither Homophobic nor (Hetero) 
Sexuality Pure: Contextualizing Islam’s Objections to Same-Sex Sexuality, by drawing on the 
classical interpretations of the story of people of Lut in the Qur’an, Aleardo Zanghellini argues that 
the Qur’anic texts refer to a very specific sexual act between men (anal intercourse), and not to 
identities and orientations (which, as Foucault explains, are modern concepts). He also comments 
that “indeed, even some contemporary legal scholars, although speaking of the crime of 
‘homosexuality’, actually use it as a synonym for anal intercourse between men rather than in its 
broader usual [modern] sense”. Then, he concludes that what forbids same-sex anal intercourse in 
the Qur’an is its conceptualization as the practice of “subordination”. In other words, being 
submissive in male same-sex practices particularly anal intercourse, as Zanghellini asserts, is 
                                                          
373 Edward Henry Palmer, The Koran. (London: Watkins, 1951). 81-82 
374 Ibid. 26. 
375 Ibid. 29. 
376 Samar Habib, “Introduction,” in Islam and Homosexuality: Volume One, ed., Samar Habib (UK&USA: Praeger, 
2010), xlv 
 
  83  
 
problematic and “bad because it subordinates the passive male through dishonor effected by his 
emasculation”.377  
       However, among Islamic scholars, there is a fluctuation of opinions and interpretations on the 
punishment of liwat. In shariʿa, forbidden acts fall into two categories: the first is hodud, which 
refers to the transgression of the limitations set by God and require fixed, mandatory punishments 
(‘uqubat muqaddare) that are based on the Qur’an and Sunna. Hodud includes theft, drunkenness, 
unlawful sexual intercourse (such as fornication or any sexual intercourse between people not 
married to each other) and false accusations of unlawful sexual intercourse.378 The other category, 
which is called ta’zir, includes those crimes where the judge has the right to apply his discretion: 
this is the case of, for example, manslaughter or assault. While liwat is forbidden in the Qur’an, 
there is a variance as to whether liwat should be seen as a hodud crime or as a part of ta’zir offense. 
Whereas the Shiite schools of Islam regard liwat as a hodud crime, some Sunni schools of Islam 
see it punishable as a ta’zir offense where the judge determines the punishment.379 The root of this 
variance regarding the punishment of liwat lies in the lack of clear Qur’anic references that result 
in leaving a space of ambiguity on how liwat should be punished.380 For example, some Muslim 
jurists have proposed the death penalty, but in Sexual Politics in Modern Iran, Afary identifies four 
factors that prevent such extreme punishment. First, to prove any kind of unlawful sexual 
intercourse, the legal system of shariʿa requires “solid evidence” (that entails the witness of four 
adult Muslim men who observed the actual penetration) before imposing punishment, which is 
often impossible. Second, a false accusation of liwat is itself a major sin and, therefore, punishable. 
Third, the Qur’an recognizes the possibilities of repentance, and the person who repents must be 
forgiven. Fourth, due to “the severity of the punishment” and the “wide practice of same-sex 
relations”, it would be difficult to condemn and accuse people. Hence, in the majority of Islamic 
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communities, Shari’a laws employ the customary punishment of flogging as a less severe 
alternative for liwat.381    
      In his last two volumes of The History of Sexuality, Foucault argues that in ancient Greece, 
same-sex relations were not equated with immorality if these relations were regulated by self-
imposed “forms of austerity”. For example, having a beloved boy was an acceptable practice for an 
adult man, but also he was responsible for the boy’s reputation and his future political status. It 
shows that in antiquity, same-sex relations under certain conditions not only were not considered 
immorality, but also it was acceptable cultural practice.382 In the Islamic context, despite strong 
Shari’a disapproval, homoerotic love and male same-sex relationships in many pre-modern Muslim 
worlds were implicitly recognized as cultural practices as long as the men who desired such 
relations remained discreet while also respecting certain conventions. In particular, in contrast to 
the debates over the condemnation of liwat, there is evidence of a widespread tolerance of same-
sex sexuality, such as the permissibility of sex with slaves in the pre-nineteenth century of the 
Islamic world.383 In Before Homosexuality in the Arab-Islamic World, 1500-1800, El-Rouayheb 
points out that in the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam—in order to reduce the scope of liwat’s 
punishment—for jurists, liwat with male or female slaves or even one’s wife was permissible. Other 
jurists of the same school saw liwat with male slaves equivalent to temporary marriage (mut’ah).384 
As in these Sunni schools of Islam, also in some Shiite schools, sex with male slaves during travel 
was permissible when a man did not have access to his wife or female slaves.385 Foucault also 
highlights that in ancient Greece, women were associated with passivity and weakness. For this 
reason, men sought companionship among male homosocial spaces.386 In similar fashion to ancient 
Greek tradition, Islamic culture valued male companionship over romantic relationships between a 
man and a woman; loving beautiful boys was recognized as true romance, and women were 
considered objects of procreation and thus not worth of companionship. Therefore, because of this 
                                                          
381 Afary, Sexual Politics in Modern Iran, 81. 
382 Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure: The History of Sexuality (New York: Vintage, 1985), 253. 
383 khaled el-rouayheb, Before Homosexuality in the Arab-Islamic World, 1500 –1800 (Chicago and London: Chicago 
University Press, 2005), 124. 
384 Ibid. (Mut’ah is Arabic equivalent of sigheh in Persian)   
385 Cyrus Shamisa, Shahedbazi dar Adabiat Farsi (Homoerotism in the Persian literature) (Tehran: Ferdows 
Publications, 2002), 114. 
386 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure: The History of Sexuality, 
 
  85  
 
gender segregation, it was not unusual that in homosocial environments such as religious 
seminaries, masters would fall in love with their young pupils or arrange a courtship with their male 
colleagues.387                
      Describing the physical features of the male beloved and falling and expressing love towards 
youths it in verse or prose were also permissible as long as not taken realistically.388 As pointed out 
by one of the most prominent jurists of the early Ottoman period, Ibn Hajar al-Haytami (d. 1566): 
Amorous verse is not an indication of having looked with lust; as a rule the poet 
says it by way of making his poetry more delicate and to exhibit his craftsmanship, 
not because he is really in love… the composition of amorous verse is a craft, and 
the intention of the poet is to produce discourse, not the verisimilitude of what is 
mentioned”.389 The ideas that “poets say what they do not do” thus made a peaceful 
space of coexistence between the ideas of homoerotism celebrated in love poetry 
and the austere ideals upheld by religious jurists. Poets always did not “say what 
they do not do”, but this was an assumption that they did so, as a rule, to allow 
them to express their desires for male beloved, wine, or women.390  
      Many of the points I have made so far, such as Shari’a’s rules regarding same-sex relations 
and its tolerance in Muslim societies, are also valid for the Iranian pre-modern context. As in 
ancient Greece, same-sex relationships in medieval Iran were based on an inequality of power in 
terms of age and social standings. However, in some cases, pre-modern Iran also experienced 
relatively symmetrical same-sex relations as well as different forms of erotic expression that I will 
discuss further in this paragraph. Sexual relationships between two men were not identified as 
homosexuality in the modern sense, nor was a sexual relationship between a man and a woman 
considered heterosexuality. Rather, as Afary argues, male same-sex relations were based on a 
“status-defined homosexuality” whereby men were identified by their “positionality” during 
sexual intercourse.391 It was assumed that in the gender convention of pre-modern Iranian society, 
in same-sex intercourse, one partner was deemed as masculine and another as feminine. Foucault 
argues that in the ancient Western world, the first evidence of the ethic of love or what he calls 
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“true love”392 orbited around the eraste (active adult lover) and paidika (passive adolescent boy). 
In pre-modern Iran, male same-sex relations involved sex between an active adult man and amrad 
(passive adolescent boy).393 Amrads were boys who “could be penetrated without losing their 
potential manliness, so long as they did not register pleasure in the act which would suggest a 
pathology liable to continue into adulthood”.394 Furthermore, if the relationship was kept discreet 
and private, an amrad could overtake his passive status, marry and have children, and if he himself, 
as an adult, entered into a same-sex relationship, he was assumed to play an active role.395  
     In same-sex relationships, passive partners, besides amrads, could be labeled in two more ways. 
Ma’bun was an adult man who desired a passive role. He was considered sick and contemptible. 
Ma’bun did not copy the women’s conduct, he could be a husband and father, but in the patriarchal 
medieval Iran and Muslim world, he was viewed as an ‘imperfect man’ or someone who suffered 
from the loss of ‘manliness’.396 The term mukhannath, in contrast to amrad and ma’bun, was 
completely recognized as effeminacy and transvestism among males. Mukhannath imitated a 
woman in the “languidness of limbs” or “softness of his voice” and usually had activities as 
musicians, actors, and dancers.397 In modern terms, maybe we can somehow identify the 
mukhannath as a transgendered person.398 These sexual roles—amrad, ma’bun and mukhannath—
as well as different forms of homoerotism (that I will discuss) greatly contributed to the fluidity of 
Iran’s construction of gender and sexuality. Cyrus Shamisa, one of the most important Iranian 
contemporary scholars in Persian literature, claims that Persian poetry is essentially homoerotic.399  
In fact, it offers an interesting commentary about same-sex relationships—an in-depth look into 
the construction of gender and sexuality in pre-modern Iran. The oeuvre of classical Persian poets–
like Attar (d. 1220), Rumi (d.1273), Sa’di (d.1291), Hafez (d. 1389), Jami (d. 1492) and those of 
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the twentieth century like Iraj Mirza–(1926) are saturated with homoerotic love.400 The first 
explicit examples of same-sex relations in Persian literature traces back to the tenth and eleventh 
centuries.401 In this era, there was no incompatibility in a man’s sexual inclination toward both 
boys and women. Rather, a “man who penetrated both women and boys” was perceived as “hyper 
masculine”.402 In this form of erotic expression that we call today bisexuality, a man could be 
inclined toward men, even as a married man with a family or a man could be inclined toward 
women and have amrad at the same time. The literary genre of Andarz Nameh (Mirrors for Princes) 
gives advice on the merits of sexual relationships with both women and men. For example, in the 
major work of Persian literature in the eleventh century, Qabus Nameh (Book of Kavous), the 
Ziyarid ruler Keykavous (1050-1087) advises his son Gilanshah that sexual relations with both 
men and women should be a part of a man’s life experience:  
As between women and youth, do not confine your inclination to either sex; thus, 
you may find enjoyment from both kinds without either of the two becoming 
inimical to you. During the summer let your desire incline toward youths and 
during the winter toward women.403      
      In the tenth and eleventh centuries, besides “romantic bisexuality,” we can see a form of a 
relatively symmetrical same-sex relationship. In this era, Iran was ruled by the Turkic dynasty, and 
classical Persian poetry celebrated same-sex relationships between the Turkic sultans and their 
soldiers and pages. One of the best-known examples of same-sex relations of this era is the one 
between sultan Mahmud Ghazni (the first sultan of the Ghaznavid dynasty in 999-1030) and 
Abulnajm Ayaz (one of sultan Mahmud’s Turkic military commanders). Sultan Mahmud adored 
Ayaz until the last days, not just when Ayaz was young. Under sultan Mahmud’s region and even 
during his son, sultan Masud, Ayaz was treated with great respect and endowed with many official 
responsibilities. Sultan Mahmud even paid his court poets to praise Ayaz’s strategic and 
militaristic courage and talent as well as his physical beauty in their verses and proses.404 In his 
notable work Chahar Maghale (Four Discourses), Nezami Aruzi, a court-poet in sultan Mahmud’s 
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reign, praises the love story of sultan Mahmud and Ayaz in his panegyrical prose. He tells the story 
in a way to absolve Mahmud’s sinful love for Ayaz but confirms the sultan’s great fondness for 
the Turkic commander:  
 The love borne by Sultan Yamtnttd-Dawla Mahmud to Ayaz the Turk is well-known and 
famous. It is related that Ayaz was not remarkably handsome, but was of sweet expression 
and olive, complexion, symmetrically formed, graceful in his movements, sensible and 
deliberate in action, and endowed with all the arts of pleasing in which respect, indeed he had 
few rivals in his time. Now all these are qualities, which excite love and give permanence to 
friendship. Now, Sultan Yamtnttd-Dawla Mahmud was a pious and Godfearing man and he 
wrestled much with his love for Ayaz so that he should not diverge by so much as a single 
step from the Path of the Law and the Way of Honour. 405          
 Although the dominant form of same-sex relationships in pre-modern Iran was asymmetrical, I 
consider the case of sultan Mahmud and Ayaz as a significant counter-example in this ongoing 
debate over the properties of same-sex relations. This story shows that the ideal love between 
males was not necessarily pederasty or merely an issue of inequality in terms of age and social 
status at least in comparison with same-sex relations between an amrad and an adult man. 
Although Ayaz did not possess an equal status with sultan Mahmud, he was relatively powerful 
with the ability to rise to higher levels of power. 
      We can find another significant counter-example regarding the dominant debate over pre-
modern same-sex relations in the Sufi’s poetry. In the eleventh century, the emergence of Sufism 
nurtured the roots of homoerotism from the outset. Greatly influenced by Greek philosophers such 
as Plato, Sufis perceived beauty as one of God’s worldly manifestations. They believed that 
worldly love could lead to heavenly love. Loving a person as a creature of God was the first step 
to reaching a higher level of mystical insight and eventually to the true love or loving God.406 Much 
like religious seminaries and intellectual gatherings of the time, Sufi circles were male homosocial 
and gender-segregated spaces. Thus, worldly beauty as a sign of God was to be manifested in an 
adolescent youth—amrad—or what was termed as shahid (witness) in Persian literature.407 In Sufi 
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practices, the beauty of a male adolescent was represented and venerated in paintings, poetry and 
Sufi parlance as an “object of desire” which was connected to “the practice of gazing” 
(nazarbazi)—a form of spiritual practice with the expressions of falling in love with the beauty of 
boys who reflect a testimony to divine perfection.408 Sufi tradition also brought its own style of 
literary language into Persian poetry—a complex and heavily symbolic language, which was in 
contrast to the former literary language (in the Ghazanvid era in the tenth century). This mystical 
and opaque language, along with genderless Persian language,409 “has made tracing homoerotism 
on Sufi-influenced poetry more difficult than in the poetry of their like-minded predecessors. 
Nevertheless, this is a dilemma that mostly concerns the general public rather than literary critics 
and expert, since there is still sufficient evidence that the beloved is in the most cases male”.410   
      One good example of these mystical homoerotic stories of this era, which I consider as a 
counter-example in the dominant discourse of Iran’s pre-modern same-sex relations, is the 
relationship between Rumi and Shams Tabriz. Rumi fell in love with Shams who was a mystic and 
Sufi poet. They met for the first time in Konya in 1244, exactly when Rumi succeeded his father 
as the religious master in the city of Konya—the capital of the Seljek Turk Empire—whereas 
Shams was a well-known Sufi mystic with a large following of disciples. Shams was seeking a 
student of equal extraordinaire qualities when he saw that spark in Rumi. About their love story, 
in Sex and Spirit, Robert Barzan writes that   
In the November of 1244 an event occurred in the lives of these two different men that would 
be the cornerstone for a tradition that to this day inspires the lives of millions: Mevlana Rumi 
and Shams Tabriz fell in love. The exact details of their meeting are lost in time and obscured 
by legend. It would appear though that it was love at first sight… Whatever really happened, 
the point is that they become inseparable, and the rest of Rumi’s life and work would be a 
reflection of the relationship that began that day. The two men were obsessed with each other. 
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Rumi shocked and scandalized his family and followers by neglecting his religious and social 
obligations to spend as much time as possible with his beloved Shams.411  
 In the case of Rumi and Shams, there are two different interpretations on their relationships. One 
interpretation emphasizes that their love was a homoerotic relation, while the other considers it as 
heavenly and mystical. From the evidence, we cannot prove either point of view. However, 
including sexual intercourse in their relations is not of great significance. Regardless of the 
physical relationship, what remains is that Rumi's homoerotic poetry reflects their relationships as 
lovers.412 This love demonstrates a kind of symmetrical relationship, since both were mature and 
renowned masters,413 and it indicates a lack of hierarchal relationship, as Schimmel describes a 
romantic scene from their meeting after Shams returned to Rumi from Syria: “they embraced each 
other and fell at each other’s feet, so that one did not know who was lover and who was beloved”.414 
Rumi had chosen Shams over his disciples and loudly confessed his love to Shams without 
considering the conventions of society:     
 
Take love’s chalice and on you go 
Just choose this as your love and go 
Be limpid wine, pure as spirit 
unblurred by vinestalk scum, and flow 
Once glance at him’s worth scores of lives 
Strike a bargain, sell your soul and go 
Such a body: argent, fluid, fine! 
Pay the silver, close your purse, and go 
Let the whole world weep for you! So what? 
Look up at his smiling globe and go. 
If they call you hypocrite, poseur, 
Say, “So I am, and ten times worse,” and go 
Thumb your nose at people, rub it in 
Suck sugar of his lips and go 
“The moon is mine, the rest is yours 
I need neither hearth nor home,” you go 
Who is that moon? 
Lord of Tabriz, it’s Shams, the Sun! 
Step into his regal shade 
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Let’s go! 415 
 
       Regarding symmetrical same-sex relations, a question that arises is: in the rigidly hierarchal 
society of pre-modern Iran, can homoerotic stories of sultan Mahmud and Ayza or Rumi and 
Shams be viewed as a form of same-sex relation that “defines a definite cultural theme” and moves 
beyond “the status-defined homosexuality”? 416 In response to this question, Afary refers to the 
case of Rumi and Shams to argue that  
Some mystic poets such as Rumi may have aspired to a new and more reciprocal 
ethic of love within their small communities. When Rumi and his contemporaries 
insisted that in the most exulted state of love, the distinction between the lover and 
beloved disappeared … they may have been moving beyond status-defined 
homosexuality, beyond a relationship that always involved an implied ‘active’ lover 
and ‘passive’ beloved. In ultimate love, then, reciprocity and consent were 
essential.417  
Here, my intention is not to argue that the relationship between Rumi and Shams was a homosexual 
relationship, which is doubtlessly a modern phenomenon; rather, I would argue that we can 
consider their relationship as one of the closest examples to homosexuality and the furthest form 
from pederasty.  
       From the post-Sufism era to the Qajar period (between the thirteenth and the nineteenth 
centuries), however, we can see that in Persian poetry, poets tended to discard the spiritual aspects 
of homoerotism and move toward more explicit admiration of physical properties of the male 
beloved. In this era, the Persian literary language was overflowed with same-sex themes, such as 
those that symbolized homoerotic allusions. 418 From then on, the ghazal form of poetry (love 
poem) was dedicated to the themes of homoerotism, showing that the love of boys was a preferred 
source of poetic inspiration, though sometimes it is impossible to recognize whether the object of 
description is a woman or a man—once again due to lack of grammatical genders and references 
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in the Persian language419—but in the works of Sa’adi (1210-1291), for example, the object of 
desire in most cases undoubtedly was a male beloved.420 Sa’adi Shirazi is one of the major Persian 
poets recognized for the high quality of his writings and the depth of his social and moral thoughts. 
In his two major works Golestan (The Rose Garden) and Bostan (The Orchard) he depicts his 
same-sex and pederasty experience. In his writings, the romantic love between men and women is 
absent, only in some of his anecdotes he touches upon his own experience with marital discord; 
Sa’adi himself complains about his wife who “turned out to be ill-humoured, quarrelsome, 
disobedient, abusive in her tongue and embittering my life”.421 On the contrary, he explicitly 
expresses his fondness of beautiful boys:   
There are many pretty boys in the world, but not one of them 
Possesses the sweetness of your life-imparting, heart-soothing lips.422 
 
O heart, if that sweet boy should shed my blood,  
Make it as lawful for him as his mother’s milk.423 
        Furthermore, he encourages love for beautiful boys that, according to him, has four benefits: 
“ first, it makes the day auspicious; second, it adds pleasure to life; third, it inspires generosity and 
compassion; fourth, it augments [one's] wealth and position ...”.424  
       The other most popular Persian poet, Hafez Shirazi, celebrates youths' beauty by interplaying 
eroticism and mysticism. He is best known for his ghazals, regarding wine-drinking, music, and 
unrequited love but in a universal and transcendent scope. One of his famous ghazals is a poem 
about his unfaithful young Turk from Shiraz for whom he would give all treasures of the cities of 
Samarkand and Bukhara. 
If that Turk Shiraz gain our heart 
For her dark mole, I will give Samarghand and Bukhara425 
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  Wafer argues that although Hafez’s poetry defines beloved as specifically male, there is no 
indication that he himself practiced pederasty.426 Shamisa also notes that Hafez’s homoerotic 
poetry is not limited to the description of youths, since he praises the Emirs of Shiraz in the same 
manner and with the same poetic vocabularies that he uses when he describes his male beloved.427  
       Socially, pederasty remained the dominant form of same-sex relations during the Safavid era 
(1501-1736) and onwards.428 The pre-modern Iranian society assigned gender conventions to 
partners and distinguished between adult lover and adolescent beloved. According to these 
conventions, the beloved could be the amrad of an adult man as long as he is beardless, but the 
first appearance of a beard indicated that he was no longer suitable to be the passive object of 
desire.429 These relationships that had strong platonic tendencies were not only about sex, but also 
about cultivating the relationship “by placing responsibilities on the man with regard to the future 
of the boy”.430 The partners were bound by “rules of courtship” such as “the bestowal of presents”, 
“teaching of literary texts”, “bodybuilding and military training”, “mentorship, and the 
development of social contacts that would help the junior partner’s career”. In these cases, 
sometimes partners exchanged vows with homosexual tones, known as sigheh baradar khandeghi 
(brotherhood).431  
       During the seventeenth century, amrad khaneha (male houses of prostitution) were recognized 
by the state, and they were tax-paying establishments. Bathhouses and coffeehouses were other 
common homosocial locations for same-sex sexual encounters.432 French traveler Sir John Chardin 
in his travelogue, wrote about coffeehouses where amrads entertained customers. Many of them 
were male dancers or servants who dressed like women and performed erotic dances.433 The 
beginning of the Qajar dynasty (1789-1925) was quite similar to the previous centuries concerning 
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same-sex relations and their reflection on Persian literature. Homoerotic poetry and literature 
moved to the explicit description of sexual acts and pederasty, and unequal relationships became 
the dominant form of homoerotism.434 According to Najmabadi, one of the characteristics of this 
era was the notion of beauty, and “beautiful men and women were depicted with very similar facial 
and bodily features”.435 This was certainly “true in the case of amrads, who were expected to 
possess qualities that by today’s standards are regarded as feminine”.436 Even in written sources, 
the same feminine adjectives were used to describe men and women's beauty. For example, 
Rustam al-Hukama, an Iranian historian in Qajar era, described young boys toward whom 
Tahmasb Mirza (Shah of Iran in the Safavid Empire) was sexually inclined. He describes the young 
men as “young beardless men, rose-faced, silver-bodied, cypress-statured, narcissus-eyed, and 
coquettish, with sugar lips, wine bearers with tulip black-scented hair, and crystalline chin folds, 
and full of games and coquettishness.”437 Although relationships with amrads were totally common 
in urban or rural areas during Qajar, it was a privilege of the upper class of society and royalty to 
keep boy concubines.438  The best-known example of this era is Naser al-Din Shah of Qajar (1831-
1896), who was not only inclined toward women but also kept boy concubines in his harem. One 
of the amrads toward whom Shah had developed feelings was Malijac, who was later endowed 
official responsibilities and finally became a charge of a cavalry regiment.439 In poetry and 
literature, Iraj Mirza was the last major Iranian poet of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries who 
openly wrote about courtship with boys. Iraj Mirza, who also well known for his sexual affairs 
with amrads, usually begins his poems by providing an account of how he convinces the boy to 
bed and later gives readers a description of physical details of sexual acts.440 
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      As I have shown so far, in the Iranian dispositif of alliance, “vaginal intercourse with wives”441 
was aimed to the establishment of family and obligatory procreation. However, men could seek 
love and other forms of sexual gratification with other women in sigheh (temporary marriage) or 
other men or boys in homosocial spaces. In this context, one might be described as inclined toward 
women like sultan Husayn Safavi, 442 another as inclined toward “one joseph-faced to thousands 
of Zulaykhas and Laylis and Shirin” like Shah Tahmasb II443 and sultan Mahmud Ghaznavid and 
a third as fond of both men and women like Fath‘ali Shah444 who had wives but was engaged in 
Shahid bazi (the practice of gazing).445 Sexual relations of this era did not adhere to the modern 
sensibilities of sex, class, mutual consent, and age. Afary argues that prior to the end of the 
nineteenth century, “distinctions between consensual adult sex and pedophilic or pederastic abuse 
or rape of a boy were less clear”.446 These male sexual activities447 , along with different forms of 
erotic expression and sexual roles, contributed to the ambiguity and fluidity of gender and sexual 
construction. In the next paragraph, I will show how, to modernize Iranian society by creating a 
modern-nation state and national identity in the nineteenth century, Iran’s fluid construction of 
gender and sexuality, particularly traditional same-sex relations, was reduced to heteronormativity 
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3.3    Hybridized Homosexuality  
          In this paragraph, I will discuss Iran’s modern construction of gender and sexuality and its 
dialogue with Iranian modernity and the Western discourse of sexuality from the eighteenth to the 
twentieth century. For doing so, I will discuss how Iranian modernity was fashioned through a 
creative process of cultural grafting between reinventing Iranian pre-Islamic traditions and re-
elaborating modern Western resources. Furthermore, I will show how modernization gave rise to the 
establishment of a specific Iranian biopolitical dispositif within which—for the sake of building a 
modern nation-state and national identity—the fluidity of sexuality and gender, particularly 
traditional same-sex relations were erased and covered from the collective memory of Iranians in 
favor of the heterosexualization of Eros. But before, in order to develop my arguments, I will begin 
to investigate the link that exists between European colonialism and Iran’s modern construction of 
gender and sexuality.  
        In Between Warrior Brother and Veiled Sister, Minoo Moallem argues that “Iranian modernity 
is defined in significant ways by the constructions of race and gender found in the traveling notions 
that accompany the civilizational imperialism of Western modernity”. She further argues that since 
colonialism and postcolonialism are integral elements of modernity, any discussion of modernity in 
any society—including Iran that had never been in the zone of colonialization—without considering 
these integral elements is impossible.448 In the Iranian context, one of the colonial tropes linking to 
the modern construction of gender and sexuality is the challenging with translating of homoerotic 
literature into European languages. Classical Persian literature and Sufi poetry, as already explained, 
are essentially homoerotic. To object to the homoerotic contents of these texts, from the eighteenth 
century, Persian literature and Sufi poetry became the subject for a display of puritanical morality 
by Western scholars and translators.449 One good example of this purification is the fact that Western 
scholars preferred to genderize Persian literature in a socially acceptable manner that was by 
heterosexualizing the Eros. They translated ‘the beloved’ into ‘female beloved’ in the ghazals or 
Sufi poems, where the verses more often were dedicated to a ‘male beloved’.450 European translators 
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simultaneously subjugated the real homoerotic nature of Persian literature and unmasked their 
Orientalist approach. In other words, while constructing their own erotic Orient, European 
translators covered the gender dynamicity and sexual fluidity of Iranian society. This textual strategy 
emerged once the early circulation of Persian texts in Western countries contributed to the notion of 
‘erotic Persia’ in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.451 For example, during the nineteenth 
century, we can see the trace of exoticization and eroticization of Persian poetry in the works of 
British writer Edward Fitzgerald. His translation of the classical Persian poet and philosopher Omar 
Khayyam’s rubaiyat (quatrains) in 1859 was very different from the original spirit of Khayyam’s 
profound philosophy. He transformed rubaiyat into “a sort of Epicurean Eclogue in a Persian 
garden”452 and reduced Khayyam’s tone and existence to a drunk, atheistic and desperate poet. In 
fact, Fitzgerald’s translation of rubaiyat was a reproduction that was “designed to appeal to a mid-
Victorian audience inclined to rebel against the restricting puritanism of the Victorian ethic”.453 
Similarly, British translator Sir Richard Francis Burton, regardless of Christian morality in the 
Victorian era, celebrated the erotica of Persia in his writings. In the English translation of the stories 
of Sa’adi’s Golestan in 1888, he explicitly illustrated the significance of same-sex practices in 
Persian literature in which “Joseph is the paragon of male beauty”.454 The celebration of erotic Persia 
also emerged in the writings of some other European writers who through their fabricated “eye-
witness” travel accounts contributed to the exoticization of Iranians’ sexual mores such as those 
Montesquieu’s Letters of Persanes and Travels of Sir John Mandeville that “exploited the public’s 
thirst for the exotic by about harems and hypersexualized Persian men”.455 
       In European views, therefore, classical Persian literature was a portal to the world in which 
men’s sexual activity and particularly same-sex relations were unrestricted by any social mores. 
Some European scholars and religious conservatives strongly reacted to the explicit expressions of 
                                                          
451 Ibid. 
452 Edward FitzGerald, Rubáiyát of Omar Khayyám, ed., Daniel Karlin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 146. 
453 Laurence Paul Elwell-Sutton, “Omar Khayyām.” in Persian Literature, ed., Ehsan Yarshater (USA: SUNY Press, 
1988), 147-160.   
454 Sir Richard Francis Burton, Tales from the Gulistân: Or Rose-garden of the Sheikh Sa'di of Shirâz (London: P. 
Allan & Company, 1928), 165.  
455 Wendy Desouza, “The Love That Dare Not Be Translated: Erasures of Premodern Sexuality”, in Rethinking Iranian 
Nationalism and Modernity, eds., Kamran Scot Aghaie, Afshin Marashi, (Texas: Texas University Press, 2014)70. 
 
  98  
 
erotic contents of Persian literature that differed from their Christian morality.456 At the end of the 
eighteenth century, those scholars began to remove or change the gender in their renditions of 
Persian literature.457 For example, in his famous ghazal Turk of Shiraz, as already explained in the 
previous paragraph, Hafez explicitly declares his love for Turkish amrad or the male beloved, but 
in many translations, such as the linguist and adventurous spy Gertrude Bell’s translation of Hafez, 
Turk is rendered as a female beloved. Sir William Jones, who translated one version of Hafez in the 
eighteenth century, acknowledged that according to his sense of morality, he altered the male 
beloved into a female one.458 The effort to purify the Persian texts from homoerotic inclinations was 
not limited to rendering beloved males into charming females; the British translator Edward 
Eastwick in 1850 completely erased chapter five of Sa’adi’s Golestan whose central theme was 
devoted to same-sex love.459  
       Besides the European translators’ censorship of Persian homoerotic poetry, another colonial 
trope that was essential to the modern construction of gender in Iran was travelogues that were 
produced by both Iranian and European travelers, traders, missioners, politicians, and elites.460 This 
trope contributed to the construction of Persia as the other of Europe. The otherness of Persia was 
established through producing the normative conceptions of the West as civilized, progressive, 
dynamic, free from any traditional bonds and through casting the image of Persia as a land, which 
was “frozen historically and incapable of proceeding autonomously to modernity.”461 For many 
nineteenth-century European writers (and some Iranian elites), the otherness of Persia was tied to 
the embracing of the Mohammedan religion, which was essential for explaining Persian 
backwardness. 
        For example, in Sketches of Persi in 1827, Scottish diplomat and historian Sir John Malcolm 
depicted Persians as intellectually backward, as people who know nothing of philosophy, 
metaphysics, or modern arts and sciences. He wrote, “the intellectual acquirements of the Persians 
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are very limited indeed; consequently, their minds are not imbued with anything noble or elevated, 
they receive no philosophical training, and they know nothing of metaphysics. To be well-read in 
the Koran is the highest of their literary acquirements”. Then he associated the inferiority of Persia 
with the religion of Islam because he assumed that “no Mohammedan country can ever be great, or 
far advanced in art, science, and literature, for their religion is the great barrier that keeps them back 
and binds the mind in a shroud of mental darkness.”462 According to Moallem, Malcolm’s thesis of 
the backwardness of Persia and its connection to the role of Islam is grounded on the “European race 
theory” through which religion, particularly Islam, became a “means of racialization” and a 
“theoretical tool” for assessment of the “backwardness” of Middle Eastern societies.463      
       In Safar Nameh, Persian Pictures: A Book of Travel, published in 1894, English writer, linguist 
and adventurous spy Margaret L. Gertrude Bell with a racial narrative, praised Western modernity 
and advancement as an exception in the world, and identified Persia as a “hoar conservative 
antiquity”, lacking progress, civilization and the evolution of race. 464 As Moallem claims, the 
racialization of Muslim communities “works together with the representation of gender relations in 
Western discourse”.465 Women’s condition (hijab, early marriage, polygamy, divorce and rules of 
Islam) and sexual relations in the Muslim communities were served as a defining factor to make 
boundaries between the civilized West and the uncivilized, barbaric Muslim world. For example, 
Thomas Herbert, an English politician in the eighteenth century, while accompanying the English 
ambassador in Iran, explicitly expressed his disgust for Iranians’ same-sex desire as “a vice so 
detestable, so damnable, so unnatural as forces hell to show its ugliness before its season”.466 
Similarly, Jean Chardin, in the 1800s in his travelogue, linked the Iranian prevalence of same-sex 
desire with women’s isolation. He stressed that while amrad-khanehe (male house of prostitution) 
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and young boys were available for men; Iranian women were preserved from any social interactions 
and education by religious prejudices.467             
       In Refashioning Iran, Mohammad Tavakoli Targhi argues that, as European travelers, the 
Iranians, during their journeys to Europe and in their travelogues, exoticized and eroticized the lands 
of the West where locals “looked upon” the travelers as “exotic aliens”. He argues that “the anxiety 
and the desire to represent and narrate alterity were reciprocal amongst” Iranians and Europeans. 
Within these ambivalent encounters, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, both Iranians in 
Europe and Europeans in Iran gazed simultaneously at the other while returning the gaze. Within 
this ‘cultural looking’, the narrators (both Iranians and Europeans) of travelogues often “fetishized” 
and “reduced” each other to the “visible signs of otherness”.468 Through a process of “projection and 
introjection, the visible features of the other became loci for self-reflection and self-fashioning” for 
both Iranian and European travelers. Tavakoli Targhi emphasizes that in this “conjoined process,” 
“otherness served as a vantage for cultural mimicry and mockery”.469 In accordance to Bhabha’s 
account of modernity, Tavakoli Targhi argues that Iranian modernity was created through this 
mutation and hybridization of cultures between Iran and Europe. In one sense, he sees the project of 
Iranian modernity as located in a hybrid space of shared practices and mimicries. Najmabadi and 
Tavakoli Targhi consider the period between 1850 and 1920 as formative of what is termed Iranian 
modernity. According to them, relationships with the West, along with its colonial and orientalist 
impulses, contributed to the constitutive of this process. Transformation in the political and 
technological formations refashioned some social domains that their effects lasted for centuries. The 
nation-state as a discursive formation is at the center of this refashioning that later I will discuss it 
in detail.470   
         However, regarding the modern construction of gender and sexuality in Iran, Tavakoli Targhi 
argues that Iranian elites and travelers, on their journeys to Europe during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, were particularly impressed by the fact that European women had a public 
presence and were interlocutors with men. They were not accustomed to the appearance of unveiled 
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faces and bodies of women in public parks, operas, and playhouses, and the “only cultural equivalent 
to this public display of male-female intimacy was the imaginary Muslim heaven”471 (that was 
characterized and promised in the Qur’an for faithful male and female Muslims). The European 
women, thus, were the locus of gaze, eroticism and exoticism in the self-experience recounting of 
Iranian travelers. In 1810, for example, the writer and the Iranian ambassador in England, Mirza 
Abu al-Hasan Khan Ilchi, described European women’s display in the public arenas: 
if a sorrowing soul traverses these heavenly fields, his head is crowned with 
flowers of joy, and looking on these saffron beds—luxurious as Kashmir’s—he 
smiles despite himself. In the gardens and on the paths, beauteous women shine 
like the sun and rouse the envy of the stars, and the houris [fairies] of paradise 
blush with shame to look upon the rose-checked beauties of the earth below. In 
absolute amazement, I said to Sir Gore Ouseley: if there be paradise on the earth, 
it is this, oh! It is this.472 
      The “eroticized depiction of European women” by Iranian travelers thus led to a desire for 
“heaven on the Earth” in which fairy-like women could accompany men. This experience gave rise 
to a visualization of a society without gender segregation that turned into political contestations: 
“The attraction of Europe and the European women figured into political contestations and 
conditioned the formation of new political discourses and identities”.473 Tavakoli Targhi further 
argues that in these contestations, the hijab (veil) became the visible signifier of cultural difference 
between the self and the other (us and them). In this way, for Iranian elites, the hijab became a sign 
of backwardness, and the removal of the hijab became a key element for modernization.474 This 
Islamphobic thesis attracted more attention when Iran lost its power in foreign policies dealing with 
Britain and Russia.    
      During the nineteenth century, Iran began to slip gradually into many political conflicts. In 1914, 
from the north, Iran was occupied by the Russians and from the south by British India; accordingly, 
Iran became a “contested zone in the Great Games played by the two powers”.475 Russia, took 
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advantage of Iran’s weakness and intensified its territorial grab, whereas Britain attempted to keep 
“the strengthening of commercial and economic ties with Iran as a bulwark against Russia 
expansionism”.476 For its part, Iran considered the British’s investments in “the Iranian 
infrastructures as a protection against Russian influences”.477 For this reason, Iran granted many 
concessions to the British Empire. Just one example, in 1872, Naser al-Din Shah Qajar granted Baron 
Julis de Reuter, a British citizen, the rights for the construction of railroads, mining, exploitation of 
the national forests, banking and financing.478 This circumstance created a sense of shame and loss 
of confidence among the nineteenth-century Iranian intellectuals and nationalists. Some of them, 
such as Mirza Agha Khan Kermani, Mirza Fath‘ali Akhundzadeh and Abd al-Rahim Talebof, who 
were radical critic of Islam, called for a “modern political order that limited the power of the Shah 
and reduced the European dominance of Iran”.479 They believed that Iran’s Islamic traditions no 
longer provided a “suitable guide for navigating the world”. They argued for the rejection of 
dominant Islamic traditions of Iranian society. Instead, they advocated for an Iranian nation-state 
and nationalist discourse, anchored in a comprehensive modern worldview, as the first constituent 
of any attempt to modernize Iran.480 Iranian sociologist, Jamshid Behnam, notes that in the 
nineteenth century, the real intention of modernization, or what Iranian intellectuals termed Tajadod 
(renewal), was a desire for change and innovation that came from Iran’s backwardness and “Western 
civilization’s advancement”. Tajadod was conceived as the “best incorporation of national culture 
with modern values and beliefs”.481 With that in mind, elites found a solution in a certain mimicry 
and adaptation of available successful models in the West. According to Najmabadi, it was not 
always the case of a mindless mimicry, but rather it was a form of grafting derived from cultural 
inventiveness.482 Tavakoli Targhi also insists that mimesis in Iranian modernity was a strategy by 
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which Iranian nationalists and modernists reconstructed Iran’s history and identity.483  He argues 
that while Europeans “constructed the modern self in relation to their non-Western others” 
(including Iranians), Iranians began to experience the formation of the ethos of modernity in relation 
to their Western others.     
     In Iran’s nineteenth-century political discourse, identification with European modernity and 
scientific rationality served for both disassociation with the dominant Arabo-Islamic culture and 
the building of a modern nation-state and national identity grounded on the reconstruction of pre-
Islamic traditions.484 After all, as Anderson argues, every nation forms the national community 
through the reconstruction of histories and memories.485 Similarly, Hakim discusses that we can 
discern a continuity between pre-modern groups and modern nations as the latter “derive some of 
their features and vigor from ancient solidarities, traditions and myths”.486 These claims touch 
upon Hobsbawm’s suggestion that modernity includes traditions that are “actually invented, 
constructed and formally instituted”.487 In nineteenth-century, in particular, with the rise of Iranian 
nationalism, there has been a growing body of historical investigation and reinvention of e pre-
Islamic past that contributed to the articulation of national identity and memory. As Tavakoli 
Targhi states, “the selective remembrance of things pre-Islamic made possible the dissociation of 
Iran from Islam and the articulation of a new national identity and political discourse… that 
refashioned the millat [nation] from a religious collectively (millat-I Shi’i) into a national 
collectively (millat-i Iran)”.488 At the centre of this process of nationalism, there was the mytho-
historical work of the eleventh century Iranian poet Firdawsi. His Shahnameh (the Book of Kings) 
provided valuable “semantic and symbolic resources for dissociating Iran from Islam and for 
fashioning an alternative basis of identity.”489 Reading and (re)citing this mytho-historical book in 
“a period of societal dislocation, military defeats, and foreign infiltration during the nineteenth 
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century” contributed to “the rearticulation of Iranian identity and construction of alternative forms 
of historical narrations and periodizations.”490 Shahnameh’s “authorization and popular recitation 
of national narrations resulted in a process of cultural transference that intensified the desire for a 
recovery of the forgotten history of ancient Iran”.491 Najmabadi provides a brief explanation on 
the Shahnameh’s contribution to modern nationalism over monarchy legitimacy. She writes that  
The two kinds of appropriation of Shahnameh in the nineteenth century were in 
competition. The nationalist appropriation centred on a story about the land, 
Iran’zamin [the land of Iran]. It aimed to produce a sense of persons belonging to 
a common land with a common history. The royal appropriation emphasized 
persons as subjects of a king who reigned over that land. By the twentieth century, 
Shahnameh was accepted as national rather than a royal epic, signifying the 
triumph of modern nationalism over the monarchy legitimacy. The Iranian had 
been transformed from a subject of an Iranian king to a citizen of Iran’zamin.492  
Therefore, in the nineteenth-century, Shahnameh, in Dabashi’s words, became “a poetic 
disposition of a nationalist modernity, integral to the machinery of making modern subjects 
suitable for a modern nation-state”.493 Lewis argues that besides local resources, most of the 
political structure of the modern nation-state in the Middle East, particularly Iran, was informed 
by European emotional and ideological overtones and undertones, especially by the French notion 
of la patrie (homeland).494 Similarly, Najmabadi asserts that in the case of Iran, the modern notion 
of vatan (homeland) was an issue of “inventiveness of cultural grafting” informed by both modern 
European concepts—including patriut (patriot), disput (despost), sivilizasiun (civilization), 
rivulusiun (revolution), piruqrah (progress), pulitik (politics), and libiral (liberal)—and 
simultaneous integration and rejection of the pre-modern Sufi meaning of vatan.495 Najmabadi 
explains that in Sufi’s tradition, vatan was an allegorical concept denoting one’s grave or “the 
return to earth, to one’s original substance, marking the beginning of return to the divine”. At the 
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same time, vatan was a mother figure. It expressed a “desire to return to the mother’s womb 
whence one had been born”, to that “original state of pure”.496 In Sufi’s writings, ‘love to vatan’ 
or ‘love to return to mother’s womb’ was also interpreted as Sufi’s attempt to reach unity with the 
divine. However, while appropriating the love of vatan from Sufi’s tradition, the modern 
nationalist discourse insisted on the material meaning of vatan as homeland and disassociated it 
from its allegorical and spiritual meaning. For example, Iranian intellectual of the nineteenth 
century, Abd al-Rahim Talibuf explicitly associated ‘love to vatan’ or ‘love to mother’ with ‘love 
of Iran zamin (land of Iran)’. He wrote: “we Iranians, among thousands of problems, have become 
alien from the holy love of vatan... We must understand that this vatan, for whose protection and 
progress we have the duty to make every necessary sacrifice, is Iran and its famous cities are 
Shiraz, Isfahan, Yazd, Kerman, Kashan, Tehran, Khurasan Qazvin, Rasht, Tabriz, Khuy and other 
places.”497  
      In the modern nationalist discourse of vatan, therefore, there was a shift from the spiritual 
meaning of the mother’s womb (and grave) to a material meaning of love to one's mother (or love 
to the homeland). Theoretically, in Between Men Sedgwick reminds us that male bonding is always 
mediated through a female figure.498 Najmabadi contends that in nationalist discourse, the 
homeland is represented by eroticized allegories of female bodies that construct a national identity 
based on male bonding.499 In the Iranian modernist discourse, vatan was portrayed as having a 
reciprocal relationship: a beloved mother who nurtured a nation and simultaneously required 
protection in return. In other words, while educating the nation, the mother (homeland) was in 
need of protection by her children (nation, both male and female).500 This modern notion of vatan 
evoked a new gender discourse within which women needed to be educated in order to teach future 
generations. For doing so, elites concluded that veiling and gender segregation were huge obstacles 
for women’s attainment of education and knowledge that not only did not guarantee women’s 
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chastity but also were, in their opinion, the main reasons for the prevalence of same-sex practices 
in Iran.501 In 1896, Mirza Agha Khan Kermani disavowed same-sex practices and argued:  
Men are naturally inclined toward socializing with enjoying the companionship 
of women. This is so strongly evident that it needs no explication and proof. If a 
people is forbidden from this great blessing and is deprived of this great 
deliverance, then inevitably the problem of sexual acts with boys and young male 
slaves [bachchah'bazi and ghulam'baragi] is created, because boys without facial 
hair [pisaran-i sadah] resemble women and this is one of the errors of nature. It is 
for this reason that in the Iranian people/nation this grave condition has reached 
saturation. You lust after men instead of women can be witnessed in Iran.502 
       He finally concluded that the ground for the prevalence of same-sex practices was situated in 
women’s veiling because “men’s natural desire to see women is frustrated and they are deprived 
of that blessing, of necessary and inevitably, they turn to pederasty [bachchah'bazi] and making 
love with boys”503. At the end of the nineteenth century, same-sex relations became less culturally 
acceptable, and Iranian elites began to advocate a modern discourse of gender and sexuality, 
including gender desegregation in public, removal of the hijab and the heterosexualization of love 
for shifting the constitution of marriage from a procreative to a romantic contract. One marker of 
Iranian modernity, thus, was the transformation of homoeroticism into heteroeroticism.504 I would 
argue that modernists and nationalists’ writings and their advocating for the modern gender 
discourse was a new regulatory discourse on the individual and social body, attempting to 
institutionalize heterosexuality as the normative ideal. From the end of the nineteenth century 
onward, this new regulatory discourse, or what I call, using Foucauldian terms, the Iranian 
dispositif of sexuality was deployed by Iranian society and superimposed on the Iranian dispositif 
of alliance. In contrast to the traditional dispositif, gender and sexuality in this modern dispositif 
became more problematic and the subject of medical, political and literary investigation. For 
example, Akhundzadeh, who wrote important political essays on the nationalism and modern 
nation-state such as Maktubat-e-Kamalaldolle (Kamalaldolle’s Letters) in 1865, wrote also some 
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essays and plays, like Hekayat Marde Khasis (The Story of Stingy Man) in 1874 to advocate 
women’s rights, anti-hijab discourse and monogamy based on love, instead of arranged marriage, 
polygamy and temporary marriage.505 At the end of the nineteenth century, prominent Iranian 
politician and scholar, Hasan Taghizadeh, in his influential periodical Kaveh (1916-1922) in 
Berlin, advocated greater women’s rights including marriage and divorce, the normalization of 
heterosexuality and the abandonment of same-sex practices.506 Ahmad Kasravi, another Iranian 
intellectual who developed normative discourses on sexuality and marriage, in his journal Peyman, 
condemned classical poets, including Hafez, Sa’adi and Rumi, for their homoerotic oeuvre and he 
called for their writings to be eliminated from school textbooks.507 Other Iranian journals, 
including Akhtar, Soraya and Parvaresh and particularly Molla Nasreddin, advocated greater 
women’s rights and normative heterosexuality. They also criticized sexual relationships with 
children, including the institution of child marriage.508 The education of Iranian women appeared 
as another integral element of the modern Iranian dispositif of sexuality. Najmabadi argues that 
the modern educational regime, which “was deeply gendered from the beginning”, aimed at 
producing modern women through “particular disciplinary techniques and emancipatory 
impulses”.509 What is important to highlight is that within the modern Iranian dispositif of 
sexuality, the project of women’s emancipation and promise of heterosocial space rested upon the 
reformist decisions of modernist men. Iranian feminists protested against modernist masculinities. 
They argued that modernist men did not go far enough in order to protect their own patriarchal 
institutions. For instance, the Iranian pioneer feminist of the end of the nineteenth century, Bibi 
Khanom Astarabadi, in the essay Maʿayeb al-Rejal (The Men’s vices), expressed anger toward 
modernist men who reduced women’s lives and education to housekeeping and child-rearing.510 
In the next years, under the Pahlavis, women’s bodies became the focus of much cultural and social 
politics.         
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     When the Qajar dynasty was overthrown in 1925, Reza Shah established the Pahlavi dynasty. 
He began to build a new state characterized by two main pillars: the army and bureaucracy.511 Reza 
Shah was “antagonistic toward the clergy” and with strong repression built his new state through 
the adoption of “the material advances of the West” and “a breakdown of the traditional power of 
religion and a growing tendency toward secularism”.512 For him, the emancipation of women was 
an instrument to provide the state with a new form of power, a power that used gender in order to 
“emasculate religious authorities and transfer patriarchal power from the domain of the clergy to 
the realm of the state, and further, to utilize gender to accomplish its Europeanization policies.”513 
Reza Shah’s modern liberties had been accompanied by new administrative and disciplinary 
mechanisms. Within the Iranian dispositif of sexuality under Reza Shah’s reign, gender and body 
became the subjects of the state and public concern in four specific areas: (1) he increased reforms 
in health and hygiene that affected the health of women and children. In fact, producing healthier 
children, preventing a decline of the population and reducing the spread of venereal and other 
contagious diseases gave rise to the control over men and women’s bodies through medical 
advice.514 (2) Reza Shah’s government increased the number of public schools for girls in 1933.515 
Darius Rejali argues, in terms that remind Foucault’s concept of disciplinary power, that during the 
modernization in Iran, schools were a matrix that employed various measures to produce 
individuals who were suited for society’s needs.516 (3) In 1931, Reza Shah introduced some new 
reforms in marriage and divorce through which women became able to ask for divorce under certain 
conditions, and while the Shari’a recognized the age of puberty at 9 for females and 15 for males, 
the 1931 law fixed the minimum age for marriage at 15 for women and 18 for men.517 (4) He issued 
drastic reforms in dress codes to produce modern Iranian citizens in both appearances and conduct. 
In 1928, he enforced parliament to pass a new dress code, enforcing all males working in 
governmental organizations to dress more like Europeans. In 1936, Reza Shah issued a formal 
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decree enforcing women to unveil and dress in European fashions. 518 All these modern reforms 
before and during Reza Shah’s reign gave rise to the greater progress in the normalizing of 
heterosexuality and covering and erasing the fluidity of gender and sexuality typical of pre-modern 
Iranian dispositif of alliance, particularly homoerotism from the collective memory of Iranians. This 
project of heterosexualization did not merely cover up the already existing notion of same-sex 
practices, but rather, it brought up a moment for the constitution of heterosexuality and 
homosexuality, a moment, I would argue, that was linked to creating a modern nation-state and 
national identity through a dialogical relationship between traditional and modern resources. 
Between the late nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries, within the Iranian dispositif of sexuality, 
this reconfiguration of the structure of desire did not shape the type of homosexuality described by 
Foucault in the modern heterosexualization of the West; that is a deviant or criminal type produced 
by disciplinary technologies and medical and legal discourses. As Najmabadi claims, what this 
process produced in Iran was a type of individual who still engaged in same-sex practices stricken 
with some sort of illness but without abnormal identity.519 In one sense, the notion of homosexuality 
as a deviant type, produced in mid-nineteenth-century Europe through disciplinary technologies 
and medical and legal discourses, did not emerge in the Iranian context.520 The reason is that 
modernist elites saw same-sex relations not as an attribute of a person. As already explained, they 
assumed that veiling and gender segregation were the main obstacles for the socializing of men 
with and enjoying the companionship of women. Their modernist project of heterosexualization 
was grounded on the premise that “once women became available to men”, “homosexual practices 
would disappear”.521 Of course, hiding homoerotism from cultural memory does not mean that 
same-sex desire disappeared. Rather, in the next years under Mohammad Reza Shah’s sexual 
policies, we can see more or less an explicit form of same-sex relations in urban area of Tehran. 
      In 1941, Reza Shah, due to his support of the Third Reich, was forced to abdicate by Allies, 
and his son, Crown Prince Mohammad Reza, became the last Shah of Iran.522 Under his rule, 
particularly during the 1960s and 1970s, Iranian society “underwent a state-sponsored 
                                                          
518 Ibid. 
519 Najmabadi, Women with Mustaches and Men without Beards, 57. 
520 Ibid.  
521 Ibid. 
522 Abrahamian, A History of Modern Iran, 97. 
 
  110  
 
modernization program that affected the economic relations, social institutions, and cultural 
patterns”.523 These reforms dramatically transformed the urban way of life. Traditional social 
structures such as the “guild system (Asnaf), family life, religious institutions and the spatial 
division in the urban center all underwent a process of transformation and experienced severe 
tensions as a fallout of the modernization program”.524 For example, regarding family life, 
Mohammad Reza Shah increased the reforms in his father’s sexual policies. Under his reign, 
abortion was legalized in 1973.525 The Family Protection Law was introduced in 1975, which gave 
women greater rights in divorce. He continued his father’s reform in age restrictions for marriage 
and legally restricted polygamy by allowing it only with permission from the first wife.526 For 
what concerns same-sex practices, under Mohammad Reza Shah, that were neither recognized, 
accepted nor punished by law.527 Paul Vieille, who worked with a team of Iranian sociologists on 
the study of Iranian peasants and industrial workers from the 1960s to 1968, in an article writes 
that “eight out of ten boys were said to have had at least one homosexual experience of one form 
or another before marriage, whether with their peers or with much older men. The practice is thus 
transmitted from generation to generation, though it is in decline”.528  
     Najmabadi quotes a report from 1954, describing nightlife in and around Shahr-i nau in Tehran 
(Tehran’s red-light district). The report tells of the overlapping of sex work and the entertainment 
offered in the nightclubs, restaurants, and cafes by non-heteronormative males or by male dancers 
who made themselves up like women and could be defined as a woman-presenting male (mard-i 
zan-numa)529. Within that space, what can be defined as gay space emerged where men met and 
entertained with other men. However, regarding gay identity, as I explained, during modernization, 
the Iranian dispositif of sexuality, compared to the Western dispositif, did not produce gay identity 
in the Foucauldian sense. Later, it was in the post-revolutionary era that gayness began to be 
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embraced precisely for self-identification. As Najmabadi argues, although “the term gay first 
appeared in Iran of the 1970s”, it was avoided by local men because “it was received as the English 
translation of a Persian word with a highly pejorative and dishonorable load (kuni)530 [literary 
means ass, referring to the act of anal sex]”. However, it seems that although those local men did 
not identify themselves as gay, at least they were active and create their own community as Afary 
argues that by the 1970s, as a result of interaction with “American and European advisors who 
lived in Iran”, a small “gay community” (or maybe I can call male homoerotic community if the 
members did not identify themselves as gay) took shape in elite circles of Tehran with some 
famous members such as fashion designer Keyvan Khosravani531 and artist and architect Bijan 
Saffari. 532 The main spots of this small subculture were located in several hotels and bars, and by 
the late Pahlavi era, there was some talk of establishing a “gay rights organization,” even in 1972, 
in Shiraz University, Iranian sociologist Saviz Shafai, who after the revolution started his queer 
activism in the USA, for the first time gave a lecture about homosexuality and discrimination533 
(that unfortunately, no further information is available on his lecture). Furthermore, some articles 
in the “American gay press” represented their enthusiasm about the Iranian gay subculture. The 
gay American anthropologist Jerry Zarit, who visited Teheran before the Islamic Revolution, in an 
article titled The Iranian Male—an Intimate Look, exoticized Tehran as a “gay paradise”. He 
wrote: “Iran was for me and for others like me, a sexual paradise. In terms of both quantity and 
quality, it was the most exciting experience of my life”.534  
      However, such an Orientalist vision from Tehran’s gay scene does not show that Tehran before 
the revolution was a real ‘paradise’ for non-heterosexual and non-cisgender individuals. Moallem 
argues that the transformations of masculinity under the Pahlavids also coincided with the 
diffusion of homophobic discourses and language as a site of everyday elaboration and 
construction of sexual identifies and practices. According to the author, in this homophobic 
language, “the geographical and cultural diversity of Iranian society was used to discipline bodies 
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by associating male homosexuality and women’s perversity with certain localities in Iran and 
opposing them to the hegemonic model of masculinity”. She gives examples from the northern 
part of Iran where “men were thought to lack virility (bi-ghyrat), Khasvini men were depicted as 
natural homosexuals, and men from the Azarbyjan were constructed as hyper-virile”.535 Moreover, 
whereas the nineteenth-century modernist elites located same-sex relations in the domain of 
Arabo-Islamic culture, Islamists and religious thinkers in the 60s and 70s and later in the post-
revolutionary era attached it to the domain of secular and Western culture. For example, during 
the 1970s, religious thinker, Ali Shariati, criticized the open homosexuality in the West. He said, 
“Have you heard the arguments of the British members of parliament in defense of liwat bill 
[homosexual rights]? They say this is an objective reality and it exists in our society and we must 
recognize it”. Then he attacked the emergence of similar values in Iran as a form of imperial 
encroachment.536 However, both the nineteenth-century intellectuals and religious thinkers in the 
twentieth century failed to consider the homoerotic history of Iran. Same-sex relation and 
identification in the dispositif of alliance, constructing the contrast of homosexuality and 
heterosexuality in the dispositif of sexuality at the end of the nineteenth century, the emergence of 
gay subculture under Mohammad Reza Shah’s sexual policies and gayness as a self-identification 
in the post-revolutionary era (that I will discuss in the next paragraphs) were not a vice rooted in 
Arabo-Islamic tradition or a form of Western imperialist conspiracy. In other words, the production 
of homosexuality in the history of Iran was neither , in Najmabadi’s words, a process of implanting 
an “alien seed into an empty soil” nor a self-nurturing phenomenon. Rather, it has been developed 
within the hybridized and cultural grafting construction of Iranian modernity, the modern nation-
state and Iranian dispositif of sexuality. In one sense, Iranian homosexuality itself has also 
occupied a hybrid location of shared practices and mimicries between Iranian traditional same-sex 
relations and the Western-oriented notion of homosexuality. In paragraph 4.3 
“Hamjensgara/Gay’s Existence”, I will argue that within the Iranian dispositif of sexuality in the 
post-revolutionary era, at the end of the twentieth century, Iranian gay-identifying men as authentic 
agents have reworked the Western gay identities in order to constitute their own sexual self-
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determination. But before, I will begin the next paragraph with a discussion on the establishment 





















  114  
 
4. Sexual Identity in Iran: From Construction to Resistance 
4.1 The Rise of Islamism  
 The main subject of investigation in this paragraph is how within the Iranian 1979 revolution and 
the reinvention of Islamic traditions, the Islamic Republic emerged both as a religious and 
biopolitical dispositif within which homosexuality, in contrast to the modern Iranian nationalist 
discourse, is depicted as a Western trope of invasion that aims to corrupt the authentic culture of 
Islam and Iran. Such anti-Western sentiment—or what is known in Iran as Gharbzadegi 
(Occidentosis)—was promulgated before the revolution. Therefore, I will begin my argument with 
a discussion on the 1979 revolution and its ideological formations in the Shah's last years.  
      Shah’s sexual policies were strongly condemned by Islamists and Islamic intellectuals, who 
considered women’s emancipation and homosexuality as products of Western culture that brought 
immorality and unethicality to Iranian society.537 Furthermore, through Pahlavis’ modernization 
project, a powerful autocratic state was built and “people who were affected by the modernization 
programs and policies were in large numbers alienated from the process, and in many respects, an 
attitude of resistance to and even hostility toward modernization developed”.538 All this dissidence 
finally resulted in an alliance among the Shah’s oppositions, including clergies, Islamist thinkers 
and reformists, as well as some secular leftist intellectuals. With a certain degree of agreement, all 
these shared their feelings of resentment and frustration with the Western culture and the 
modernizing and secularizing trend–particularly modern gender norms–of the Shah.539 Despite the 
ideological differences in these dissentients’ writings, ideological dialogue between Islamist 
thinkers and clerics resulted in the formation of an Islamic ideology that offered a cultural context 
and shared a language within which the Islamic Republic was predicated. In this paragraph, I will 
discuss the ideas of prominent figures who contributed to the making of Islamic ideology and the 
1979 revolution.  
      The first steps toward developing Islamic ideology appeared in the works of political writer 
and critic Jalal Al-Ahamd who, by the early 1960s, laid the ground for a critique of modernization 
and Westernization policies in Iran. Al-Ahamd, who was a Marxist, renewed his interest in Islamic 
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traditions and, with a leftist lens, attacked Western imperialism and rampant consumerism as the 
main “causes of the defeat” of the Iranian “nationalist and democratic movements”.540 In 1962, 
Al-Ahamd published the book titled Gharbzadegi [the English translation: Occidentosis: A Plague 
from the West] in which the West is depicted as a disease that infects Iranians and alienates them 
from their identity. Here, he argues that Iranians have been forced to be the “consumers of Western 
products" while being asked to "reshape their native culture to resemble a machine”.541 He 
criticizes Iranian nineteenth-century intellectuals such as Mirza Agha Khan Kermani and Abd al-
Rahim Talibuf who, in his opinion, lost their identity and assimilated to the West.542543 Moreover, 
he highlights industrialization and urbanization as the symbols of Western invasion.544 He also 
conceptualizes gharbzadegi in terms of Western values, lifestyle and imitation of the West. He 
argues that modernity and Westernization promote moral and sexual degeneracy that corrupts the 
authenticity of Iranian culture. For example, for Al-Ahamd, the imitation of the West regarding 
women’s emancipation is reduced to a display of eroticized female bodies in a public space:  
So we really have given women only the right to parade themselves in public. We 
have drawn women, the preserves of tradition, family, and future generations, into 
vacuity, into the street. We forced them into ostentation and frivolity, every day to 
freshen up and try on a new style and wander around. What of work, duty, social 
responsibility, and character? ... We will have succeeded only in swelling an army 
of consumers of powder and lipstick—the products of the West’s industries—
another form of Occidentosis.545 
     To cure gharbzadegi, Al-Ahamd proposes a return to the ‘roots of Islamic culture’. He sees 
Islam as the only remaining barrier to prevent the harm of modernity and Western invasion.546 
Through romanticizing and idealizing the past, Al-Ahamd reinvents Islamic concepts and 
relations.547 This new trend of thinking spread the rhetoric of authenticity among other Iranian 
intellectuals and Islamic thinkers through which they questioned the “governmental image of 
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progress” and “Western rationalism”.548 Although he criticizes Shah’s project of modernization 
and proposes returning to Islamic roots, Al-Ahamd never advocates abandoning modernity or 
technological modernity; instead, he supports a reconfiguration of modernity within the national 
context:549 “I am not speaking of rejecting the machine or of banishing it, as the utopians of the 
early nineteenth century sought to do… it is a question of how to encounter the machine and 
technology.”550 In one sense, he also saw modernity as a matter of hybridization, but in opposition 
to Iranian nineteenth-century intellectuals—who did a cultural grafting between Iranian pre-
Islamic traditions and modern Western achievements—Al-Ahamd’s notion of modernity was 
anchored in a foundation in local Shi’s Islam. Al-Ahamd died ten years before the revolution, but 
his many ideas on gharbzadegi contributed to the making of Islamic ideology and revolutionary 
discourse. In the next years, gharbzadegi and the ‘toxic West’ became the dominant and official 
discourse of the Islamic Republic regarding the struggle against the influence of the West.  
      After Al-Ahamd, Ali Shariati, a French-educated social scientist and Islamic scholar, 
contributed to this trend of thinking. Shariati argues that Muslims’ civilization—that for several 
centuries had been “unparalleled in the world and had the whole world under its influence”—is 
now reduced to the consumer of Western products.551 As Al-Ahmad, Shariati also condemns 
modern sexual norms. As I explained in 3.3, “Hybridized Homosexuality”, in particular, Shariati 
reproaches ‘Western culture’, Shah’s gender policies, and the emergence of the small gay 
subculture that was taking shape in the urban Iranian elites.552 Inspired by Frantz Fanon’s calling 
for a “new history” and a “new man” in his The Wretched of the Earth,553 Shariati also developed 
his own calling for “a new thought, a new humanity, and a new and more humane modernity that 
did not seek to turn the Third World into another Europe, another United States, or another Soviet 
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bloc.”554 However, while “Fanon’s call for reclaiming modern humanism on the basis of the 
particular experience of the colonized did not engage with religious modes of thought and action, 
Shariati called for an alternative modernity precisely by utilizing the social and inspirational 
capacities of religion”.555 He claims that Islam is not just an opiate like other religions; it is “both 
an ideology and a social revolution” which intends “to construct a classless and free society on the 
basis of equality and justice, and in which would live enlightened, responsible and free people”.556 
Besides Fanon, Shariati also appropriates Heidegger’s concept of ‘freedom-toward-death’. In 
Being and Time, Heidegger argues that life is finite and comes to an end with death. Thus, if we 
want to experience an authentic life and be authentic human beings, we should project life onto 
the horizon of death, confront this finitude, and find meaning in death. This is what Heidegger 
calls ‘freedom-toward-death’.557 He argues that when faced with one’s own possibilities of death, 
one can adopt a freedom-toward-death point of view, thereby experience authentic living.558 
Informed by Heidegger’s concept of freedom-toward-death, Shariati produces his own 
conceptualization of freedom-toward-death that is a radical version of Shiism in which 
‘martyrdom’ is a privilege because a martyr invites death at a time of his own choosing. He argues 
that in the history of Islam, when Shiites faced with the enemy, they chose death and thus created 
a possibility of authentic living for other Muslims.559 Through the concept of martyrdom, Shariati 
calls for “a revolutionary ideology that permeate[s] all spheres of life, including politics, and 
inspire[s] true believers to fight all forms of exploitation, oppression and social injustice”.560  In 
the early 1970s, Shariati gave a series of lectures on martyrdom and the role of true believers and 
their sacred duty “to struggle, and if necessary to make the supreme sacrifice, in order to liberate 
their country from class oppression and colonial domination”.561 Through his works including his 
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writings and speeches, Shariati became the “ideological inspiration” of the 1979 revolution.562 
Accordingly, Shariati, in the same fashion as Al-Ahmad, provides a peculiar, hybridized version 
of Iranian modernity, which entails Western thoughts and Iranian-Islamic traditions.     
      After Al-Ahamd and Shariati, Ayatollah Khomeini also, through his orthodox interpretation of 
Islam, contributed to the making of Islamic ideology. He was not only the leader of the 1979 
revolution, but also he was also faqih (jurist), and as faqih he formulated the concept of velayat-e 
faqih (Jurist’s Governance) through which he contributed to the making of the Islamic ideology 
before the revolution. In 1970, through a series of lecture that later became a book (velayat-e 
faqih)563, he introduced the concept of velayat-e faqih by which he referred to the Islamic 
government of the prophet and Imams who had been sent by God to guide the Islamic community, 
particularly in the absence of the Twelfth Imam. In the Shi’ite doctrine, he did not pass away but 
lives in a spiritual form of existence known as occultation. According to this doctrine, he will return 
to the earth as a messianic Mahdi at the end of time to reinstate justice and equity.564 Khomeini 
contends that the senior faqih is the deputy in the Islamic government at the time to keep the 
community on the right path.565 He also argues that “the existence of a non-Islamic political system 
necessarily results in the non-implementation of the Islam political order”566 and that it is a Muslim's 
duty to remove from his society all traces of taghut (paganism) and shirk (polytheism) and substitute 
them with the faqih’s governance. He argues that monarchies are taghut and shirk systems that 
bring about corruption.567 He calls Shah’s monarchy “corruption on earth” and expresses his 
opposition as follows:  
Islam, then, does not recognize monarchy and hereditary succession; they have no 
place in Islam. If that is what is meant by the so-called deficiency of Islam, then 
Islam is indeed deficient. Islam has laid down no laws for the practice of usury, for 
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banking on the basis of usury, for the consumption of alcohol, or for the cultivation 
of sexual vice, having radically prohibited all of these. The ruling cliques, therefore, 
who are the puppets of imperialism and wish to promote these vices in the Islamic 
world, will naturally regard Islam as defective.568  
       In another book, Kashf al-Asrar [Unveiling the Secrets], Khomeini criticizes secularism and 
modernization, particularly modern gender norms under the Pahlavi era. He opposes unveiling, 
women’s education and their socializing through companionship with men. He describes women’s 
unveiling by Reza Shah as an evil act and warns that “the unveiling of women has caused the ruin 
of female honor, the destruction of the family, and untold corruption and prostitution”.569 When 
the Family Protection Law was introduced in 1967, and divorce was legalized in Iran, Khomeini 
issued a fatwa, declaring that “women who are divorced should consider their divorce null and 
void. They are still considered married. If they remarry, they have committed adultery. Men who 
knowingly marry such women are also committing adultery and must be punished according to 
religious law”.570 Islamic ideology, as developed by Khomeini, Al-Ahamd, and Shariati, was thus 
a direct or indirect response to the modern policies of the Pahlavis and Western imperialism. These 
revolutionary thinkers created an Islamic ideology that, according to Dabbashi, was “the dialectical 
outcome of a discursive confrontation between something called the West and something 
essentialized as Islam”.571 In this ‘discursive confrontation’, Khomeini’s archaic brand of Islamic 
ideas on political systems of governance and his extreme positions and radical speeches against 
the West and modernization articulated an anti-imperialist and populist sentiment with a strong 
religious casting. However, he made few compromises with modernity whenever it suited his 
purposes during and after the revolution.572 For example, in 1963, Khomeini was dissent to give 
the right to women to be elected in the election, but after the 1979 revolution, he advised women 
to have more political participation and encouraged them to vote for the referendum on 
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establishing the Islamic Republic. He also approved the election of Islamic women in parliament, 
stating, “they have the right to vote, to elect, to be elected”.573 
          Al-Ahamad and Shariati, on the contrary, never advocated the rejection of modernity.574 
Like other nineteenth-century Iranian intellectuals, they intended to produce a hybridized form of 
modernity but this time not through reinventing pre-Islamic traditions, but through advocating the 
idea of a cultural authenticity (Islamic culture) to stand against the West and at the same time 
through transfiguring and localizing modernity. Their attempt was to bridge the gap between 
tradition and modernity by emphasizing “the dynamic, progressive, and scientific nature of Islam 
and the need for a thoroughgoing reinterpretation of Islam to revitalize the Muslim community”.575 
What Khomeini, Al-Ahmad and Shariati produced in common was a politicized Islamic discourse 
(or dispositif) through which an ‘alternative political system’ was built. This alternative political 
system played a role as a force for change and for moving toward something other than what 
existed in the Islamic past and the Western present, a peculiar version of modernity that was laid 
out on the Islamic-Iranian cultural heritage and on the Western thoughts to deal with the West on 
an equal footing and at the same time reject what the West had to offer. This was what attracted 
the attention of the world, a historical rapture at the time of liberalism and communism. Foucault, 
among many, was one of those intellectuals who reflected his ideas on the 1979 revolution and on 
the work of the revolutionary Islamic intelligentsia because certain concepts of his works (such 
power, subjectivity and care of the self) resonate with, for example, Shariati’s conceptualization 
of martyrdom. Foucault traveled to Iran twice. His travels were made possible by Italian daily 
newspaper Corriere Della Sera whose editors asked Foucault to write a regular feature, Michel 
Foucault Investigates. Foucault was initially supposed to write a series about President Carter, but 
with growing political tension in Iran, he decided to change the project and traveled to Iran first at 
the end of the summer of 1978 and then in the fall of the same year.576 When Foucault arrived in 
Iran, he was shocked, because instead of the “terrorized city” that he expected, he found “an 
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absence of fear and an intensity of courage or rather, the intensity that people were capable of 
when danger, though still not removed, had already been transcended”.577 What he witnessed from 
the marching masses of people was a manifestation of collective will. In an interview in 1979 that 
appeared for the first time as the appendix to Claire Brière and Pierre Blanchet, Iran: La Révolution 
au de Dieu, Foucault says that:   
among the things that characterize this revolutionary event, there is the fact that it 
has brought out—and few people in history have had this—an absolutely 
collective will. The collective will is a political myth with which jurists and 
philosophers try to analyze or to justify institutions, etc. It is a theoretical tool: 
nobody has ever seen the collective will and, personally, I thought that collective 
will was like God, like the soul, something one would never encounter. I do not 
know whether you agree with me, but we met in Tehran and throughout Iran, the 
collective will of a people.578  
For Foucault, the prerequisite for animating and moving this collective will was the existence of a 
“political spirituality”  to which Foucault refers as “a subject acceding to a certain mode of being 
and to the transformations which the subject must make of himself in order to accede to this mode 
of being”.579 Foucault gives spirituality “a corporeal meaning, which he directly links to the care 
of the self”.580 As already explained, care of the self, for Foucault, is a practice wherein individuals 
are able to constitute themselves as ethical subjects. Foucault, by referring a number of times to 
Shariati’s conception of Shiite, considers Shiite Islam as the source of this political spirituality.581 
Foucault was also “fascinated by the appropriation of Shiite myths of martyrdom” that turned the 
uprising into a revolutionary movement.582 The political spirituality that Foucault witnessed in the 
streets of Tehran involved both the “political aim of overthrowing the Shah” and the “ascetic ethics 
of martyrdom that lies in the heart of Shiism”.583 Foucault considers ‘the ascetic ethics of 
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martyrdom’ as an ethical work through which Iranians constitute a new mode of subjectivity 
outside of the progressive scheme of the Enlightenment, liberalism, and communism. Foucault 
believes that the Iranian revolutionary experience, with its struggle to present a “different way of 
thinking about society and politics, could provide the best possibilities for the West to exist from 
its own intellectual exhaustion”.584 For Foucault, the Iranian revolution represents something new 
and unexpected in a world where the alternative was between liberalism and communism.  
      However, Foucault’s writings on the Iranian Revolution came under the increasing attacks of 
some tough critiques, especially in the case of the new regime’s execution of homosexuals and 
Khomeini’s decree on making the veiling of women compulsory. Didier Eribon (1953-present), a 
philosopher and a friend of Foucault, calls Foucault’s interpretation of Iran a ‘mistake’; Jeannette 
Colombel (1919-2016), who was also a friend of Foucault and a philosopher, refers to ‘Foucault’s 
error’on Iran’s revolutionary event.585 Here, I would argue that the significance of Foucault’s 
interpretation on Iran could not be condemned or diminished to a mistake or a philosophical failure 
because of the bloody regime that finally gained power. As Jahanbegloo and Khatami show in 
Acting under Tyranny: Hannah Arendt and the Foundations of Democracy, the Iranian revolution 
in its early days was largely nonviolent in its enactment; However, it suddenly degenerated into 
violence and tyranny.586 Therefore, although Foucault was neither an expert in the history of Iran 
nor in the Muslim world, his writings on the early days of the Iranian revolution resonated with 
his theoretical writings on the discourse of power, subjectivity, and care of the self. He was able 
to see the revolution correctly as a moment of historical rupture, representing possibilities of new 
political engagement, but he was not able to anticipate how this revolution could lead to the 
establishment of a religious totalitarian State. In this paragraph, however, I will use his theoretical 
tools in order to show how this revolution became a religious biopolitical dispositif.   
     Islamic ideology—velayat-e faqih, returning to Islamic roots and othering the West—succeeded 
in establishing the Islamic Republic through a major referendum in 1979, but the Islamic Republic 
“ultimately failed to result in any enduring institutions of a democratic state apparatus or the 
necessary civil liberties conducive to it, and as a result, it soon lost its revolutionary legitimacy and 
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degenerated into a theocracy” 587 within which Khomeini materialized his theories on the velayat-
e faqih. From the early days of its establishment, the new regime consolidated its power also 
through eliminating what the old regime brought up as a “cultural construction of gender and 
sexuality for the formation of Iranian modernity”. The revolutionary regime replaced nationalism, 
socialism and, liberalism with religious fundamentalism.588 Thus, as Lucerne argues, the Islamic 
Republic became a theocracy based on religious fundamentalism.589 According to Minoo Moallem, 
religious fundamentalism should be conceived as a modern formation. In particular, the author 
points out the inseparable relation between state power and religion in Iran and “the complicated 
role of religion in shaping identities, political cultures and social relations”.590  
      The Islamic Republic is thus a by-product of modernity that reinvented the Islamic traditions 
and expanded retrogressive gender and cultural practices through modern technologies of power.591 
Anti-Westernization and othering the West became the official discourse of the state and “modern 
technologies of communication, such as posters, slogans, banners, murals, television, and cinema 
were utilized to counter the West and create a “we-ness” that represented all the forces involved in 
the revolution”.592 Khomeini, by drawing on Al-Ahamd’s discourse of gharbzadegi, aimed to create 
a nation-state and national identity but with a very different nature than that of nationalists and 
modernists in the nineteenth century. Khomeini changed the definition of millat (national 
collectivity or nation) into ummat (Islamic collectivity). Ummat is an Islamic concept, referring to 
faithful people who have chosen to traverse one common path together to reach higher spiritual 
attainment or closeness to God593 through imamat (the leadership of imam or faqih) under velayat-
e faqih. This historical Islamic ideal of unity aims at creating a community within which obedience 
to Islamic authority is the main axis of relations and any action outside of this axis is attributed to 
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the enemy (which is the West and its tropes, as defined in the official discourse of the Islamic 
Republic).594  
     Within this Islamic dispositif, there was not any space for the modern gender norms introduced 
by Pahlavi. After the establishment of the Islamic state, Khomeini immediately abolished the 
Family Protection Laws on the February 26, 1979. He decreed gender segregation in all beaches 
and sports activities and later commanded that wearing the Islamic hijab is compulsory for all 
women.595 The revolutionary state established a new juridical discourse on sexuality through which 
the state gained more power over women’s bodies, reduced the age of marriage for girls from 15 to 
13 and boys from 18 to 15, turned the modern trend of love and marriage into a contract of marriage 
with specific reproductive functions, encouraged polygamy, temporary marriage, and facilitated 
easy divorce for men. In one sense, the restrictions of the new theocratic state on the one side 
encouraged motherhood and large families, and on the other side, provided cheap access to sex 
inside or outside of the formal marriage for men of all social classes.596 The main purpose of this 
new policy of gender and sexuality was to place Islamism and anti-Westernism at the head of the 
revolutionary’s activities. Through the “us-versus-them” logic that I have already mentioned, 
Khomeini created a national and post-colonial narrative, propounding same-sex love, prostitution 
and women emancipation as the result of perverted Western sexual ethos.597 The new state, thus, 
removed the right to choose other lifestyles for urban women and vanished the modern ‘gay’ 
lifestyle that had emerged among elite urban circles; during this time, homosexuality for the second 
time found shelter in homosocial spaces such as sex-segregated schools, military garrisons, and 
public baths.598 
     The consolidation of power of the Islamic revolution also lied in the elimination of opponents. 
Through mass support, reinforced by assertive ideological propaganda amongst the populace, as 
well as the Revolutionary Guard, and an armed force that ensures the regime’s survival in the face 
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of coups, domestic uprisings, and external threats, Khomeini established a centralized and coercive 
state.599 The marginalization and then the elimination of dissidents—such as liberal and social 
democrats, leftists, feminists, and ethnic and religion minorities 600—was justified by condemning 
them as “corrupt”, “evil” and “not part of the true Islamic nation”.601  Over four thousand people 
were executed during the first years of the establishment of the Islamic Republic.602 According to 
Korycki and Nasirzadeh, this public violence served for two purposes: on one side, it accelerated 
the elimination of the opponents, and on the other side, it consolidated Khomeini’s position as the 
ultimate authority over his allies, the opposition, and society.603 
     The Islamic Republic as a modern regime of power operated to produce subjects who became 
docile and obeying bodies. Thus, in the post-revolutionary era, more than in other periods, the social 
body became the object of politics and the concern of the state. In this context, through applying 
regulatory control over women’s bodies and producing homosexuals as deviant, the Islamic 
Republic constitutes new sexual subjects.604 Dealing with homosexuality, the Islamic regime’s 
policy does not recognize it as an identity.605 Rather, homosexuals are depicted as those with bodies 
that are not reproductive, who threaten the well-being of the general population, and are opposed 
to Islamic culture: therefore, they should be regulated within the biopolitical regulatory system.606 
The process of regulation of homosexuality occurred through both medical power that led to the 
pathologization of homosexuality and juridico-legal power that labeled homosexuality as a capital 
crime under the Islamic state’s rules.  
      The pathologization policy of homosexuality traces back to Khomeini’s fatwa on the lawfulness 
of sex reassignment surgery.607 He issued this fatwa in 1987, and in the case of Maryam Khatoon 
Molkara, who was a trans woman. After many struggles, she met Khomeini and asked him about 
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her condition. Khomeini responded, “there is no Islamic obstacle to sex change surgery, if it is 
approved by a reliable doctor”.608 From that moment, as Najmabadi argues, the fatwa on sex 
reassignment surgery became a policy of the Islamic state to manipulate gender and sexuality.609 
The Islamic Republic is built around a heteronormative belief system originating from the Shari’a’s 
conceptualization of men and women’s roles that God has prescribed in the Qur’an.610 Under this 
binary regime, legal gender recognition procedures in Iran have created a “fundamental dichotomy 
between concepts of perversion and deviation [enheraf] on the one hand, and pathology and 
disorder [ekhtelal] on the other”. Homosexual behaviors under this dichotomy are “treated as 
crimes, while homosexual desires are taken as symptoms of transsexualism”.611 It is interesting to 
remind that, as I have explained in paragraph 2.3 “Practices of the Self”, in nineteenth century 
Europe, homosexuality was interpreted as a form of inversion that is of a discrepancy between 
anatomical sex and psychological sex. Doctor Magnus Hirschfeld used the term ‘uranism’ in his 
own theory of ‘third sex’ or ‘intermediate sexual condition’ that also included transsexualism and 
transvestitism.612 However, Hirschfeld and other scientists in the next years differentiated the 
concept of homosexuality from transsexualism613 , and both were removed from the list of WHO’s 
mental disorders (World Health Organization) in 1990 and 2018, respectively. In the case of Iran,       
however, transsexuality is still recognized as a ‘disorder’ and used as a “medicalization device” to 
“enforce sexually normative behavior among homosexuals through state-sanctioned and 
governmentally implemented SRS, in order to demonstrate how the state shapes sexual desires and 
gender subjectivities to structure self-cognition”.614  
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       With respect to this dichotomy, if homosexuals fail to conform to “socially constructed gender 
expectations”, they have to either classify themselves as “transpatients” or “homo-perverts”. The 
first category signifies those “individuals of diverse gender identities and sexual orientations” who 
accept their gender variance as a pathological and psychiatric disorder and bring themselves to 
undergo “hormone therapy, sterilization and genital reassignment surgery within the bounds of 
gender normalcy”. In contrast to the first category, the second category refers to those who “insist 
on expressing their experienced sexual orientation and gender identity without undergoing 
hormonal and surgical treatment”.615  Homosexuals are thus considered an existential threat to the 
regime’s gender binary and challenge “the established definition of correspondence between sex, 
gender and sexual orientation.” As I explained in paragraph 3.2, “Homoerotic Persia”, even 
contemporary Islamic legal scholars use homosexuality as a synonym for liwat rather than for 
naming an identity and an orientation. In the Islamic Penal Code of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
homosexuality is also reduced to anal intercourse and is “criminalized with punishments ranging 
from flogging to the death penalty”.616 
       A new Penal Code was ratified on 21 April 2013; Article 233 yet defines that liwat is the 
penetration of “a man’s sexual organ [the penis], up to the point of circumcision, into another male 
person’s anus”. Article 234 declares that the insertive/active partner will be sentenced to death if 
he has imposed liwat by coercion, or if he “meets the condition of Ihsan [i.e. he is married and can 
have vaginal intercourse with his wife whenever he wishes]”, otherwise he will be punished by one 
hundred lashes. The receptive/passive partner, on the other hand, will be sentenced to death under 
any condition (whether he meets Ihsan or not).617 Article 235 “states that if penetration does not 
reach the point of circumcision”, it should be regarded as Tafkhiz [putting a man’s sexual organ 
between the thighs or the buttocks of another male person]. In this case, Article 236 specifies the 
punishment of one hundred lashes for both passive and active partner with no difference on whether 
or not they meet Ihsan or have resorted to coercion. Acts such as kissing or touching a person of 
one’s same-sex, according to Article 237, is punishable by thirty-one to seventy-four lashes that are 
equally applicable to men and women’s homosexuality.618 It is interesting to note that although 
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homosexuality in post-revolutionary Iran has become the subject of medical and legal regulations, 
and the Islamic Penal Codes can be seen as a harsh reaction to male homoerotism, the covert 
practice of bisexuality or same-sex love has not disappeared. Rather, male homoerotism has 
remained in the private sphere, orbiting around the tactic of “the will not to know”. In this context, 
identities of gays and lesbians are not officially recognized in Iran and therefore, they do not exist 
and any struggles for their visibility is considered as a political act against the official rhetoric of 
the Islamic state and then attributed to the enemy, which is the West. The official authorities, as I 
mentioned in the introduction, such as the Supreme Leader, the former Iranian President and some 
grand Ayatollahs call gayness a Western phenomenon exported to Iran as one of the tropes of 
Western imperialism. Here, I argue that there is a shared argument between Iranian official 
authorities and Massad who both claim that identities of gays and lesbians, as well as homosexuals’ 
rights, are a modern and Western cultural encroachment, underpinned by exporting identities of 
gays and lesbians to the Middle East. In the next paragraph, I will elaborate on Massad’s thesis and 
I will argue that such academic assertions are problematic and foster the roots of homophobia in 
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4.2.     Sexual Imperialism: Reading Josef Massad 
Although the main purpose of this thesis is not to discuss and criticize Massad’s ideas, since his 
updating and reworking of Foucault’s theory of sexuality are in accordance with the Islamic 
Republic's official discourse, we need to bring his ideas into the Iranian context and discuss them. 
For doing so, in this paragraph, I will elaborate on Massad’s thesis of the “Gay International” and 
the diffusion of modern homosexual identification in the Middle East. Then, I will give my 
reflection on Massad’s account of Western sexual imperialism and I will detect some flaws in his 
assertions, including the essentializing dichotomy between the East and the West, flattening out 
spaces of queer activism ad overlooking of agency and transformative capacity of non-
heterosexual subjects concerning homosexual identity.  
      Joseph Andoni Massad is a Palestinian Christian, born in Jordan in 1963. He received his Ph.D. 
in Political Science in 1998. He teaches about modern Arab politics and intellectual history in the 
Department of Middle Eastern, South Asian, and African Studies at Columbia University. Massad 
has particular interests in the theories of identity and culture that entails the theories of sexuality, 
race, nationalism, and religion. When established a vigorous critique of Orientalism, Said was 
perhaps willfully blind to the issues of gender and sexuality in the Orient. Instead, Massad—who 
was a disciple of Edward Said at Columbia University—explores exactly the question of gender 
and sexuality in the Middle East. Using Foucault's genealogical method, he examines same-sex 
desire in the intersection of power, production of knowledge, geopolitics and culture in order to 
investigate the role that sex and sexuality have played in the transformation of constructions of 
culture and politics in the Middle East. He is also interested in the modalities by which Arab 
intellectuals have produced and contributed to such constructions.    
      In his outstanding volume Desiring Arabs, Massad compiles an archive of medieval and 
contemporary literature on sexuality in the Arab world to examine “the influence and impact that 
Orientalism has had in shaping the Arabs’ own perceptions of themselves and each other since the 
Arab Renaissance to the present”.619 He argues that the “anxiety” of Arab intellectuals and their 
debates from the nineteenth century and early twentieth century were concerned with the cultural 
revival and modernization in response to Orientalism.620 Examining Arab fiction and non-fiction 
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literature, Massad reveals that in order to defend Arab culture and civilization against Orientalism, 
the Arab intellectuals, instead of developing their own concepts from their experience and context, 
uncritically embraced the Western understanding of culture, civilization, and moral values. In other 
words, by adopting Western views of modernity and progress, Arab intellectuals, according to 
Massad, internalized Western criteria to assess their own culture and moral values.621 In Massad’s 
opinion, without any reflection Arab intellectuals internalized the moralistic attitudes of the 
Victorian era toward sexuality that privileged heterosexuality and devalued all forms of non-
heterosexuality. For example, Massad attempts to show how Orientalist ideas of culture and 
civilization have been hegemonic in the works of Arab intellectuals, such as nineteenth century 
journalist Jurji Zaydan (1861-1914) and Egyptian intellectual Taha Husayn (1889-1973), who tried 
to censor some parts of Arab history according to the heterosexist and moralistic vision of 
Europe.622    
     By spending much time reviewing classical Arab poetry, Massad asserts that when the West 
saw ascending the practices of Victorian morality, the historical tradition of same-sex relations in 
Arab poetry began to be suppressed or condemned as degeneration and civilizational decadence. 
For example, he refers to the eighteenth-century Arab poet Abu Nuwas whose life and homoerotic 
ghazals (love poem) were dismissed by Arab intellectuals. According to Massad, this critical 
perspective on homoerotic literature is linked to the reaction or response to the imperial project of 
the superiority of the West in the realm of gender and sexuality.623 Massad makes another point 
regarding the position of Arab intellectuals in modern times. He contends that whether they reject 
or defend same-sex desire, their reactions have always been in accordance with the colonial 
discourse. He argues that “while the premodern West attacked Islam’s alleged sexual 
licentiousness, the modern West attacks its alleged repression of sexual freedom in the present”.624 
Arab intellectuals, as Massad asserts, re-categorized their own sexuality according to the Western 
dispositif of sexuality and its conceptualization of the natural and the deviant. Massad further 
argues that there is an ‘Oriental sexuality’—or a typical Arab dispositif of alliance, particularly in 
terms of traditional same-sex relations or what he calls “the practitioners of same-sex contact”—
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which is different from that of the West and there has always been an attempt by certain 
Westernized Arabs and intellectuals—such as Egyptian writer Naguib Mahfouz (1911-2006), 
Egyptian novelist Sun’allah Ibrahim (1973-present), and Egyptian feminist writer Nawal al-
Sa‘dawi (1931-present)—to blur this difference in favor of universalizing the Western model of 
heterosexuality and homosexuality (Western dispositif of sexuality).  
          Desiring Arabs raises a huge debate among gender and queer scholars. For instance, in a 
chapter significantly titled “The Past is a Foreign Country?” in the volume Islamicate Sexualities: 
Translation across Temporal Geographies of Desire, Valerie Traub states that Massad’s critique 
of Western imperialism and its relation with sexual identity is a part of a “conflicted project of 
modernity”: 
Its [the conflicted project of modernity] problematic repercussions have been amplified in 
our current political situation wherein neoimperialism, globalization, and the so-called war 
on terror pit much of the West against much of the East. Massad’s critique responds to and 
partakes in these geopolitical conflicts about the meaning of modernity and tradition, the 
global and the local, including the role of contemporary state in regulating the sexuality of 
its citizens and the state’s implication in neoimperial and transnational flows of bodies and 
capital. 625 
Considering homosexuality as a part of this conflicted project of modernity, Massad argues that 
the notion of homosexuality as a ‘function of modernity’ produced in the dispositif of sexuality in 
nineteenth-century Europe (according to Foucauldian periodization) and thereafter, in modern 
times, has been deployed by the West as an ideological tool to establish a contradiction, for 
example, between Western freedom and Eastern repression.626 Along with Massad, Will Roscoe 
and Stephen O. Murray in the introduction to Islamic Homosexualities: Culture, History and 
Literature, argue that the contrast between Western and Islamic homosexuality is the issue of 
“containment versus elaboration, of a single pattern of homosexuality defined and delimited by 
institutions and discourses closely linked to the modern nation-state versus the variety, 
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distribution, and longevity of same-sex patterns in Islamic societies”.627  Massad, Roscoe, and 
Murray do agree that the emergence of homosexuality in the West positions non-East as pre-
modern, traditional, and inferior. However, their arguments also reduce the histories of 
homosexuality to a single pattern of the modern West. In other words, their account of the 
historiography of sexual identity evokes an Orientalist perspective that not only confirms an 
essentializing dichotomy between the East and the West but also renders homosexuality and other 
forms of same-sex identifications as alien concepts to non-Western cultures.   
        Above all, what makes Massad’s thesis highly controversial in the modern discourse of 
gender and sexuality is his criticizing of LGBTQI+ politics and the universalist, essentialist, and 
Orientalist approach of LGBTQI+ rights organizations and NGOs. Massad calls attention to the 
need to interrogate Western sexual epistemology when applied to the Muslim context. For doing 
so, he raises some crucial questions such as: Is Western discourse of sexuality applicable to Middle 
Eastern societies? Is homosexuality a universal identity category applicable to Middle Eastern 
societies? Massad answers these questions in Desiring Arabs, but the strategy he adopts and the 
conclusions he draws are problematic. His main argument is that a modern form of Western 
colonialism began to impose its power on Muslim world, particularly in the realm of gender and 
sexuality in the 1980s and 90s. For the first time, Massad posited this thesis in the article “Re-
Orienting Desire: The Gay International and the Arab World” published in 2002.628 In this article, 
that later was extended into Desiring Arabs—by drawing on Foucault’s concept of the dispositif 
of sexuality—, Massad contends that the incitement to speak about sexual identity or to speak 
about sexuality as the "truth" of oneself has a specific value in the context of colonialism of the 
Middle East.629 Then, he raises another question: how do homosexual rights organizations 
intervene in the sexual life of existing subjects who do not identify themselves by modern Western 
sexual identity categories? and he answers that sexual identity categories of gays and lesbians, as 
well as the agenda of homosexual rights, are a modern and Western cultural encroachment that—
in the name of saving Middle Eastern gays and lesbians from their societies—exports Western 
understating of sexuality to the Middle East through what he calls Gay International”, that is an 
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ensemble of European and the United States’ institutions, organizations, political formations and 
NGOs for LGBTQI+ rights.630 To summarize Massad’s main argument about the Gay 
International, I would like to quote this passage from Desiring Arabs in length:     
By inciting discourse about homosexuals where none existed before, the Gay 
International is in fact heterosexualzing a world that is being forced to be fixed by 
a Western binary. Because most non-Western societies, including Muslim Arab 
societies, have not subscribed historically to these categories, their imposition is 
eliciting less than liberating outcomes: men who are considered the ‘passive’ or 
‘receptive’ parties in male-male sexual contacts are forced to have one object 
choice and identity as homosexual or gay, just as men who are the ‘active’ parties 
are also forced to limit their sexual aim to one object choice, either women or men. 
As most ‘active’ partners see themselves as part of a societal norm, so 
heterosexuality becomes compulsory given that the alternative, as presented by the 
Gay International, means becoming marked outside the norm—with all the 
attendant risks and disadvantages of such a marketing. Also, most Arab and 
Muslim countries that do not have laws against sexual conduct between men 
respond to the Gay International’s incitement to discourse by professing 
antihomosexual stances on a nationalist basis. This is leading to police harassment 
in some cases and could lead to antihomosexual legislation. Those countries that 
already have unenforced laws begin to enforce them. Ironically, this is the very 
process through which homosexuality was invented in the West. It is not the Gay 
International or its upper-class supporters in the Arab diaspora who will be 
persecuted, but rather the poor and nonurban men who practice same-sex contact 
and who do not necessarily identify as homosexual or gay.631        
Massad challenges the orientalist tendencies of some LGBTQI+ organizations and rightly 
questions “the teleology of a putative international gay liberation because the liberal human rights 
discourse defaults to an essentialist understanding of sexual identity”.632 However, he flattens out 
the politics and space of LGBTQI+ activism. In his view, it seems that there are not any positive 
contributions from human rights and LGBTQI+ organizations. For example, Massad not only 
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neglects the positive and important contributions of international activism and the politics of 
LGBTQI+ organizations—such as the International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA), the 
International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission (IGLHRC) and Human Rights 
Watch—in terms of the rising of awareness regarding abuses and persecutions of those living non-
normative lives both in Europe and non-Western countries but also he reduces their activities to a 
form of conspiratorial mission for universalizing the categories of gay and lesbian and 
transforming the “practitioners of same-sex contact into subjects who identify as homosexual and 
gay”.633 Reading Massad’s works, one gets that in the Middle East and the Arab world prior to the 
launching of the Gay International in the 80s, there was not any same-sex identification or even 
romantic love but just same-sex conduct. Besides the claim that Gay International imposes a 
Western sexual ontology on Muslim societies, Massad argues that expression of sexual desires in 
the forms of Wester sexual identities, including LGBT identities and politics, makes the sexual 
minorities visible, and then it brings the violation of the Middle East’s governments toward sexual 
minorities and spaces of same-sex practices. To prove his claim, he refers to incidents such as 
‘Queen Boat’ in which 25 men in Cairo, Egypt in 2001 were arrested and prosecuted for allegedly 
‘practicing debauchery’ (same-sex practices).634 Massad concludes that homosexuals are the 
‘victims’ of Gay International, and it is responsible for spreading homophobia in the Middle 
East.635 
         His argument becomes more troubling firstly when he confirms that those Islamists and 
anticolonial nationalists correctly have perceived the Gay International “as part of Western 
encroachment cultures”, and secondly when he not only dismisses non-heterosexual individuals as 
unrepresentative, passive victims of Western sexual imperialism, but also he refers to them as 
‘native informants’.636 In Third World Protest, Rahul Rao argues that there is something amiss in 
Massad’s argument that dismisses Middle Eastern LGBTQI+ people as “native informants to 
Western activists”, a “phrase that is loaded with colonial memories of indigenous elites engaged 
in traitorous collaboration with colonizing powers”637. By ‘native informant’, Massad intends to 
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say that those individuals working in both Western and Middle East LGBTQI+ organizations and 
identifying themselves as gays, lesbians, bisexuals, trans and queers are organic to and a parcel of 
the Gay International. He believes that Gay International found the native informants in the “richer 
segments of society”, however “although members of these classes who engage in same-sex 
relations have more recently adopted a Western identity (as part of the package of the adoption of 
everything Western by the classes to which they belong), they remain a minuscule minority among 
those men who engage in same-sex relations and who do not identify as gay nor express a need for 
gay politics”.638 Rao comments Massad’s statement that contends that most of Arabic non-
heterosexual people identifying themselves with Western sexual identities belong to privileged 
classes. For Massad, coming out as a gay in the Arab world and in the Middle East, Rao argues, is 
less about the agency and more akin to consumerism and buying the latest Calvin Klein underwear, 
while, according to Rao, although “class position certainly gives such individuals access to 
Western sexual ontologies, it cannot be assumed a priori that the motivation for identification on 
these terms is a consumerist one rather than say something that stems from a deep dissatisfaction 
with the traditional sexual ontology”.639 In Rao’s view, in “criticizing cosmopolitan rescue politics 
and its local interlocutors, Massad slips into a reinforcement of communitarian authenticity 
narratives that police how sexual preferences ought to be expressed”.640 In fact, one part of Rao’s 
antipathy towards Massad’s argument stems from his failure to problematize the “traditional 
sexual ontology”:  
As in many parts of the non-Western world, this ontology permitted some space 
for same-sex behavior, but condemned any expression of homosexual identity. The 
physical, mental, and emotional costs that such an ontology exacts in the form of 
broken relationships, sham heterosexual marriage, suicides, lack of legal and social 
recognition of what are otherwise deeply fulfilling personal relationships, lack of 
access to health care, etc. are well documented in many countries, but remain 
unknowledgeable in Massad’s argument.641    
In contrast to Massad, Rao suggests that in a context where “rebellion against the traditional sexual 
ontology has the potential to incur grave sanctions,” we can consider it as a rebellion motivated by 
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a sense of “grievance against that ontology—a feeling of victimization by its patriarchal 
assumptions and expectations—than as part of an impulse to consume all things Western”.642 Like 
Rao, in the article “Joseph Massad and the Alleged Violence of Human Rights”, Sahar Amer 
questions the denial of agency in Massad’s works. She argues that in Massad’s writings, non-
heterosexual Arabs are depicted as passive objects and “always in a reactive position vis-à-vis the 
West, never actors or in charge of defining their own lives or sexualities”.643 While Massad points 
to the Gay International as responsible for producing violence and homophobia in the Middle East, 
Amer denounces the violence that Massad himself perpetrates through “excluding Arabs altogether 
from the category homosexuality”. She writes that “if for the Gay International, an Arab who 
rejects the label gay is the victim of self-hatred or internalized homosexual homophobia, it would 
appear that for Massad, an Arab who assert a gay identity is a victim of orientalist fantasies, of 
colonial imposition, and of the universalizing claims of Western gay rights groups”.644  
       In the article “Queer as Intersectionality: Theorizing Gay Muslim Identities”, Momin Rahman 
adds that Massad’s characterizations of the “Gay International and its institutional power are 
overly determinist” and his argument “lacks any evidence of actual lived experience”. Rahman 
suggests that in order to understand the epistemological differences between traditional same-sex 
relations and modern homosexuality, “we need more evidence on homoerotism for gay Muslims 
globally and for those living in the West”. He further argues that many gay Muslims would 
challenge “the exclusive identification of homosexuality and homo-eroticism with Western 
culture, simply by first acknowledging that there are those from Muslim cultures who are, as we 
understand it, gay”.645 Rahman does agree “with those like Massad who criticize the current 
political formations of gay politics as conceits of Western modernity”. However, he resists “the 
argument that the antidote to Western impositions can be culturally exclusive and authentic non-
Western traditions of gender and sexual organization”.646 Moreover, Massad’s conceptualization 
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of queer rights campaigns as tropes of Western imperialism, according to Rahman, dangerously 
reinstates a “Euro-centric view of modernity in postcolonial analyses” that equates LGBTQI+ 
politics with neocolonialist politics. Rahman, instead, suggests that “we need to acknowledge both 
the global intersecting sociological and political formations of sexuality across cultures of the East 
and West, and the legitimacy that certain postcolonial states derive from deploying homophobia 
as a nationalist tool, exemplified by, but not limited to, Muslim cultures”.647                      
      In order to claim that we should not flatten out all spaces of queer activism to supposed 
imperialistic Western NGOs, I will refer to the case that Rao has already commented in Third 
World Protest: the hanging of two young Iranian men, Ayaz Marhuoni and Mohammad Asgari. 
They, who were 16 and 18 years old respectively, were hanged on charges for an alleged crime 
involving homosexual intercourse in the city of Mashhad in 2005. Western activists and 
international LGBTQI+ organizations responded immediately to the hanging but differently. Some 
of them publicized the case. They claimed that Marhuoni and Asgari were hanged because of their 
sexual orientation. Members of the US conservative gay and lesbian group Log Cabin Republicans 
announced that “in the wake of new stories and photographs documenting the hanging of two gay 
Iranian teenagers, Log Cabin Republicans re-affirm their commitment to the global war on 
terror”.648 The British gay activist Peter Tatchell, the executive director of OutRage, claimed that 
“this is the latest barbarity by the Islamo-fascists in Iran … the entire country is a gigantic prison, 
with Islamic rule sustained by detention without trial, torture and state-sanctioned murder”.649 The 
Human Rights Campaign, the largest LGBTQI+ civil rights organization in the US, called upon 
the State Department of “the world’s greatest democracy” to issue an “immediate and strong 
condemnation” of the execution of two homosexual teenagers who were “hanged in a public square 
after being tortured for 14 months, simply for being caught having consensual sex”.650 
          While these organizations asserted that Marhuoni and Asgari merely had consensual sex, 
several human rights groups, including Amnesty International, IGLHRC, and Human Rights 
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Watch, refrained to cast the execution of Iranian teenagers as a gay issue. They announced that 
this case lacked credible information about the teenagers’ sexual orientation and the reason for 
their execution. For example, Scott Long, a human rights activist, argued that there is not any 
evidence to conclude that Marhuoni and Asgari were gay. He also said that there existed different 
reports claiming the teenagers were executed for raping a 13-year old boy.651 In this way, Long 
and Amnesty International, IGLHRC, and Human Rights Watch reframed this case as an issue of 
execution of minors, which is a violation of international conventions, including the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.652 
According to Rao, the different reactions to this execution show that the space of the Gay 
International is not homogeneous, but on the contrary, is an “extraordinarily fractious space”. Its 
“constituents span the entire political spectrum,… and while some of its constituents seem eager 
to use gay rights as a means of consolidating Western hegemony in ways that remind us of the 
heyday of the civilizing mission, others seem wary of contributing to such an outcome”.653  
        In this way, Rao demonstrates that, by ignoring this fractious space of Gay International, 
representing queer rights campaigns as tropes of Western imperialism and essentializing the 
dichotomy between the East and the West, Massad’s thesis hinges on flawed assumptions. But, 
from my perspective, the main faultiness of his assertions backs to the lack of a critical 
understanding of the concept of modernity. He sees it through a Euro-centric view, which either 
imposed on the East or non-Europeans blindly adopted it through a process of westernization. 
Thus, his postcolonial stand in the critique of Western imperialism lacks a divergence assumption 
of modernity. As I have shown in paragraph 3.1 “Rethinking Modernity”, the most recent 
approaches to the notion of modernity have revealed commonality and overlapping rather than 
differences between the European and the Middle East and Asiatic contractions of modernity. In 
particular, Bhabha’s postcolonial trend of thinking, in contrast to Massad’s, revolves around the 
idea that the narrative of modernity is not coherent, and it should not be conceptualized through 
the oppositions of the East and the West. Dilip Gaonkar proposes that alternative models of 
modernity have been produced in non-Western countries through creative adaptations by subjects 
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who are not receivers but rather active agents. Sanjay Subrahmanyam offers the concept of 
“connected histories” in order to look at the possibilities of global connections rather than the 
disciplinary constructions of differences. 
      These approaches emphasize that with the rise of modernity in the nineteenth century, “a body 
of common concepts, ideas and ways of thinking emerges which renders inter-societal 
communication between Europe and the Middle East”.654 Massad’s conceptualization of 
modernity totally lacks such global construction, suggesting instead an assumption of “ownership 
of modernity”655 that equates modernity with the colonialism of the West—as in his view, Arab 
intellectuals were passive subjects, following the West blindly in the construction of Arab 
modernity, and the emergence of LGBTQI rights and homophobia in the Middle East was a part 
of this view of “modernity as colonialism”.656 Such an approach to modernity is not appropriate to 
all Middle Eastern societies, particularly Iran, where, as I have demonstrated, we cannot just blame 
Western imperialism for the heterosexualization of society in the nineteenth century and for 
homophobia in contemporary time. Rather, what emerged in Iran from the transformation of 
sexuality and gender was a product of modernity created by Iranian intellectuals who, with a degree 
of agency, mimicked Western modernity in order to reinvent the pre-Islamic traditions and build 
a modern nation-state and national identity.  
 
      Massad’s thesis, however, is not totally wrong. I do agree with Massad that homosexuality, in 
the Foucauldian sense, itself is a form of dispositif—produced in nineteenth-century Europe 
through the intersection of power, knowledge, and discourse—however, I have shown in paragraph 
2.3 “The Practice of the Self” that homosexuals historically have resisted within their own 
dispositifs to transform themselves into ethical subjects through the care of the self and Parrhesia. 
Thus, the subject’s transformative capacity is exactly what Massad ignores in his argument about 
homosexual identification in the Middle East. According to Rahman, we cannot explain 
“homosexualization” as a process that is a “one-dimensional continuation of colonialism in 
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contemporary times”657 ; rather, we should consider that the social forces and historical events that 
have produced modern homosexuality are spreading throughout the world—in other words, 
homosexual identity has been developed in a global communication wherein preventing the 
transmission of ideas and influences is impossible. This does not mean that people are incapable 
of making critical judgments about themselves in terms of sexual identity; on the contrary, they 
actively contribute to the construction of their sexual identities. The internet, in particular, is 
making a great impact on this global communication. In societies where any public discussion of 
homosexuality is taboo or an openly gay community does not exist, the internet circulates many 
ideas and information for those whose sexuality isolates them and allows them to have social 
contacts. As Scott Long argues, the internet “has become a way for people to connect who would 
absolutely never have connected before”, and “it has been happening in the Middle East, and the 
same thing has been happening in Africa”.658 In the next paragraph, besides bringing Massad’s 
thesis into the Iranian context, I will contextualize the use of the internet and its impact on the 
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4.3 Hamjensgara/Gay’s Existence 
After a prolonged discussion on the pre-modern and modern construction of Iranian gender and 
sexuality and an elaboration on Massad's thesis on the diffusion of homosexual identification in 
the Middle East, in this paragraph, I will bring Massad's ideas into the Iranian context and through 
a comparative analysis of different researches on the real lives of Iranian gay men, I will show that 
they, in Foucauldian sense, have transformed themselves into ethical agents to contribute to the 
construction of their own local gayness and resist within the Islamic biopolitical dispositif. 
Moreover, since in this thesis the use of identity markers is fundamental, in this paragraph, I will 
use the English term 'gay' and the new terminology in the Persian language 'hamjensgara' (same-
sex identification and orientation), because firstly, both are used as the self-identification by the 
majority of local men in the post-revolutionary Iran659 (I will use hamjensgara only in the 2000s 
when for the first time this term appeared in the Iranian sexual discourse) and secondly, I will 
consider the construction of the term hamjensgara as a form of creative and ethical activity for 
localization of the Western notion of gayness. But before, I will begin this paragraph with giving 
a reflection on the important events in post-revolutionary Iran that have all contributed to the 
process of gayness production—particularly the presidential election of Mohammad Khatami in 
1997, the rapid development of the internet and, the achievement of socio-political expression of 
freedom and discussion of human rights. 
As I have explained in paragraph 4.1 "The Rise of Islamism", under the Islamic regime, 
constituting a new woman subject, othering the West, pathologizing homosexuality, and deploying 
anti-same-sex rhetoric all in the name of tradition contributed to the establishment of a modern 
system of governance. The state reinvented and employed pre-modern forms of punishments 
ranging from flogging to the death penalty in order to restore Shi'i rituals of purity and penance 
and produce particular notions of religion and religious identity.660 As Minoo Moallem notes, in 
the late twentieth century, in the Islamic world—and in particular post-revolutionary Iran—the 
binary of tradition and modernity established a need for "the renewal of the industry around the 
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colonial discourse of a civilizing mission (on the part of the West), while provoking, in return, a 
desire to claim authenticity on the part of Muslims".661 In other words, the Islamic Republic, 
through "the return of Islam" and a "biopolitical logic" has attempted to create a nation-state and 
a national and religious identity in opposition to Western culture. After the establishment of the 
Islamic Republic, immediately what emerged from "religious and ideological fervor" and a 
"return" to the Islamic past was the suppression and constraint of civil rights, the increase of 
executions, and the arrest of many dissidents, liberals, leftists and, even Islamists.662 In this 
context, although the revolutionary regime doubtlessly was repressive toward women and gay 
men, the turn to recovering spaces and voices of resistance began amongst women's movements 
and communities of homosexuals in Iran and diaspora. In this paragraph, I will briefly discuss how 
women's mobilizations for volunteer work, coupled with a less radical political atmosphere of the 
1990s, and finally gave rise to concessions for women's rights. Then, I will return to my argument 
concerning gays' resistance in Iran and diaspora with a focus on the spread of the internet all over 
the country and the beginning of the human rights discussion that began in the 1990s.663 
From a social perspective, in the new constitution, it was stressed that the main place for 
women is home. They came to be seen just as mothers and faithful wives. All legal reforms 
supporting women's rights under the Shah were reversed and replaced with rules that were an 
orthodox interpretation of Islam. After the revolution, upper- and middle-class women—who 
mainly played social roles during the Pahlavis era—had to leave their jobs due to the pressure of 
a new constitution and gender norms. While the Islamist regime attempted to ban upper- and 
middle-class women from certain professions, such as judges and lawyers; for low-income and 
working-class women, particularly in rural areas, the situation did not change drastically; they 
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“continued to remain in the jobs they had been employed for decades”. 664 In other words, the 
ideology of the new regime disagreed with those women and female employments that were 
affected by the Shah's trend of modernization. 
Women's participation in society, however, increased with the starting of the ‘Iran-Iraq 
war’ in 1980, 'falling oil prices' and 'economic sanctions'.665 As already argued, the Islamic 
republic as a by-product of modernization, established a modern state with important features of 
modernization such as urbanization and industrialization. Therefore, the revolutionary regime, in 
order to accomplish its modern purposes, called women's support to help the country. Women, 
particularly religious women, responded to this invitation in a large number. Khomeini called for 
"volunteer organizations, [Basij and Pasdaran] and many religious women joined". Along with 
these organizations, Khomeini "mobilized mosques to set up literacy campaigns and many middle-
class, educated women joined the campaigns as volunteers".666 Between 1983 and 1987, women 
occupied 1.5% of Parliament seats and defended "women's Islamic needs and rights". The majority 
of women parliamentarians came from religious families: they viewed women “primarily as 
houseworkers, child-bearers,” and child-rearers and believed that by " following the teachings of 
Islam, the Islamic Republic has been attentive to women's rights".667 With the end of the war in 
1988, a new age called the 'period of reconstruction' began: a socioeconomic and political 
development that also led to a change in women's status. In fact, the reconstruction policies and 
economic liberalization "induced more women to join the labor market".668 This provided an 
opportunity for "a new generation of gender-conscious Islamist women to seek allies among 
secular women, to present a modern reading of Islam, and make radical demands for change in 
women's status by using politics as a potent agent".669 More significantly, the social organization 
of the economy transformed the area of education. Substantial governmental funding was used for 
school construction in villages and poor neighborhoods. The accessibility of schools made possible 
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girls' participation in educational settings so that female literacy drastically rose from 36 % in 1976 
to 72 % in 1996.670  
At the end of the 1980s, there was an explosion of births in the population. The state 
employed a U-turn policy in family planning, particularly regarding birth control.671 Although the 
new state immediately instituted its own religious sex education and adopted a natalist policy in 
1979,672 poverty, lack of services, frequent childbearing and high rates of infant mortality 
contributed to some changes in family planning after the war in 1988.673 By learning from other 
countries, and with the help of those who were involved in pre-revolutionary family planning, Iran 
developed "the world's most effective programs" that encouraged "birth spacing of three to four 
years, discourage[d] early and late pregnancy, and limit[ed] family size at first to three and later 
to two children".674 Different forms of contraceptives such as condoms, birth-control pills, the IUD 
were widely available for married couples. The new family planning also organized classes and 
seminars to teach couples about sex before marriage, including the ways of obtaining and giving 
pleasure. Abortion was also reauthorized and legalized with some conditions: only up to the fourth 
month of pregnancy and only if it threaten the mother and child's life.675 In this context, the state 
authorized relative freedom of press. Among several hundred magazines and newspapers, some 
women's magazines, such as Zanan and Farzaneh, were published and expanded the scope of 
women's issues. Moreover, some conferences began to be organized regarding different aspects of 
women and family issues. The other shifts in social and economic trends, including greater 
urbanization, contributed to the dramatic changes in gender relations and sexual mores.676  
At the end of the 1980s and in the course of the1990s, therefore, Iran experienced a unique 
set of political, social and economic issues that steadily drew the country into the tide of 
globalization. One of the most important causes of integration of Iran into global communication 
in the post-revolutionary era was the presidential election of Mohammad Khatami in 1997. 677 He 
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was a liberal president, studied theology in Qom and philosophy at Isfahan University. After the 
revolution, he sat in Parliament and later became the minister of culture. After resigning from 
ministry, he began to teach political philosophy at Tehran University.678 In 1997, Khatami 
appeared at the scene of the presidential election, and with promises of freedom for civil society, 
tolerance, and sociocultural openness, he won the election with almost 70% of the vote. 679 
Khatami's political project, regardless of whether or not it resulted in profound changes, attempted 
to depart from the past paradigms. 
 He realized that transformation is essential. He did not intend to dismantle velayat faghieh; 
instead, he attempted to breathe a new life into the existing theocratic system and transform Iran 
into a modern-day democracy predicated on Shi'ism. For doing so, he adopted an integrative, 
hybrid approach to modernity, developed in the middle ground of Islamic theocracy and 
globalization. Although the Islamic Republic from the early days was established as a by-product 
of modernity and deployed modern means of communication for its propaganda, its approach 
toward both international relations and civil freedom was a highly conservative backlash. Khatami, 
on the contrary, believed that modernity and western-inspired practices were compatible with 
Iranian culture and successfully could be woven into Iran's national, religious and historical 
tapestry.680 He immediately ran on a platform of liberalization and reform. Khatami's platform, 
with its call for global unification, market expansion, greater civil freedom, internationalizing the 
economy, fostering global dialogue and international relations, was especially popular among 
women, youth, the new middle class and ethnical and religious minorities, including the neglected 
Sunni Muslims.681 In his foreign policy, Khatami is well known for his advocacy of an inclusive 
global discourse through the thesis of Dialogue of Civilizations, which was a kind of antidote to 
Samuel Huntington's theory of Clash of Civilizations.682 Khatami's thesis called for a global 
discourse of tolerance and peace. He proposed Iran's rapprochement with the international 
community as an alternative to the discourse of gharbzadeghi to build a bridge between Iranian 
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tradition and Western civilizations and modernity.683 In his book, Islam, Liberty, and Development, 
Khatami argues that "we must concede that incompatibility of modern civilization with our 
tradition-bound civilization is one of the most important caucuses of crisis in our society. What is 
to be done? Should we insist on remaining immersed in our tradition, or should we melt fully in to 
Western civilization? Or is there another way of removing this contradiction?"684 For him, 
civilizations have always been dynamic, constantly changing and evolving. He also viewed the 
dialogue among civilizations as a strategy to "free human rights from the bounds of diplomatic 
negotiations with a discourse for defending human life, dignity and culture".685 During his 
presidency, he assured international organizations and lawyers that the Islamic courts would no 
longer deploy the stoning and restrict corporal punishments.686 His claim for human rights also 
gave more strength to the voices of lawyers, journalists, college students, actors, film directors, 
literary writers and intellectuals who, before Khatami's election, fought for a more tolerant and 
equal society. For example, Iranian film directors—particularly female directors such as Tahmineh 
Millani (Hidden Half, 2001; Unwanted Woman, 2005), Rakhshan Bani E'temad (Under the skin of 
City, 2001; Gilaneh, 2005), Samira Makhmalbaf (The Apple, 1998), and some of their male 
colleagues, like Bahram Beyza'i (Bashu: The Little Stranger, 1988), Dariyush Mehrjui (Leila, 
1997), and Jafar Panahi (The Circle, 2000)—helped to redefine gender roles, call attention to the 
nurturing roles of women in society, and criticize Iranian Islamic patriarchal cultures, particularly 
the division of labor and traditional marriage.687 
Within this more tolerant context, the discourse of human rights opened up a liberal space 
for gender relations through which women's rights advocates attempted to reinstate greater social 
freedoms. Under Khatami, Women gained "some rights to initiate divorce and Parliament 
exempted women's mahriyeh from taxes", single women were permitted to study abroad on 
government fellowship and reformists managed to "reduce the severity of the hijab for children 
and high-school students by allowing more colorful uniforms and scarves".688 Moreover, during 
Khatami's presidency, the rapid expansion of the internet in Iran provided another forum for new 
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development in gender relations. The internet offered a new sphere where many new ideas were 
openly shared and discussed—the young generation used the internet as a liberal tool, aspirating 
for more personal freedom and further political changes. The dominant discussion on the Iranian 
blogs revolved around freedom of speech, political reforms, freedom of assembly and gender 
equality.689 One example is the One Million Signatures Campaign, an online petition organized by 
Iranian feminists calling for repealing the discriminatory marriage and divorce laws, which spread 
over the country through the internet.690 As argued by Noushin Ahmadi Khorasani, an Iranian 
feminist, regarding this campaign, "the rise of the internet and related forms of rapidly scalable 
global communications has "allowed women within Iran to tell the world—including the Persian-
speaking diaspora—about their quest for justice as never before".691  
The discourse of gender and sexuality in post-revolutionary Iran has never been limited to 
heterosexual relations; it also has significantly touched upon the emergence of gay identification 
and gay subculture. In the rest of this paragraph, I will turn to my main argument regarding Iranian 
gay-identifying men and their voices of resistance and transformative capacities in constructing 
their own local gayness. Moreover, since in this thesis the use of identity markers is fundamental, 
in this paragraph, I will use the English term 'gay' and the new terminology in the Persian language 
'hamjensgara' (same-sex identification and orientation), because firstly, both are used as the self-
identification by the majority of local men in the post-revolutionary Iran (I will use hamjensgara 
only in the 2000s when for the first time this term appeared in the discourse of sexuality in Iran)692 
and secondly, I will consider the construction of the term hamjensgara as a form of creative and 
ethical activity by gay activists for localization of the Western notion of gayness. To develop my 
argument, I will categorize gay's resistance and activism into activities of community organizing 
in Iran and diaspora. Then I will draw on non-formal outreach work693 and individualistic 
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resistance of Iranian gay-identifying men who position themselves as active agents in taking care 
of 'the self' and 'the other' to resist the dominant norms in their socio-religious environments 
through their sexual embodiment and actions. Since the end of the 90s and at the beginning of the 
2000s, despite the Islamic Republic's adaptation of the harsh penal code regarding homosexuality, 
there has been growing visibility of gay individuals in Iran, particularly in metropolitan centers 
such as Tehran, Isfahan, and Shiraz.694 The emergence of this modern Iranian gay community has 
been associated with several factors. One factor has to do with the socio-political freedom of 
expression and human rights discourse under Khatami's presidency.695 In Young and Defiant in 
Tehran, Shahram Khosravi argues that although the discourse of gharbzadeghi has been the 
dominant discourse of the Islamic state, Khatami's liberation policy gave rise to the integration of 
young people into the stream of 'global consumerism'.696 This is another factor that has been linked 
to "a growing of consumerist culture with its emphasis on individual expressionism in public 
spaces, which rejects the imposition of hegemonic identities by the Islamist government in Iran 
and defies Islamic legal restrictions".697  
 The other factor, or maybe the most important one among the others, which has facilitated 
the gay subculture's transformations, has been pervasive internet access.698Nowadays, we know 
how the internet can be used for making social control and manipulating information, but certainly, 
at the beginning of its spread, it was used as a "democratizing instrument" as Manuel Castells in 
Network of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age, argues that "the internet 
social networks … are spaces of autonomy largely beyond the control of governments and 
corporations". In other words, especially at the beginning of its spread, the internet has been used 
as a democratizing instrument, which expands freedom, lowers the transaction costs of collective 
actions, and reduces the barriers for internal and international communication and transmission of 
information.699 In addition, Iranian gay communities that were barred from participating in 
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political and social discourses found a new way to express their voices through the internet social 
networks. Concomitant with the diffusion of internet access throughout the country, in European 
and non-European countries, there has been a growing number of Iranian diasporic LGBTQ 
associations and groups, established by Iranian gay immigrants and refugees. In this context, the 
internet played as an intermediator in transmitting ideas regarding modern conceptions of gay 
identities between gay activists and their community in diaspora and the gay community inside of 
the country.700  
The use of the term gay as a self-identification also has been associated with greater internet 
penetration in Iran.701 As already mentioned, Najmabadi argues when "the term gay first appeared 
in Iran of the 1970s", it was avoided by local men because "it was received as the English 
translation of a Persian word with a highly pejorative and dishonorable load (kuni) ".702 However, 
it was in the 1990s—particularly at the end of the 1990s and at the beginning of 2000s, along with 
the spread of the internet—703 that this term began to be embraced as a self-identification: "it had 
come to provide distance from the Persian pejorative assignation and helped those who so 
identified to connected to a global imagined community."704  The term gay still has been used 
widely as a self-identification among Iranian non-heterosexuals. In "The Role of Social Media in 
the Lives of Gay Iranians", Abouzar Nasirzadeh, in 2011, interviewed 213 Iranian Facebook users 
who identified themselves as gay.  He concluded that "what was remarkable about these 
individuals was that they literary identified themselves by using the English word 'gay'. Being 'gay' 
was not only an important part of their identity, but for some, it was the main marker of their 
identity and not just merely a sexual practice".705 By drawing on this conclusion as well as 
Rahman's critique of Massad, that his argument "lacks any evidence of actual lived experience", I 
argue that only Middle Easterners and, in this context, only Iranian gay men should answer for 
themselves whether their identity is imported from the West or, with a degree of agency, they have 
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adopted their sexual identities. Moreover, claiming a Western-oriented sexual identity should not 
be simply depicted as a neocolonial imposition infringing upon local and indigenous forms of 
sexuality. As pointed out by Sami Zeidan, "the universalizing of gay terminology, which is often 
condemned as Western hegemony, can in fact have a local liberatory function".706 Therefore, 
adopting this Western sexual-identity label by Iranian gay-identifying men should be taken into 
account as a self-identification and not simply as an imposition of Western sexual understating.  
The growing visibility of gay-identifying men has also coincided a growing of Iranian 
LGBT communities in the diaspora.707 Jahangir Shirazi, a gay activist, argues that for the first 
time, by the beginning of the 1990s, Iranian LGBT immigrants and refugees in Sweden decided to 
publish the first Iranian LGBT magazine. They published a periodical magazine called Homan that 
attempted to raise Iranian awareness about sexuality in general and homosexuality in particular, 
such as giving information about HIV and AIDS to Iranians who did not have access to this type 
of information or providing advice and help to many individuals who had struggles with their 
coming out process.708 With the diffusion of internet access among Iranians, Homan, in 
collaborating with other gay activists inside and outside of Iran, in 2004, published MAHA: the 
first Iranian LGBT e-magazine.709 From the early days, MAHA extended its area of activism into 
the domain of language. As already mentioned, in Iran, homosexuality was surrounded by 
derogatory references in the Persian language such as kuni (ass), evakhahar (effeminate gay) and 
hamjensbaz (faggot). Jahangir Shirazi claims that MAHA and other gay groups inside and outside 
of Iran employed the Western 'gay' label to resist the dominant discourse and negative language 
on homosexuality.710 Although Shirazi and other Iranian gay activists such as Saviz Shafai 
advocate a more modern gay culture, they also believe in articulating a localized and authentically 
Iranian gay identity.711 In other words, they insist on elaboration and localization of the Western 
notion of gay identity into an Iranian context in order to resist both the hegemonic Western 
understanding of sexual identity and the dominant legal-religious discourse of the Islamic Republic 
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that represents homosexuality as a Western trope of invasion and homosexuals as non-authentic 
Iranians. For doing so, they began their effort to redefine homosexuality in the Persian language. 
Foucault reminds us that "psychological, psychiatric, medical category of homosexuality was 
constituted from the moment it was characterized".712 In other words, in a Foucauldian perspective, 
it is the act of naming through language and discourse that brings identities into being and then 
produces subjectivities. By drawing on Foucault's conceptualization of resistance, that "resistance 
is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power",713 Judith Butler argues that individual 
subjects are able to resist at the discursive and linguistic level because the diversity and multiplicity 
of language creates a possibility of resistance to destabilize the hegemonic discourses.714 This 
resistance is possible through the resignification of particular terms and labels or through the 
construction of new terminology. In Western societies, discursive or linguistic resistance has been 
a part of gay and lesbian activism. Queer as a word, during in the seventeenth century, was a label 
for people or things that were considered strange or perverted. In the twentieth century, with the 
consolidation of sexual orientation as a cultural identity indication, queer turned into a derogatory 
substitute for homosexuals and gender subordination. However, it was during the 80s that queer 
received political and cultural refashioning. Many gay and lesbian groups, activists and 
organizations while retaining its non-normative functions, reinvented and re-signified queer as an 
identity category and positive frame in order to politically deploy it against violent homophobia 
of the state and diverse sectors of society.715 At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Iranian 
gay activists, particularity those who collaborated with MAHA such as Jahangir Shirazi and Saviz 
Shafai articulated the positive and respectful term hamjensgara (same-sex orientation and 
identification), instead of the term hamjensbaz, which is a negative and pejorative term denoting 
a lustful same-sex act and sometimes pedophilia.716 In addition, they invented the term 
degarbashan jensi for the term queer and degarbash setizi for homophobia.717 This terminology 
in Persian language can be considered as a form of a strategy of resistance against othering of 
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same-sex desiring subjects as "non-authentic Iranians because of their self-identification as 
gay."718  
As I explained in paragraph 3.2 "Homoerotic Persia", individuals in same-sex relations 
were defined by their "positionality" during sexual intercourse. In one sense, in the gender 
convention of pre-modern Iranian society, in same-sex intercourse, one partner was deemed as 
masculine and another as feminine. 719  MAHA, in the article "Hamjensgarayan-e Mosalman" 
(Muslim Homosexuals), is also a critic of rigid regulations of 'status-defined homosexuality' that 
maintained active and passive identities. Although this article is written before Deasiring Arabs 
(2007), I can consider it as a response to Massad's claim that gays and lesbians do not exist in the 
Muslim world and Muslim cultures enjoy pervasive traditional and nameless same-sex relations 
or what he calls "the practitioners of same-sex contact".720 This article contends that Iranian 
hamgensgara/gay communities adopted more flexible sexual-gender identities that are not merely 
based on sexual acts; instead, they are constructed according to a more modern understating of 
hamjensgarai/gayness, which is a mutual and respectful relationship. Moreover, this article argues 
that once people talk about homosexuality, they reduce it to the level of mere same-sex physical 
relations (mostly a sexual relationship between an active adult man and a passive adolescent boy). 
However, they should notice that firstly, physical-sexual relations reflect one's exchanging of love 
and affection and sharing of feelings and emotions, regardless of one's sexual orientation. 
Secondly, these are the very same things that take place in heterosexual relationships.721   
         However, what makes this journal such a pioneer publication in terms of Iranian gay issues, 
is the discussion of homosexuality in the context of contemporary Iranian society. MAHA, in the 
article "Hamjensgarai: Darkha va Bardashtha." (Same-sex identification: Perception and 
Impression) criticizes Iranian artists, intellectuals and leftists whose works lack a discussion 
regarding homosexual rights. Referring to Oscar Wilde's imprisonment due to his homosexuality 
and those artists and intellectuals who refused to sign the petition for his release, this journal argues 
that in Iranian society, if an artist is sent to jail for his homosexual orientation, other artists and 
intellectuals cannot speak out in his or her defense. MAHA argues that they criticize and condemn 
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the right of man to have sex with an underage girl under the name of marriage, but they are silent 
in the case of consensual and mutual relations between two adult men because still they think 
homosexuality is a perversion or they, out of fear, do not dare talk about or support it.722 MAHA, 
in another article "Halqeh-ye Gomshodeh" (The Missing Link), directs its attack also toward the 
silence of religious and Islamist intellectuals and reformists regarding homosexuals' rights. This 
article argues that Muslim thinkers and reformers, such as Abdolkarim Soroush and Mohsen 
Kadivar, who speak of the Protestantization of Islam and religious and cultural pluralism, should 
not be silent regarding diversity in sexual orientation, particularity about the homosexual 
orientation of Muslims who form a significant social, cultural and religious foundation out of 
which the religious thinkers have emerged. This article claims that the homosexuals of the two 
other Abrahamic religions (Christianity and Judaism), through a rational moderation, reached a 
consensus between their religious beliefs and their sexual orientations. In Islam, as this article 
suggests, Islamic thinkers also should reach such rational moderation by offering a more tolerant 
reading of the Qur'an through a new reading that ought to begin with reinterpretations of the Qur' 
anic story of the people of Sodom.723  
         In the next years, in the academic area, a new perspective to the story of the people of Sodom 
was proposed by academic and religious intellectual Arash Naraghi. In contrast to the traditional 
and patriarchal understating of the Qur'an, Naraghi argues that firstly, the verses in the story of the 
people of Sodom do not stand for the prohibition of same-sex desire and the God's wrath that 
descended upon the people of Sodom was not due to their sexual inclinations, rather it had to do 
with a range of crimes such as murder, robbery, coercive sex and rape. Secondly, he reminds us 
that 'justice' is the spirit of the Qur'anic culture and "it is one of the pillars around which Muslims 
must develop their understating of religion". Therefore, according to Naraghi, any interpretation 
that approves or tolerates discrimination based on sexual orientation is inappropriate. To develop 
this argument, he emphasizes several principles: Naraghi argues that in Islam, morality precedes 
religion; it means that the approval of religious authorities is not a necessary condition for moral 
validity. Then, the Qur'an states that all humans are equal, and a violation of this equality is only 
permitted if there is a moral reason (a non-religious defining factor) that is sufficient enough. 
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Moreover, there is no "morally and rationally sufficient reason to condemn homosexual identity 
and orientation as such". Therefore, discrimination against homosexual identification and 
orientation is against "the principle of justice and thus morally unjustified". Hence, according to 
him, "any commentary on the Qur’an that discrimination against people on the ground of sexual 
identities and orientation is morally inappropriate." Finally, he concludes that homosexuality is 
permissible or at least consistent with Islam.724 
As I have explained in the 2.3 paragraph “The Practices of the Self”, like Western 
homosexual activists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that contributed to the construction 
of their own homosexual identifications through their writings and campaigns, Iranian 
hamjensgara/gay activists through their writings and community organizing not only have 
constructed their own sexual beings but also have articulated an authentic conceptualization of 
Iranian hamjensgara/gay identity produced between local realities and global influences. 
Furthermore, as I have shown in the theoretical part of the thesis, Focualdian ethics is not a 
submission to the 'regimes of truth'; instead, it is an undoing of such regimes. In the space of this 
undoing, there is a relatively autonomous personal-political ethos that reproduces not social norms 
and normative ways of being, but a space of agency and transformation and, in Allen's words, "a 
form of resistance involving the crossing of limits or boundaries"725 through which one is able to 
attain a certain mode of being.  By drawing on Foucault's conceptualization of ethics, Naisargi 
Dave, in Queer Activism in India, sees activism in general as the "undoing of social moralities" 
and queer activism in particular, as an ethical practice, which is "the creative, practical struggle 
against the drive to normalization".726 Regarding Iranian hamjensgara/gay activism in the post-
revolutionary era, I argue that Iranian gay activists have applied different forms of ethical practices, 
such as Parrhesia, in order to, on the one hand, criticize and problematize the Iranian society, its 
social rules, norms and collective habits, and on the other hand, refashion and improve themselves 
as the ethical subjects of their own actions.  
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          The emergence of online Iranian LGBT magazines has not been reduced to the MAHA's 
contributions. Between the 1990s and early 2000s, other groups such as HASHA, Iran Shadman, 
Khaneh-ye Doost, and Gay Iran "held conferences, produced magazines, and provided moral and 
legal support to Iranian LGBTQI+ who lived inside and outside of Iran".727 In paragraph 4.2. 
“Sexual Imperialism: Reading Josef Massad”, by drawing on Foucault's periodization, Massad 
argues that the notion of homosexuality produced in the dispositif of sexuality in nineteenth-
century Europe and thereafter, in modern times, the Western dispositif of sexuality, particularly in 
the form of LGBTQ identities (he mostly refers to gay identity), has been deployed by the West 
as an ideological and political tool to construct a binary model by which America and Europe are 
depicted as civilized vis-a-vis the uncivilized societies of the Middle East with regards to the 
sexual/civil rights of gays and lesbians.728 I sympathize with Massad that LGBTQI+ rights have 
become a politically opportunistic tool by some LGBTQI+ groups and organizations (or in 
Massad's words, Gay International) to depict Iranian hamjensgarayan/gays as sexually oppressed 
victims who are in need of being saved by liberal and gay-friendly West from their homophobic 
Islamic-Iranian state. However, I sympathize with Rao Raul's argument as well that we cannot 
flatten out the space of queer activism and reduce LGBTQ+ politics at the level of neocolonial 
politics. 
        Regarding Iranian hamjensgara/gay activism and LGBTQ+ politics, while Homan, MAHA, 
and other e-magazine and gay groups deployed their politics through critical and creative practices, 
some activists and groups have given hypervisibility to the Iranian gays and produce images of so-
called hamjensgara/gay hangings in Iran during the war on terror. Arsham Parsi Pour, the founder 
of both the Persian Gay and Lesbian Organization (PGLO), a small group registered in Norway in 
2003 and the Iranian Queer Railroad (IRQR), a Canada-based organization established in 2008, 
has been criticized for repeating the “pre-existing normative narrative of hegemonic discourse of 
home of oppression in Iran and home of freedom in the West”.729 On his website, he writes: 
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Now living in a safe country, I still consider myself first and foremost an Iranian. 
I can never forget that I am in exile due to my own sexual orientation. This 
situation is both a burden and a tremendous personal responsibility for me. In May 
2005, as I crossed the border out of Iran into Turkey, I promised myself, my nation 
and my people that I would one day return to a free, open and democratic Iran. To 
that end, I promised that I would fully devote my labors toward achieving for 
myself and my fellow citizens in Iran the treasured dream and desire of so many 
millions around the globe, and which so many in the West take as for granted as 
breathing: freedom.730 
By the representation of Iran as a grand prison for homosexuals, Parsi, through the use of the 
internet, including his e-magazine Neda, YouTube, and weblogs, has cultivated his self-promotion 
as the representative of Iranian queers and as an expert on the persecution of homosexuals in Iran. 
Although his organizations have provided valuable legal and moral supports for Iranian queers 
inside and outside of the country, he depicts them as sexually oppressed victims of the Islamic 
state, who are in need of being saved by Western democracies, without considering their agency 
and resistance against the official discourse of homophobia. Sima Shakhsari, in "From 
Homoerotics of Exile to Homopolitics of Diaspora: Cyberspace, the War on Terror, and the 
Hypervisible Iranian Queer”, critically argues that "while former groups used cautionary methods 
in 'outing' gay life in Iran, Parsi does not hesitate to produce and publicize exaggerated accounts 
of gay persecution in Iran".731 For example, Shakhsari refers to "the widely publicized case of the 
hanging of two young men, Ayaz Marhouni and Mohammad Asgari" (that I discussed in paragraph 
4.2 “Sexual Imperialism: Reading Joseph Massad”) in which Parsi "is instrumental in producing 
highly sensationalized accounts of gay persecution in Iran".732 While some human rights 
organizations, such as Amnesty International, IGLHRC, and Human Rights Watch, claimed that 
the case of the hanging of two young Iranian men lacked credible information about their sexual 
orientation and the reason for their execution, other groups like the Human Rights Campaign, Log 
Cabin Republicans, British Outrage, and some Iranian queer diasporic organizations, particularly 
Parsi's groups, circulated inaccurate news about their hangings in Iran, representing them as the 
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case of gay executions. For instance, Parsi as executive director of IRQO and PGLO appeared on 
several radio and television shows and was interviewed with some international press, claiming 
that two young Iranian teenagers were arrested at a gay party.733  
          By bringing the issue of gay hangings and Iranian hamjensgara/gay activism, organizations, 
magazines, and groups into the discussion in this paragraph, I have tried to respond to Massad that 
although some LGBTQI+ groups and activists have approached Iranian and Middle Eastern gay 
subjects via a universalist lens to underpin Western sexual epistemology or, in the case of Parsi's 
organizations, have used LGBTQI+ politics as an opportunistic tool to promote the home of 
oppression in Iran and home of freedom in the West, firstly, we should not consider Gay 
International, at least in the case of Iran, as a single entity. Secondly, an individual's sexual self-
determination should not be ignored. We cannot see gay identity or the adaptation of the Western 
notion of gayness simply as an effect of neocolonial imposition or as having complicity with 
imperialist norms and expectations. In the rest of this paragraph, I will direct the discussion from 
community organizing among hamjensgara/gay activists toward non-formal and individualistic 
resistance of Iranian hamjensgara/gay men. 
       By drawing on Rahman's critique of Massad, that his argument "lacks any evidence of actual 
lived experience", I argue that only Middle Easterners and, in this context, only Iranian 
hamjensgara/gay men should answer for themselves whether their identity is imported from the 
West or, with a degree of agency, they have developed their own sexual beings. For doing so, I 
will draw on and go through several secondary ethnographic data and sources, representing the 
reality of hamjensgara/gay men's lives in Iran. These data not only prove a certain level of 
hamjensgara/gay livability in contemporary Iran but also uncover a significant hamjensgara/gay 
underground world, which is invisible to local and international communities. For example, in the 
article "Iranian Gay/Queer Activists and Activism", Jón Ingvar Kjaran shows how Iranian 
hamjensgara/gay individuals and activists build up a community of support and learning through 
underground or online outreach work in a society that criminalizes same-sex sexual acts. Kjaran 
shows that in contrast to the dominant paradigm regarding the politics of visibility and outreach 
discourse in the West—instead of employing the Western notion of 'coming out' as a political 
strategy—Iranian hamjensgara/gay activists and individuals have taken alternative approaches in 
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order to resist within the dispositif of the Islamic Republic of Iran and "avoid being dismissed as 
Westernized".734 
          In Kjaran's research, participants' ages range from 20 to 50 and they came from the low or 
middle classes of society. For example, Ramtin, one of the participants, introduces himself as a 
gay activist and believes that what is important is not the "recognition or being visible as gay, we 
don't have that here in Iran anyway. It is more about support, building a community and helping 
others, without thinking about who you are or how you define yourself". To contribute to Tehran’s 
invisible hamjensgara/gay community, Ramtin began his activism by disseminating information 
about hamjensgara/gay issues among other young hamjensgarayan/gays who were unaware about 
hamjensgarai/gayness or underground hamjensgara/gay communities. He also got involved in 
some activities like taking photos in public places, in buses, on the streets, and in the hills 
surrounding Tehran, with hamjensgara/gay symbols, such as the rainbow flag, or slogans about 
ending homophobia and heterosexism. These pictures were posted on the hamjensgara/gay 
website Hamjesgara with the purpose of showing "other gays and lesbians inside of Iran that there 
is a community out there and that we as queers can claim or queer the public space with our 
presence".735 
           Nima, another  participant in Kajarn's research, started his activism as a agent of PGLO 
inside Iran and his tasks for the organization included supporting the fellow Iranian 
hamjesngarayan/gays within the country and disseminating information through online 
publications particularly through writing blog posts on LGBT issues: "I wanted to tell Iranian gays 
that they are not alone. God does not hate you because you are different". According to him, 
another of his important tasks is disseminating and deploying the positive Persian term 
hamjensgara instead of the Western notion of homosexuality and the Persian pejorative term 
hamjensbaz. Giving an account of his activism, he says that through establishing a connection with 
popular TV channels, such as VOA (The Voice of America), which broadcasts from USA in Farsi 
and is watched by many Iranians, he and other Iranian hamjensgara/gay activists sent emails to 
these channels and asked them to use the positive term hamjensgara, instead of the offensive word 
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hamjensbaz. Referring to the movie Broke Back Mountain, he says that when it won the Oscar, 
"we asked them to use hamjins-gara' in the description of the plot." Nima also points out that the 
identification with the positive word hamjensgara opened up the possibilities for Iranian 
hamjensgara/gays to express their feelings and identities in a positive way particularly confronting 
families and parents; they can identify themselves in their own language, without having to use 
the Western term gay or the offensive term hamjensbaz that conjures up an image of the pedophile. 
As a result of hamjensgara/gay activism inside Iran and wide dissemination and circulation of the 
term hamjensgara, Nima says that "through their activism, they were able to influence the official 
discourse and terminology in terms of sexual categories, despite the limits to public debate in the 
Islamic Republic, given the official medico-religious-legal disavowal of homosexuality and 
criminalization of same-sex sexual acts". As an indication of this, he draws our attention to the 
new penal code that substituted hamjensgara with hamjensbaz in order to describe all same-sex 
acts, including kissing and touching.736 
          After the 2009 Iranian presidential election, immediately a protest movement, or what is to 
be called the Iranian Green Movement, took shape within which people protested against the re-
election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for the 2009 presidency and for what they regarded as a 
fraudulent election. Under Ahmadinejad (2005-2009, re-election in 2009-2012) Iranian society 
became more repressive and civil freedoms underwent more restrictions. The presidential election 
of 2009 created a space of hope for the young Iranian generation who sought changes and more 
personal freedoms. They supported the reformist and the former Prime Minster Mir-Hossein 
Mousavi, who was the competitor of Ahmadinejad. The election was held on 12 June 2009 and 
immediately caused a significant controversy over the result. The government announced that 
Ahmadinejad was re-elected by 60% of the votes, but the supporters of Mousavi believed that the 
results were manipulated. They took the streets and through peaceful protests, they managed to 
find political spaces to express their dissent. However, the protests turned into a battleground 
between protesters and security forces aiming to suppress people's voices of dissidence.737 The 
Green Movement possessed a polyphonic nature that entailed different groups of people with 
diverse social and economic backgrounds. Among others, hamjensgarayan/ gays participated with 
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the aim of seeking change and creating spaces of gayness and a more personal freedom in a more 
politico-social atmosphere.738  
          Farhod is another participant in Kajar's research who draws our attention to the fact that 
"many gay and lesbian identifying Iranians participated in the protest, not demanding recognition 
or visibility within the public sphere, but focusing more on personal freedom in general". He 
started his activism with organizing and attending meetings and protests against the government. 
Farhod got arrested several times and the last time he was sent to jail. The authorities asked him 
to sign a statement in which he declared he would never participate in any protest again. "I signed 
it but I knew immediately after I did so that I could never stop taking part in protests against the 
authorities. It was just in me to protest and express my views." He believed that through 
participating in protests, the young generation, particularly hamjensgarayan/gays, could open up 
society. Farhod pointed out that a lot of hamjensgarayan/gays took part in the Green Movement, 
but he noted that "the security forces, for example, the Sepah, made some false video clips showing 
hamjensgara/gay people in the line of protest. Their aim was to ruin our reputation—saying that 
the protests were inspired by hamjensgarayan/gays and Western agents who want to destroy 
Iranian culture." When the Green Movement was crushed with brutal force, Farhod saw emigration 
as his only option for constructing his sexual life.739 Further, I will discuss that leaving one's own 
country might be considered as a  form of self-transformation through which Iranian gay-
identifying men transform themselves into ethical agents in order to construct their gayness. But 
before insisting on this point, by returning to the cases of Ramtin, Nima and Farhod, I would argue 
that they embraced and problematized their ethical substance, which is their sexuality and their 
sexual existence. Then, they positioned themselves in relation to certain norms, rules and moral 
codes to recognize their modes of subjection that entail the medical regulations within the religious 
biopolitical dispositif of sexuality (pathologization of homosexuality), religious-juridical norms 
and regulations (criminalization of homosexuality), the political and official discourse of the 
Islamic state (homosexuality as a trope of western invasion) and hegemonic linguistic discourse 
(pejorative and stigmatized labels for homosexuality). To resist their modes of subjection, they, in 
Foucauldian sense, transformed themselves into ethical subjects through creative and ethical 
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practices to change the discourses and carve out a hamjensgara/gay space to pursue their life as 
sexual beings. For example, Ramtin and Nima positioned themselves as active agents in taking 
care of the self in terms of being aware of various modes of subjection as well as resistance against 
the domain norms and social environment to not only gain a sexual state of being, but also create 
a community of support for other gay brethren. Farhod also as an active agent, took a critical and 
truth telling position toward dominant socio-political discourse in the hope of changing the 
discourse and creating a space of support within the limit set by the government. Moreover, I 
consider their activism as efforts for localization of the Western notion of gayness. Ramtin and 
Farhod's accounts of hamjensgara/gay activism draw our attention to their resistance within 
Iranian dispositif through Parrhesia and ethical works. Their activism places less emphasis on the 
Western paradigm of visibility and coming out. Instead, they focus more on personal freedom, 
opening up society and building a community of support and help for their fellow 
hamjensgara/gays and taking a critical stance toward their homophobic society. The case of Nima 
reminds us that hamjensgara/gay activism as an ethical practice can also be a creative practice that 
changes the hegemonic discourse and produces the space of hamjensgarai/gayness through not 
only building community and offering mutual support, but also through constructing terminology 
and introducing positive words in Farsi for same-sex desires. 
         Apart from inventing terminology and building a community of support, integration into 
family structure is another way to localize the Western notion of being gay. In the article 
"Hamjensgara Belongs to Family; Exclusion and Inclusion of Male homosexuality in Relation to 
Family Structure in Iran",740 Ahmad Karimi, in accordance to Kajarn, emphasizes that in Iran 
where homosexuality is criminalized and any formal queer activism is considered as a political act 
belonging to the Western imperialism, Iranian hamjensgara/gay men are following less-politicized 
channels. Interviewing Iranian hamjensgara/gay men from the ages of 22 to 35 and along with 
middle- and low-class backgrounds, Karimi argues that in Iranian and Middle Eastern cultures, 
family is the central space of subject formation and Iranian hamjensgara/gay men use family 
emotional bonding as a survival strategy to negotiate their in-process sexual identities. By taking 
this approach, "in a way different from that of Western LGBT activities", Iranian hamjensgara/gay 
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men "are trying to portray a positive image of their sexuality in relation to local family standards 
so they can be integrated into the Iranian family structure". Karimi argues that in the absence of 
human LGBT politics inside of the country, the language has been used as an apparatus to imagine, 
speak about and shape a world for themselves. He refers to the terminology of hamjensgara 
through which Iranian hamjensgara/gay men have attempted to define themselves in terms of 
"commitment, responsibility, morality and enduring emotions", in order to "locate themselves back 
into society and family structure by attaching their sexuality to values, such as passion and 
commitment". For example, one the participants in Karimi's research says that: 
 I first try to explain to them that people are different and we should accept 
differences, then I tell them more explicitly about sexuality. I first use 
hamjensgara to show how positive it means, and in future, if the topic 
comes up and I need to say something, I use Gay. I think it is safer because 
they may have some negative stereotypes attached to Gay because of what 
they hear in Western and Iranian news and media.741  
       In the same manner, another participant mentions, "I prefer to use hamjensgara because it is 
gara to show the orientation. I prefer to use hamjensgara because it has less negativity. You know 
when I want to talk about sexuality with a friend or even I want to come out to someone I prefer 
to use hamjensgara because it is quite positive compared to the old word [hamjensbaz]". 
Therefore, as revealed by Karimi, while wiping out the sexualized, demonized picture depicted 
through hamjensbaz, the participants of this study have deployed the terminology of hamjensgara 
to express and emphasize their sexual identity and orientation. Karimi also shows that in order to 
"keep a balance between kinship and sexuality", and to "keep parent-child relationship intact", 
Iranian hamjensgara/gay men create their own "family-friendly image of sexuality' and come out 
to some friends and their younger siblings but not discuss about their sexual orientation with their 
parents.742 
          Another example of this selective coming out practice can be seen among the participants 
in Yadegarfard's research, described in the article "How are Iranian Gay Men Coping with 
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Systematic Suppression under Islamic Law? A Qualitative Study".743 In this research, many 
hamjensgara/gay participants, who came from middle- and low-class backgrounds with ages 
ranging from19 to 52, mention that they built their own' family of choice' among people they could 
trust. According to Yadegarfard, Iranian hamjensgara/gay men "who have never been supported 
by their own biological family create a new and modern sense of family among themselves". In 
this second family, hamjensgara/gay couples who have been together for a long time become the 
source of emotion, support and even finance for the younger members. For example, one of the 
participants explained that: 
one of the older gay guys who is financially stable, has his own dependency, has 
lots of experience with gay people, and can host people in his house usually 
becomes the head of our so called family. People get together around him. Some 
people might call him 'mamman' (mother) or 'malakeh' (the queen) or 'amme 
bozorg' (great aunty), or other names which depend on the person's personality in 
this group of friends. Some call him big brother, sister, uncle, grand mom and so 
on and so forth.744   
 Thus, the family of choice develops a union among hamjensgara/gay men beyond the biological 
bond and through providing a sense of belonging as well as a source of support and information. 
Integration into family structure or alternatively, creating a family of choice shows that Iranian 
hamjensgara/gay men are aware of their existential limits but they also resist against their subject 
position constituted by the official discourse of the Islamic Republic in order to construct their 
own subjectivities. Telling the truth about themselves (in terms of their sexuality) and confronting 
their parents and friends on these issues was the beginning of transforming the self. They also have 
employed different strategies in order to make their life much more meaningful, such as having 
sex, dates or intimate relationships with boyfriends. In this regard, Yadegarfard points to the 
engagement in sexual relationships through which Iranian gay men take the risk because, "firstly, 
having sex is an act of rebellion and non-conformity"; secondly, "sex gives them a sense of identity 
and who they are". Thirdly, "sex helps them to connect to other gay men and engage in social 
networking as a coping strategy for social isolation and loneliness".745 The participants in his 
                                                          
743 Mohammadrasool Yadegarfard, “How are Iranian Gay Men Coping with Systematic Suppression under Islamic 




  164  
 
research reported that they found their sex partners in dating apps, social media or public spaces 
such as parks. Others mention that traveling to different cities gave them more opportunities to 
meet new people and have more sex. Although many mentioned that they were aware of the risk 
and death penalty that such action could bring about, they still were committed to doing it.746 In 
the regime of heteronormativity, having same-sex sexual practices, as an act of non-conforming, 
particularly in public spaces, show that Iranian hamjensgara/gay men have recognized their modes 
of subjections, such as religious-juridical norms and regulations (criminalization of 
homosexuality) and positioned themselves as active agents to take of care of themselves through 
other modalities of transformations such as sexual embodiments, and actions. 
        Traveling between cities to meet other hamjensgara/gay men and having more sex is not 
always an ideal coping strategy since it is costly and time-consuming. However, both 
Yadegarfard's and Kjaran's participants mention that instead of traveling, they would rather leave 
the country and seek asylum in another country. Sexual identities, practices and desires have 
always been factors that contribute to people's motivation to migrate. The term' sexual migration' 
is broadly associated with the relocation and movement of hamjensgara/gay men seeking for their 
sexual emancipation with regard to their practices, identities and subjectivities.747 For Iranian 
hamjensgara/gay men, it is the restrictions imposed by Islamic law and society that push them to 
migrate. One of the Yadegarfard's participants says that "as a gay man, you can have everything 
and nothing here (in Iran). When you cannot be yourself, what's the point? You can have the best 
job, best car, best house but you cannot be yourself. You have to lie all the time, just not to get 
into any trouble."748 On the other side of the coin, however, some Iranian hamjensgara/gay men 
reject the idea of Iran as a 'grand prison' for homosexuals, and they take a critical stance toward 
those who left Iran. Mehrdad, one of Kjaran's participants, opposes migration to the West. In his 
view, migration of Iranian gay men to the West has to do more with a better economic existence 
and getting a European citizenship than with religion and government. Mehrdad said that "when I 
have a chat with my friends that have left, they tell me that they miss Iran and they['d] like to come 
back. Why? Because it's difficult to live in the West, even in terms of [having] sex, it can be 
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difficult to find your 'type' outside of Iran. So many of them wish to come back to Iran, for example, 
when their family gets older and they can maybe live more of an independent life". As Mehrdad 
experienced through his friends, leaving Iran is not "always the best solution", because it takes 
time to adapt to a new country and being there without the support of one's family can be 
difficult.749 Additionally, he commented that  
in Tehran, you can be gay and nobody will kill you [laughter]. Even if they know 
that you are having sex within the privacy of your home they cannot arrest you. 
Even in Islam, the rule is that four adult men must see you in [an] act of sex before 
the authorities can arrest you and take you to court. So it is not easy to hang you 
or kill you for having sex with men.750  
However, he acknowledges that family pressure sometimes is unbearable and it is another reason 
for which Iranian hamjensgara/gay men leave the country. Mehrdad himself has never experienced 
such a pressure because he has kept his private life secret to his family, but Morteza, another 
participant, took the drastic decision to leave Iran and his mother because coming out of the closet 
and confronting his mother was unbearable for him. He explained that "finally, I decided to talk to 
my mother and tell her everything about myself because she had only heard things about me from 
somebody else. I however, wanted to tell her after 22 years of [lying about] who I was so, I started 
to talk to her about homosexuality and explain what it meant to be gay." Morteza's sexual 
orientation for his mother was "outside of grids of intelligibility".751 For her, in line with the official 
discourse of Islamic Republic, homosexuality is a disease and then unacceptable. For this reason, 
Morteza left Iran to construct himself as a sexual being. Morteza's story can be interpreted in terms 
of ethics of being and care of the self. Telling his mother about his sexual orientation and inner 
self can be interpreted as truth telling and as the first step in his self-transformation into a subject 
of truth and sexual being, which in the case of Morteza meant adopting hamjensgara/gay identity. 
Telling the truth, thus, was a strategy for Morteza to resist within his subject position (for example, 
as a heterosexual son who would get married one day) in order to expand the liminal space within 
which he can be himself with regards to his feelings and identity.752 These narratives indicate that 
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Iranian hamjensgara/gay men and their embodied experiences are not unified and simple; instead, 
they are more complicated and multifaced, or in Kjaran's words, they should be considered as a 
"complex process of adjudication and being and becoming".753 Leaving the country is not the main 
focus of all Iranian hamjensgara/gay men; however, those who leave the country in order to 
construct their own space of agency and self-transformation in one of the European countries, as 
Mehrdad mentioned, usually experience discrimination and racism and find themselves in a 
stressful condition, filled with uncertainty, and lacking the support they expect to receive from 
political and human rights organizations and groups. For example, those who directly migrate to 
the first destination in one of the Western liberal democracies usually experience discrimination 
and racism within LGBTQI+ communities. This discrimination or what is to be called 
'homonationalism' is "an understanding and enactment of homosexual acts, identities, and 
relationships that incorporate them as not only compatible with but even exemplary of neoliberal 
democratic ethics and citizenship".754 This incorporation establishes that certain respectable 
LGBTQI+ subjectivities now have been included as a part of national imaginary and they owe this 
tolerance, openness and their rights to the liberal, democratic Western states. Therefore, they 
should support their national and military campaigns against terrorist others. The homonationalist 
discourse has justified the exclusion of others and incited racism toward (im)migrants and 
particularly Muslims that are portrayed as homophobic, uncivilized and barbaric.755 In "Sexuality 
and Integration: A Case of Gay Iranian Refugee's Collective Memories and Integration Practices 
in Canada",756 Ahmad Karimi shows that although Canada is a multicultural society, which as a 
model of policy and practice, emphasizing the integration of differences with the goal of social 
inclusion and cohesion, racism is a part of, and inherent to, the Canadian nation-state. In this 
context, Iranian hamjensgara/gay men are "generally sexualized, racialized, and marginalized 
within Canadian gay communities". For example, one participant says, "I feel like they [Canadian] 
want me, sorry, but only for a one-night stand because I'm darker, I know they say I'm exotic". He 
continues "I feel wanted, for sex, but not for anything more. They have their own friends and 
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communities and I do not think I have any place there". Another participant who had worked at a 
gay club recounts that he was "hit on by white Canadian gay men only to be later insulted by them 
through racial slurs such as camel rider and terrorist". These stories echo in the narratives of other 
participants. One participant says "I was on Grinder for a while, and you do not know how many 
times they told me to go back and bomb my own country as soon as they realized I was Iranian".757 
These narratives come along with experiences of Iranian hamjensgara/gay asylum seekers who 
are faced with assimilationist impulses and essentialist violence that are set by some human rights 
and UNHCR's offices (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) in Turkey. In the article 
"The Queer Time of Death: Temporality, Geopolitics, and Refugee Rights",758 Sima Shakhsari, 
through ethnographic data from interviews with Iranian LGBTQI+ refugee applicants in Turkey, 
points to "inconsistencies in the universality of human rights" and argues that "while the 
designation of an act as a violation of human rights committed by states or citizens, is arbitrary 
and contingent on the place and time of the act, the recognition of the refugee in the human rights 
regimes relies on essentialist and timeless notions of identity that travel in the teleological time of 
progress". She explains that the UNHCR in Turkey processes the LGBTQI+ cases faster and with 
a low rate of rejection. This has made the reputation of asylum based on sexual orientation as a 
golden case but prone to allegations of fraud. For this reason, UNHCR staff cross-examine refugee 
applicants to assess the 'authenticity' of their sexual identities, in this context, their 
hamjensgarai/gayness. The measure that has been applied for the credibility of an applicants' claim 
is based on "the authenticity of their sexual identity" and the "country profile (the accumulated 
knowledge about human rights violations in the applicant's home country)". Shakhsari criticizes 
the normative notions of sexuality, gender and desire by which human rights organizations assess 
the authenticity and rightfulness of gay refugee applicants. For example, she points to one of these 
organizations, "ORAM [Organization for Refugee, Asylum, and Migration] a refugee rights 
organization, [that] relies on the UNHRC's interpretation of membership in a particular social 
group." Shakhsari writes that "membership in a particular social group is interested in the UNHCR 
as either sharing a characteristic that is 'immutable or so fundamental to human dignity that [one] 
should be compelled to forsake it' or 'a characteristic which makes a group cognizable or sets it 
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apart from society at large. The characteristic will often be one which is innate, unchangeable, or 
which is otherwise fundamental to identity, conscience, or the exercise of one's human rights'." 
Then ORAM explains that "gay men have the immutable characteristic of being sexually and 
emotionally attracted to men, and lesbians to women". This "assumption of refugee's immutability" 
is problematic because it ignores the conditions and multiple and complex subjectivities of 
applicants (for example, due to some complexities that come from family pressure or society 
norms, some gay men are married to a woman and some lesbians have children from a heterosexual 
marriage). Therefore, this "immutable characteristic" is not applicable and valid criteria for all 
refugee applicants' various narratives and conditions. On this account, Shakhsari argues that the 
assumption of refugees' immutability produces "essentialist juridical discourses" to reduce 
applicants' narratives,  “conditions, and multiple and complex subjectivities to rational and linear 
definitions to match the acceptable immutable identity” by defined human rights regimes.759  
        Besides reifying essentialist notions of sexual identity, some of these organizations measure 
the authenticity of applicants' gayness through their claims for a "well-founded fear of 
persecution". These organizations "often consider sexuality in Iran to be backward, repressed, and 
in need of liberation". Therefore, they accept and support those whom they consider authentic gay 
individuals with “immutable characteristics” and fear of persecution in the homophobic state. 
However, the stories of Iranian refugees for leaving their country are a lot more nuanced (as 
already mentioned such as pressure from the family or society) than the usual, hegemonic narrative 
of leaving homophobic Iran for a gay utopia in the West. Therefore, Iranian hamjensgara/gay 
applicants often "repeat stories that inevitably demonize the home-country".  For example, Pejman, 
a Shakhsari's participant, who passed the UNHCR refugee test, says that: 
I left because I was fed up with the situation in Iran. I knew that you could become 
a refugee for being gay. Many of my friends had left. I didn't have problems with 
the state for being gay. So, I made up a story in my interview, just to make sure 
that the UN would not reject me. But it doesn't mean that I didn't have a good 
reason to leave. In fact, the way that this [the economic situation in Iran] is going, 
all 70 million Iranians have legitimate cases to become refugees.  
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The recognition of refugees in what Shakhsari calls "human rights regimes" works to "erase 
difference (thus universalizing sexual identities) while emphasizing difference (third world versus 
the first world).” These facts, which are based on the real lives of Iranian gays and queers, show 
that Massad's thesis is not totally wrong, particularly with regards to the issue of "Western LGBT 
solidarity politics" and some (of course not all, as I have claimed that LGBTQI+'s politics is a 
fractious space) human rights and LGBTQI+ organizations that have an essentialist and 
assimilationist agenda. However, the same facts simultaneously reveal the agency and 
transformative capacity of Iranian gay identifying men who, despite being faced with many 
impediments and difficulties such as discrimination, racism, having limited or no access to 
financial support, consistent harassment from local people and work and housing discrimination,760 
still struggle for their sexual self-determination. Moreover, in contrast to Massad’s claim that those 
non-heterosexual Middle Easterners who identify themselves as gay belong to privileged classes, 
I have shown that most of the participants in these researches came from the low or middle classes 
of society. I have also tried to show that these identifying hamjensgara/gay men are most 
concerned about the question of sexual identity and articulating localized Iranian gayness, and for 
doing this, they have chosen, depending on their social positions and geographical locations, 
different forms of resistance and activism from those of the West in order to navigate their 
identities within the restrictions set by the government, family and society. This shows that Iranian 
hamjensgara/gay men themselves are a heterogeneous group and therefore, in depicting the picture 
of gay life in Iran, their different embodied actions and experiences inside Iran and their different 
resistive strategies and activism within the limits of homophobia and the harassment of Iranian 
state and society should be taken into consideration. However, this picture is at odds with the 
discourses of victimization produced both by Massad and some LGBTQI+ groups and 
organizations. They both, not in the same manner, ignore the agency of Iranian gay men. While, 
for Massad, a non-heterosexual Middle Eastern man, and particularly in this context, an Iranian 
man who expresses his sexual differences in the form of LGBT identities, is a victim of colonial 
imposition and of the universalizing claims of Gay International, for some human rights and 
LGBTQI+ organizations, Iranian gay men are victims of their society and in the need of liberation 
through Western gay movements.  
                                                          
760Ibid.  
 




As I have reconstructed in the first theoretical part, Rereading Foucault, Rethinking Sexuality, 
Foucault claims that homosexuality is the result of a ‘historical evolution’ specifically inscribed in 
nineteenth-century Europe and produced through a proliferation of discourses. A crucial 
component of Foucault’s assertions about the historical transformation of ‘deviant’ sexual 
behaviors (or sodomy) into homosexual identification was the vision that sexual identities are the 
products of the dispositif of sexuality developed in the discourses that spun out the new disciplines 
and sciences of the modern period, such as biology, psychology, sociology, and anthropology.761 
In other words, he attempts to show that sexual categories of homosexuality and heterosexuality 
are historical constructions that are intimately bound up with ‘modernity’ and ‘modern regimes of 
power’. By drawing on Foucault's method, in part two, Modernity and Transformation of Same-
Sex Relations into Gay Identity, I have shown that the emergence of homosexuality in Iran is also 
a ‘historical evolution’ produced through discursive practices. This thesis has provided a 
Foucauldian genealogical account of this historical discursive construction regarding the 
transformation of same-sex relations into gay identity in Iran before and after starting 
modernization in the nineteenth century until the present.  
          At the same time, in contrast to Foucault, who sees modernity through a Eurocentric 
vision,762 I have taken a critical position toward its Western narrative. By redefining and rethinking 
the notion of modernity with authors like Homi K. Bhabha, Dilip Gaonkar, and Sanjay 
Subrahmanyam,  I have adopted a globally interconnected understanding of it, which is grounded 
on the process of cultural hybridization and diversification.763 By taking this approach, I have 
realized that there has always been a historical tension between modernity and tradition in Iran 
since the nineteenth century. This tension has been a crucial and pivotal component in the cultural 
and social development of modern Iranian society. In other words, Iranian modernity, by using 
Joseph R. Gusfield’s words, is an “admixture of tradition and modernity” 764 in which each drives 
a degree of support from the other, rather than being considered as merely a clash of opposites. 
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Moreover, Iranian modernity is not constituted spontaneously. Instead, it is a ‘hybrid space of 
shared practices’ and ‘mimicries’ between Europe’s and Iran’s cultural-historical experiences and 
dispositions. As Tavakoli Targhi argues, while Europeans constructed the “modern self in relation 
to their non-Western others” (including Iranians), Iranians began to experience the formation of 
modernity's ethos in relation to their Western others.765 In nineteenth-century Iran, this ‘admixture 
of tradition and modernity’ as well as identification with European modernity and scientific 
rationality served for both disassociation with the ‘dominant Arabo-Islamic culture’ and the 
‘building of a modern nation-state and national identity’ grounded on the reconstruction of ‘pre-
Islamic traditions’.766  
         Within this hybridized and cultural grafting construction of Iranian modernity, and by 
drawing on the Western discourse of sexuality and nationalist impulses, the nineteenth-century 
Iranian elites proposed a modern gender discourse in which ‘heterosocial spaces’ and 
‘heterosexualization of eros’ were represented as the markers of modernity and progress. This 
discursive move prepared the ground for the state to recast the traditional same-sex relations and 
gender segregation as the signs of backwardness belonging to the Arabo-Islamic culture. In other 
words, the nationalists’ advocacy for modern gender norms was a regulatory discourse on the 
individual and social body that was linked not to the modern sciences, as happened in the 
nineteenth-century West, but rather to the nationalist discourses regarding the establishment of the 
modern nation-state and national identity. However, not unlike the West, in nineteenth-century 
Iran, gender and sexuality served as sites of social engineering and governmentality by which 
Iranian elites and the state were able to establish a society’s normative grid of intelligibility in the 
name of modernity. This historical account––regarding the recasting of same-sex relations as 
backward and heterosexuality as modern and ideal––was the first step toward the constitution of 
an Iranian gay identity. 
           The second step coincided with the Islamic Republic's establishment in 1979 when 
admixture of Iranian tradition and modernity and its dialogue with the West in a hybrid space were 
used to create the Islamic-Iranian nation-state and identity. Before the Islamic regime’s 
establishment, there was a rise of Islamism in society—a shift from the hybridity of modernity 
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with pre-Islamic traditions to the hybrid of modernity with the Islamic cultures and values.  During 
the 1960s and 1970s, by romanticizing and idealizing the Islamic past, members of the Islamist 
intelligentsia, such as Al-Ahmad and Shariati, proposed returning to the Islamic roots as the only 
remaining defense against the harm of Western invasion. After its establishment, the Islamic 
regime constituted itself as a religious biopolitical dispositif, capable of interpolating new subjects 
through deploying modern sciences such as psychology and psychiatry. In this context, in line with 
the notion of ‘the will not to know’ and the discourse of gharbzadeghi and toxic West, the Islamic 
state depicts homosexuality as a deviancy or a foreign element that—contrary to nineteenth-
century elites who located it in the domain of Arabo-Islamic cultures—belongs to the Western 
values and lifestyle. The aim of the Islamic state, the same as nineteenth-century European states, 
is to create homosexuality as a category of person in lieu of a deviant act. In this official discourse, 
homosexuals are depicted as those who have bodies that are not reproductive, who threaten the 
well-being of the general population, and who oppose Islamic culture. Furthermore, they are 
considered as an existential threat to the regime’s gender binary that challenges “the established 
definition of correspondence between sex, gender and sexual orientation.”767 The process of 
regulating homosexuality occurs through both medical power that led to the pathologization of 
homosexuality and juridico-legal power that labeled homosexuality as a capital crime under the 
Islamic state’s rules.768 According to the biopolitical state's logic, homosexuality should be 
eliminated or normalized with surgery as a heterosexual form of transsexuality.769 
         While the historical evolution of Iranian gayness in the first step deals with nineteenth-
century modernization and state consolidation and the second step with the Islamic regime's use 
of modern technology of power; in the third step, Iranian gay men themselves participated in the 
construction of their own sexual beings. This third step took place in the 1980s and during the 
politico-social liberalization of the1990s that provided broad access to the internet and brought the 
discourse of human rights to Iran. During this period, Iranian gay men tried to transform 
themselves in a Foucauldian sense within the limit of their own subjugation to express their 
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resistant voices. Following Jòn Ingvar Kjaran’s research, I have divided their resistance in two 
categories: community organizing and non-formal outreach work770 or individualistic resistance. 
Regarding community organizing, Iranian gay activists and scholars published magazines and 
articles through which they did the following: they criticized both leftists and religious thinkers’ 
silence toward the violation of gay men’s human rights; they proposed a more tolerated reading of 
the Qur’an with regards to diversity in gender and sexuality, and they contributed to the raising 
public awareness regarding the diversity of sexual identifications and orientations. More 
importantly, they produced new terminology with two goals in mind: to replace stigmatizing words 
(kuni, evakhahr, and hamjensbaz) with positive terms such as hamjensgara (same-sex 
identification and orientation), and to redefine and localize the Western notion of gayness in the 
Persian language and culture. I have considered this recent attainment as a creative resistance 
against both the hegemonic Western understanding of sexual identity and the dominant legal-
religious discourse of the Islamic Republic that represents gayness as a Western trope of invasion 
and gays as non-authentic Iranians.771 In non-formal outreach work, Iranian hamjensgarayan/gays 
position themselves as active agents in taking care of their self to resist the dominant norms in 
their religious-social environments through their embodiment and actions. To make their lives 
meaningful, to go on dates, and to spend time with their boyfriends, they employ different 
strategies such as making underground communities of support, leaving the country and making 
new families of their choice. Iranian hamjensgarayan/gays are aware that they are not officially 
recognized as a category of person. On this account, they do not ‘come out of the closet’, in the 
Western sense of the term, because they are aware that they cannot seek out any recognition and 
rights neither from society nor from the government. In this context, they come out only to their 
parents, siblings, and close friends by defining themselves in their language through the term 
hamjensgara to attach their sexuality and identification to a sense of “commitment, responsibility, 
morality, and enduring emotions”.772 
         My analysis of the historical evolution of Iranian hamjensgaran/gays, their agentic self, and 
resistance aims to answer the discourses of victimization produced by Joseph Massad and some 
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LGBTQI+ groups and human rights organizations. As I have argued in part two, some LGBTQI+ 
groups and human rights organizations depict Iranian hamjensgarayan/gays just as sexually 
oppressed victims who are in need of being saved by the liberal and gay-friendly West from their 
homophobic Islamic-Iranian state. With respect to these groups and organizations’ efforts to 
condemn the Islamic Republic’s violation of the sexual minorities’ human rights, I have shown 
that their discourse has been produced through a one-dimensional perspective where the 
victimization of Iranian hamjensgarayan/gays is hypervisible while their agentic self is not taken 
into consideration. Massad directs his attack toward the imperialist and orientalist impulses of the 
same organizations, but while criticizing them, he also produces a victimization discourse within 
which non-heterosexuals in the Middle East are depicted as victims who blindly adopted the 
Western sexual identity categories. Massad agrees with Foucault about the evolution of 
homosexuality and considers it as a dispositif produced in the intersection of power, knowledge 
and discourse; however, while Foucault’s concept of homosexuality is a ‘historical evolution’ that 
emerged in nineteenth-century Europe, Massad uses the concept of gayness in the colonial settings 
within which Gay International in the name of saving Middle Eastern sexual minorities from their 
societies, export and impose the Western dispositif of sexuality to produce and universalize 
Western sexual identity categories. In contrast to Massad, I have shown that Iranian 
hamjensgaragai/gayness is neither an imposition of colonialism nor of Gay International. Rather, 
it is a result of a historical evolution produced through nationalist discourses of the nineteenth 
century, the Islamic regime’s use of modern technologies of regulations, and 
hamjensgarayan’s/gays’ agency and transformation capacity. Therefore, “homosexualization” 
should not be represented as a “one-dimensional continuation of colonialism in contemporary 
times”;773 instead, we should consider that the social forces and historical events that have 
produced modern homosexuality are spreading throughout the world—in other words, homosexual 
identity has been developed in a global communication wherein preventing the transmission of 
ideas and influences is impossible. Moreover, an individual’s sexual self-determination should not 
be ignored. We cannot see gay identity or the adaptation of the Western notion of gayness simply 
as an effect of neocolonial imposition or as having complicity with imperialist norms and 
expectations. By drawing on Abouzar Nasirzadeh, Ahmad Karimi and Jón Ingvar Kjaran, I have 
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shown that since the 1990s, the English term ‘gay’  has been used as the self-identification by the 
majority of local homosexual men in post-revolutionary Iran.774 As argued by Nasirzadeh, 
“identifying by using ‘gay’, is not only an important part of their identity but for some, it was the 
main marker of their identity and not just merely a sexual practice”.775 Moreover, I have shown 
that besides the English term ‘gay’, since 2000s, the new Persian terminology, hamjensgara, has 
been used not only as a self-identification but also as an ethical and creative activity for localization 
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